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1.

SUMMARY:

These appeals arise from a declaratory

judgment action challenging the constitutionality of the Federal
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C.
§§

1201-1328.
2.

FACTS & PROCEEDINGS:

Appellanm in No . 79-1596

(appellees in Nos. 79-1538 and 79-1567) are a voluntary

~ssociation

of coal producers engaged in .surface coal mining

operations in Virginia;

t~mvn

c:]:J: ommonwealth of Virginia.
the Association and

l,.

of Wise, Virginia; and the

Along with 63 coal company members of

individual landovmers, appellants filed

suit in the DC W.D. Virginia against the Secretary of the Interior,
(

seeking a declaratory judgment that the surface mining act was unconstitutional and an injunction against its enforcement.

Plain-

tiffs argued that the Act was beyond the scope of the commerce
power and that it violated

Equa~

proportionate economic impact in

Protection because of its dis~

south~ves

t Virg inia, the Tenth

Amendment because it usurped the "integral governmental function"
of land use regulation, the Just Compensation Clause because of
the restrictions imposed, and the Due Process Clause because it did
not provide for a hearing before the imposition of civil penalties
and cessation orders.

Appellants in No. 79-1567 intervened as

defendants; they are a citizens' group and the Town of St. Charles,
Virginia.
The Act provides for a two-tiered regulatory structure .
The interim regulatory phase, now in effect, is based on federally
promulgated performance standards

fm~

restoration of land to the

- 2 original condition, segregation and stabilization of topsoil,
water quality, coal mine waste piles, use of explosives, revegetation, and spoil disposal.

§

515(b).

The Secretary is

responsible for enforcing the interim regulations, but states
that actively assist in the enforcement shall be granted financial
reimbursemento

State-issued permits for interim operations must

1/

conform to the federal performance standards.The second stage of enforcement depends on permanent
regulations promulgated by the Secretary but implemented by either
a state or federal enforcement program.

Any state interested in

assuming permanent regulatory authority over surface coal mining
within the State must submit to the Secretary a proposed program
demonstrating that the State environmental protection laws and
regulations will implement the federal standards and that the State
can and will enforce them.
ed program.

The Secretary must approve each propos-

The Secretary

Vi~tedo

(All but three coal-mining states submitted

plans, but the Secretary has acted on only two of them o)

In addi··

tion, the Secretary must develop a federal implementation program
for the States that fail to submit or enforce a satisfactory state

2/

program.

!./

Portions of the interim regulations have been challenged in
the DDC. Some of the enforcement provisions at issue here were
attacked in that litigation and upheld. The appeal to CA DC was
argued June 5, 1979. ·

'!:.I

Litigation on certain of the permanent regulations is underway
in the DDC.

- 3 -

Enforcement includes cessation orders issued under
§ 521 without

upon a showing of

11

imminent

danger to the health or safety of the public" or "signif i cant,
immediate environmental harm to land, air, or water resources."
There is an automatic civil penalty which must be paid into
escrm.v before the operator may contest either the order or the
penalty amount.

(By regulation, the operator may request a

conference prior to payment into escrow.)

A hearing must be held

prior to a final order of payment; and if return of the penalty
is necessary, it is made with interest.
A violation notice may be issued upon a lesser showing
of danger than is required for a cessation order.
I ~..-_....

is allowed up to 90 days for compliance.

The ope rator

There are daily penalties

for continued violations, and a cessation order may follov;r noncompliance.
Once the order or notice is issued, the operator has
30 days to apply to the Secretary for reviewo

The Secretary has

another 30 days to conduct a hearing and render a written decision .
An action for judicial review in federal district court follows
wit bin another 30 days o Alternatively, a cessation order vJill expire if no hearing is held within 30 days at or near the mine site.
The operator may also petition for temporary relief from a cessation order or violation notice.

The Secretary must render a deci-

sion within 5 days on a cessation order and "ex peditiously" on a
violation notice.
granted.

.;

A hearing must be held before relief can be

Judicial review is provided •

- 4 -

(

In February 1979, following a hearing on plaintiff's
motion for a preliminary injunction, the DC enjoined the
Secretary from enforcing§§ 502-522 of the Act, the principal
regulatory and enforcement provisions.

CA 4 reversed, finding

that the DC had applied an incorrect standard.

While that

ap ~

peal was pending, the DC held a 13-day trial and subsequently
granted plaintiffs a permanent injunction against certain portions
of the Act.
The court rejected the Commerce Clause challenge, which
was based on the regulation of private,' nonfederal land.

The

court stated that it must defer to the congressional finding in
§ 101 of the Act that surface coal mining has adverse effects on
commerce.

The court further found that Congress bad a real and

substantia.l,rational basis for enacting surface mining legislation
to protect commerce and the national interest.

Congress would

-

therefore be limited only by other express provisions of the Constitution.

The court also rejected on the Equal Protection and

substantive due process challenges, .and they are not in issue in
this Court.
The court held, however, that the Act "displace[d] the
~

States' freedom to structure integral operations in
traditional governmental functions,

reas of

National League of Cities,

426 U.s. [833,] 852," and therefore violated the Tenth Amendment.
In particular, the court found that the requirement that steep
slopes be returned to approximate original contour was not environmentally sound, did not serve the interests of the federal

- 5 -

government, and was so burdensome on the Commonwealth as
to threaten its economy.

Finding also that the federal

government would not be harmed by the permanent injunction,
the court therefore enjoined enforcement of the· steep slope
standards of§ 515(d) and (e).

Other provisions that in-

fringed on the traditional governmental function, such as
proximity to cemeteries, control of blasting, and establishment
of sediment ponds, "while offensive," were not so burdensome
to the State as to threaten its economy or affect its land use
planning functions; and their enforcement would not be enjoined.
In a supplemental memorandum) the DC clarified its order to
state that the injunction against § 515(d) should not be construed to allow the placement of spoil on downhill slopes, except
in accordance with the federal standards.
/

The court also held that § 515(d) and (e) violated the

{Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

The facts of

the case put it on all fours with Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393 (1922).

Again, because it was economically and

physically impossible to comply with the steep-slope reclamation
provisions~

the requirements effectively prohibited mining and

resulted in a physical property restriction, a nearly complete
diminution in the value of the land, as well as loss of future
profits.

Section 522, _which prohibits mining within a certain

proximity to houses, public buildings, schools, churches, community buildings, parks, or cemeteries, was similarly unconsti.tutional.

Enforcement was enjoined until such time as the federal

government smv fit to obtain the land by eminent domain and payment of compensation .

- 6 I

(

Finally, the court expressly rejected certain contrary
conclusions of the DDC and held that certain of the Act's enforcerncnt provisions violated due process.

The court found that

inspectors had issued unjustified and arbitrary cessation orders,
causing irreparable harm to the mining companies, because they
were making subjective decisioas.

Accordingly, the court enjoined

the issuance of orders under § 521 without a prior hearing "until
such· time as Congress [made] provisions to correct the use of
subjective criteria."

With more objective guidelines, the Act

would provide adequate due process guarantees for summary administxative action with the exception of the 5-day reply provision
of § 525(c) for action on the oper~tor's application for temporary
relief.

The court would allow only 24 hours and enjoined§ 525.

The civil penalty provisions of § 518 were enjoined because of the
imposition of penalties for violations "prior to an adjudication
of fault."

Summary imposition of penalties would be allowed if

temporary relief were available.

The Secretary should be required

to act under § 525(c) within 24 hours and not merely expeditiously.
And judicial review under § 526(c) should be available for violation notices as well as cessation orders.

In a supplemental

opinion, the court stated that§§ 518, 521, and 525 were enjoined
only insofar as they related to summary issuance of cessation
orders and civil penalties, which could be issued or imposed only
in accordance with the court's prior opinion.

The court stated

that the order did not affect issuance of violation notices under
§

521 or their review under § 525.

- 7 3.

CONTENTIONS:
----(a)

No. 79-1538 . . The SG argues that
~

Sections 515(d) and (e) do not violate the

Tenth Amendment.

National League of Cities does not apply

because the Act regulates only coal mine operators not States;
the States are not required to expend any funds or enforce the
Act (although they are encouraged to assume enforcement).
Moreover, regulation of coal mining is not an integral governmental function protected by the Tenth Ame ndment.

The land use

consequences are minimal because the purpose of the Act is a
return of the land to the original condition, and the States are
then free to exercise their full powers over the land.

Finally,

Congress made findings contrary to the DC's conclusion that the
steep-slope requirements were economically infeasible and physically
impossible; and in any event, economic impact does not give rise
to a Tenth Amendment violation.
Response:

The motion to affirm calls specious the

SG ' s contention that the Act regulates only coal mine operators and
not states.

The Act regulates by usurping the regulatory powers of

the States over land use.

The motion otherwise relies on the DC's

decision.
(b)

The takings questions under § 515 ( d) and 522(e)

are not ripe for decision because there is no particular piece of
property involved.

On the merits, the SG argues that Congress found

the § 515 techniques feasible and practical; and given that the Act
serves a substantial public purpose, the only Fifth Amendment ques tion is whether the regulation prevents any beneficial use of

- 8 property.

Use of the property, even mining, and even surface

mining is not prohibited; it is only regulated.

Section 522 is

expressly made subject to valid existing rights; and the prohibitions do not prevent underground miningo
Response:

The SG's contention that the issues are

not ripe is frivolous.

Plaintiffs demonstrated to the DC that

they had property interests in lands subject to the Act and that
the Act prevented them from surface mining their coal.

The motion

othexwise relies on the decision below.
(c)

The due process rulings are premature.

plaintiff received a cessation order or civil penalty.

No
In any

event, neither provision invalidated amounts to a denial of due
process.

First, emergency action under § 52l(a)(2) is

where personal ·
damage likely.
procedure as a
found.

appropriat~

harm is imminent or significant en.vironment:a 1
More particular

~.vhole

the standard cannot be, and the

is adequate, as the DDC and the SD Iowa have

Second, the DC misunderstood § 518 by confusing the actual

assessment of a penalty and the initial notice to the operator of
the proposed amount of the penalty.

Only the latter precedes a

hearing, and even it follows a conference.

The escrow requirement

is a reasonable solution to the problem of nonpayment of fines.
[Note:

The SD Iowa found a substantial likelihood that it violated

due process.]

In a footnote, the SG states that the reduction of

the Secretary's reply time on the application for temporary relief is
an undisguised substitution of the court's judgment.

- 9 -

Response.:

A pre-sanction hearing is required

because of the substantial operator interests at stake.
Their interests include working capital, so the requirement
of prepayment of penalties is unconstitutional.
No. 79-1567.

Appellants' arguments do not differ

significantly from the SG 's.
No. 79-1596.

Appellants urge the Court to take

the case, including the questions not otherwise appealable,
as a wholeo

Accordingly, appellants argue that the Act exceeds

the authority of Congress to regulate interstate

In

con~erce.

contrast to other. mining legislation, the Act is directed not
to the "commerce" aspects of surface mining but entirely to the
land use aspectso

Appellants contend that the Court has never

held, nor even intimated, that land as such is subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause.

They argue that the Act thus

presents the question whether regulation is a genuine exercise
of the commerce power or is simply a cloak for assumption of
federal control of land use functions and police powers not
heretofore recognized under the commerce powero
brief on behalf of eight States
in support of appellants.
The SG relies on § 101 of the Act: and asserts that
there is a rational basis for the findings that surface mining
affects commerce.

Thus the judicial inquiry is c.omplete.

In

any event, there is no basis for appellants' distinction between

- 10 the concededly permissible regulation of mining operations
and the allegedly improper regulation of aspects of land use.
The decision below should be affirmed to the extent that it
upholds the Act under the Commerce Clause.
4.

DISCUSSION:

The DC held significant portions of

the federal legislation unconstitutional; accordingly, probable
jurisdiction should be noted in No. 79 -1538.

No. 79-1567 pre-

sents the same issues, but a response should be called for first.
Given Congress' findings that energy production in general and
surface mining in particular affect interstate commerce, findings
that would not seem to be significantly different from those upon
which other environmental legislation is based, the Commerce
Clause issue appears to be correctly decidedo

Yet it might be

more efficient to accept the issue as presented in No. 79-1596
as well because the DC seemed almost to ignore these same findings
in dealing with the Tenth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment issues.
There are motions to affirm in Nos. 79-1538 and 79-1596.
There

is~

6/11/80

response in No. 79-1567.
Solomon

Opinion in
Jurisdic tional
Statement in
No. 79-1538

ME

3/
Appellants seem limited to seeking review by appeal to this
Court. See' 2~ 28 U.S.C. § 1252; and see§ 1254, which provides
for cert only to theCA 's, to which appellants could not go .::tft:er.
the SG filed his appeal. The alternative to "noting" tbe "appeal 11
would be to affirm.

3/
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FROM:

RE:

Question Presented
Two of
being

argued

in

these

cases

are

consolidated;

tandem

with

the

other

two.

the
In

third

each

is

case,

States and mining interests contend that certain aspects of the
Surface

Mining

Control

and

Reclamation

Act

unconstitutional under a variety of theories.

of

1977

are

.

q~
~~~~ot-~_!~~~~~A:!.~~
~~~ ~ ~ d'-~4;nl---T~,~~

~~-

~~~d~.;

·'

2.

Background
These

consolidated

cases

involve

scattershot

constitutional attacks on Congress' 1977 strip mining law.
set

of

cases

involves

suits

by

Virginia

interests [I discern no recusal problem];
by Indiana and its mining interests.

and

its

One

mining

the other is a suit

The issues in the cases

are remarkably similar, so I address them in one memo.
The

statute

is Congress'

attempt to remedy some of

the abuses that it perceived in strip mining.
substantive

provisions

of

the

Act

require

company do no permanent damage to the land
extracting

coal.

Two

particular

this case 0

one is the "stee_p slope"

The principal

that

the

mining

in the course of

provisions

p~sion.

are

relevant

in

It essentially

~......,

requires the land to be restored to its original contour after
The Virginia parties are primarily concerned

coal is removed.

with this aspect of the law.

----

farmlands."

It

permits

The other provision

mining

of

coal

on

co~ "prime
----

such

land,

but

requires that the fertile soil be preserved and replaced, and

I

'
~
--------------------------------------farming resumed, when mining is completed. The Indiana parties

-----------

object primarily to this aspect.
Although
different

the

portions

essentially

parties

of

the

identical.

law,
The

from

the

their

two
legal

statute

is

that

Congress

states

attack

theories
said

to

are
be

unconstitutional because:
(A)

it

governs

through the Commerce power;

matters

cannot

reach

3.

(B)

it violates powers reserved to the States by the

lOth Amendment,

National League of Cities v.

Usery,

u.s.

426

833;
(C)

it violates equal protection and substantive due

process (Indiana parties only);
(D) it is a "taking" without just compensation;
(E) its enforcement mechanisms violate procedural due
process.

Discussion
There is little need to review the background of the
well-known constitutional theories under which appellants hope
to prevail.

I 1 11 therefore

than summarizing

all

turn to their arguments.

the arguments party-by-party,

Rather

I 1 11 deal

with them issue-by-issue.
A.

Commerce Power
1.

linking

-

this

found that:

United States:
statute

to

Congress made explicit findings
11.....

its power

to

regulate

'-l

commerce.

~-----------------------------------

many surface mining operations result in
disturbances of surface areas that burden
and
adversely affect commerce and the
public welfare by destroying or diminishing
the
utility
of
land
for
commercial,
industrial,
residential,
recreational,
agricultural, and forestry purposes, by
causing
erosion
and
landslides,
by
contributing to floods, by polluting the
water, by destroying fish and wildlife
habitats, by impairing natural beauty, by
damaging the property of
citizens,
by
creating hazards dangerous to life and
property by degrading the quality of life
in local communities, and by counteracting

It

4.
governmental
programs
and
efforts
to
conserve soil, water, and other natural
resources.
[Moreoever,]
surface
mining
and
reclamation
standards
are
essential
in
order
to
ensure
that
competition in interstate commerce among
sellers of
coal produced in different
States will not be used to undermine the
ability of the several States to improve
and maintain adequate standards on coal
mining operations within their borders.
If there is a rational basis supporting Congress'

belief that

the regulated activity affects commerce, the Court must
Heart

of

(1964).

Atlanta Motel

v.

United States,

In

it

is plain that Congress

this

case,

U.S.

379

defer. ~~

241,

258

rationally

tnA-

~

could find that strip mining and its incidents affect commerce.

~----------------------------------------------------------------While
it is true that the states typically enjoy substantial
power to

use, that does not mean that Congress,

regul~te ~ d

if it chooses, can preempt a portion of that power.
A.

2.
land use.

This

Challengers:

-

is

a

regulation

of

district

co~F found

commerce. ~

Land itself is not in

that,

"while

the

Act

ultimately

. e f f ect 1s
.
affects the coal mine operator, t;2e-l-~
1ts pervas1ve
on t h e
States'

5~f

~~

This is the sort of subject matter that historically _ ~

has been regulated by States.
The

statute

legislative

authority

and

on State

control

of

~

land

within its boundaries."

3.

My

reaction:

I

think

argument by the States is frivol q us.
which

struck

down

major

Commerce Clause argument.

portions

the

Commerce

Clause

Even the district court,
of

the

law,

rejected

It was settled

long

ago

that

that

it

deems

important.

Some

of

the

~

~

the ~

the ~

Commerce Clause permits Congress to regulate in virtually any
sphere

~

~A---

~

congressional

··-

5.
"findings" fairly might be characterized as "boilerplate," but
the

law

is

clear

implausible,

that

are

such

recitations,

sufficient

to

unless

withstand

completely

Commerce

Clause

difficulties.
B.

~

Tenth Amendment

Unite~Stater National

1.

Usery,
law

supra,

that

is the leading case.

"significantly

:

League

of

Cities

v.

It struck down a federal

altered

or

displaced

the

States'

abilities to structure employer-employee relationships in such
areas

as

fire

prevention,

police

protections,

sanitation,

public health, and parks and recreation," which are activities
typically

"performed

discharging
law

their dual

furnishing

and

-

contrast,

by

the

state

functions

public

mining

and

local

governments

of administering
In

services."

restrictions

not

are

this

mining

can

be

deemed

an

at

by
the

Regulation of ( 4A- ~

------------------------------~-----hardly

public

case,

directed

States, but rather solely at private activities.
coal

the

in

"integral

governmental

~

function."

As Justice Blackmun noted in his crucial

concurring~

opinion

National

"does

in

League

of

Cities,

that

case

not ~

outlaw federal power in areas such as environmental protection, ~
where

the

true

that

federal
the

interest

strip

is

mining

demonstrably greater."
law

i~=~!~~

does

It also is true

restrictions on land use.

It

that

land

something typically controlled by local governments.

is

impose
use

is

But that

does not mean that Congress cannot preempt the power of local
governments

to

remedy

a

perceived

constitutional magic associated with

evil.
the

There

subject

"land

is

no

use."

t.

.•

6

The States argue,
specific

local

provision,

§

--.,......

infra,

for

problems.

515 (d),

0

the need for local solutions to
The

law

includes

a

variance

if the basic statutory requirements are

unnecessary or unwise in particular cases.
The States also argue that there are "less intrusive
means"
mining.
means"

that

Congress

could

have

chosen

This argument misses the point.
requirement

is

applicable

where

in

regulating

The "less intrusive
suspect

disadvantaged or fundamental rights infringed.
of

economic

regulation,

however,

there

strip

is

classes

are

In the sphere

no constitutional

requirement that Congress tailor its legislation narrowly.

The

States interests are represented in the national legislature.
It is there that the States should make their objection to the
scope of the Act.
2.

Challengers:

There is no more integral function

of local government than land use regulation.
vary from place
nationwide

to place,

rule.

Thus,

Land conditions

and it is impossible to develop a

regulating

land

is

truly one

of

the

fundamental "attributes of sovereignty" retained by the States.
In

Virginia,

for

example,

the

federal

law

makes

no

sense

because it requires backfilling the mined land to its original
contour.

As the district court found, much land in Virginia is

naturally so steep that it is useless in its original contour.
Ideally, after land has been strip-mined, it could be levelled
and

filled

to

make

it

susceptible

to

some

productive

use.

State governments know local problems like this and can adopt
regulations narrowly tailored to the problems of each locality.

..

";

)

7.

The

variance

essentially

provision

irrelevant

suggested

because

by

the

no

circumstances

under

government

is

can

a

variance be granted that dispenses with the need to cover the
"highwall."
The Supreme Court should defer
fact by the district court.

to the

findings

of

5~
~

It found that

~
the
provision
requiring
"return
to
~.f
approximate
original
contour"
for
all
operations, regardless of the condictions,
trf
is the most intrusive practical aspect of
the Act . . . . Virginia is particularly
affected by this legislation because 95% of
he:~~_$
its stri able reserves are located on
s opes in excess o
twenty degree ~ , and,
A.-zlle:£t~~e approx i ma t e original contour
provision comes into play with regard to
almost all of the state's coal reserves . •
[Because of the Act,] the State has
~~~
lost control over the economic development ~ax.~ bJ z.o 0
that
could
take
place
in
southwest
Virginia.
The
Commonwealth
is
being
deprived of its right to dictate whether
this land could be better used for some
other purpose.

1-o

D--e:..

r

to
-ct?f/~

There are less intrusive means available to regulate.
Where, as here, the federal law infringes so substantially on
fundamental
draft

its

state

interests,

legislation

more

Congress

constitutionally

narrowly

to

permit

States

must
to

exercise their traditional land-use control authority.
3.

government.

My

reaction:

I

agree

with

the

federal

This is not a case like National League of Cities.

No fundamental function of local government, such as police

fire protection, is at issue.

Congress, perceiving a

I

J....1/

and ~

problem~

of national scope, found it necessary to legislate nationally.
See its findings of fact, supra.

9~

~

---

It may well be true that the

,,

..

,

"'

8.

law does not work well in some geographic areas.
an

argument

that

should

have

been

made

to

But this is

Congress.

When

Congress paints with a broad brush in legislation with national
import, the Court is not permitted to strike it down because it

~

believes the brush was somewhat too broad as applied in some
cases.
C.

Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process (Indiana) '
United

1.

It

States:

is

true

that

there

are
..-

variance procedures for the "prime farmlands" at issue in
Indiana case.
problem.

no %0
~

th ~

But there is no equal protection or due process ~~

The

standard

of

review

is

for

arbitrariness

or~• ~
t:::L-~

caprice.
not

In the context of economic regulation, Congress need

treat

every

region

of

the

country

It believed that

it was

The ~~

differently.

review ~) · ~

district court misapprehended the nature of judicial
this respect.

necessary to find

an

"overriding national interest," citing Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,
426

u.s.

88

That

(1976).

case

is

inapposite.

Heightened

scrutiny was necessary there because it involved restrictions
on

aliens

by

decisionmaker

an

administrative

is Congress

In

agency.

and there

this

case,

the

is no suspect or quasi-

suspect class.
2.

establishes

v.

Mow

discrimination

of

Challengers:
that

a

unconstitutional

unless

interest."

government

The

Hampton

justified
does

distinction, but hides behind a

by
not

an

Sun Wong,
this

"overriding

even

try

~~

supra,

sort

is

national

to defend

the

"presumption of rationality."

If Indiana had a variance provision, it would not be forced to

~

S(',t?

~

9.

confine

land

to

farming

uses

when other

uses

might

be

more

economical.
3.
correct.

My reaction:

The federal government is plainly

The law must be sustained unless irrational.

There

is no irrationality here, simply because Congress--pressured by
representatives of some localities--saw fit to grant a variance
provision for
kind of

hillside areas.

"input"

that a

Indeed,

this

is precisely the

representative government should hear

and respond to.

D.

Taking Without Compensation

1.
flawed.

United States:

The "taking" argument is deeply

First, there is a threshold problem.

The challengers

identify no particular piece of property that has been taken.

"Taking" cases make clear that the decision in any case
on

"ad

hoc

factual

inquiries"

placed on each

particular

United

444

States,

U.S.

into

parcel
164

of

the

Kaiser

Here,

(1979).

simply say the law on its face is a taking.

the

Aetna

v.

challengers

Agins v. City of

Instead, the taking inquiry

depends heavily on the facts and circumstances of each case.
Even
jurisdictional

if

the

problems,

showing--certainly

none

challengers
there
sui table

is

can

no

for

surmount

taking.
a

facial

There

these
is

attack on

no
the

statute--that landowners are being deprived of all use of their
land.
but

The statute does impose strict environmental standards,
these

were

intended

to

be

technology-forcing.

J

depen~~

Tiburon, --- U.S. --- (1980), indicated that the mere enactment
of a law rarely can be a taking.

-1<...0

restraints ~~

specific

land.

-

Uniform

10.

rules

encourage

industry's

requirements.

feasibility.
findings

production

The

of

equipment

Congress made

district

to the contrary.

court,

after

capable

of

meeting

specific

findings

a

trial,

short

of

made

But these should not overturn the

product of seven years of congressional deliberation.
A taking depends on the character of the government
action and its economic

impact.

full bundle of property rights,
of the bundle is not a taking."

"Where an owner possesses a
the destruction of one strand
Andrus v. Allard, 444

In this case, some uses remain for

(1979).

mining is impossible.

u.s.

51

the land even if

The legislature is not constitutionally

required to permit the owner to make the best economic use out
of land.

Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393

inapposite.

(1922), is

That case was a private injunctive suit based on

regulation

of

specific

property.

In any event,

this case

This

case

is

a

facial

challenge.
is akin to those that have

permitted takings where necessary to abate a public nuisance.
Nothing in Pennsylvania Coal is inconsistent with those cases.
2.

an estate

Challengers:

in land.

If

The ownership of coal interests is

extraction is

prohibited

by statute,

such is a taking under the fifth amendment.

Pennsylvania Coal,

supra.

out

The

testified
The

that most

Indiana

explicitly

Virginia

hillside

challengers
found

challengers

that

that

experts

land is worthless unless mined.

point
the

point

out

that

technology

the

district

required

on

court
prime

---------------------------------------------------------------~
farmlands
was
to achieve.
No mining can

be

..

'

11.

permitted

if

neighboring

land

is

subject

to

"high

level

of

management," because the statute requires the mined land to be
brought up to the yield of the neighboring land.
3.

My reaction:

I think the United States is right,

at least with respect to the threshold question.

It is odd, in

light of their stance on the Tenth Amendment issue,

that the

challengers in effect argue here that the statute is a taking
In their

on its face.

lOth Amendment argument,

the Virginia

parties noted that the propriety of land use regulations turn
heavily on the facts of each case.

They asserted that land use

regulation requires "detailed, terrain-specific inquiry."
however,
that

they seem to take

the

cannot

mere

be

bound.

enactment

right.

Kaiser

the opposite

of

the

Decisions

Aetna,

statute

on

supra.

viewpoint,

takings

is

Moreover,

asserting

taking.

This

inherently

fact-

a

are

Now,

there

has

been

-

no

attempt to exhaust the hillside variance procedure to ascertain

--------~--------'----------------------precisely
what restrictions have been imposed.
supra.

Thus,

because

there

is

no

specific

Cf.

piece

Agins,
of

land

identified to the court that allegedly was "taken," I conclude
that there is no ripe case or controversy on this issue.
E.

Enforcement Procedures

1.

United

enforcement orders.

States:

There

are

kinds

two

of

Routine violations are corrected pursuant

to § 521 (a) (3), in the form of a "notice to abate."

The owner

need take no action until the inspector's initial position is
upheld

after

challenged.

~

...

a
The

hearing.
disputed

This

method

method

of

enforcement

concerns

the

is

issuance

not
by

,~

12.
federal inspectors of an immediate "cessation order" without a
hearing.

Immediate "cessation orders" may

be

issued only if

the inspector determines that a mine is in violation of the Act
or a permit condition, and if the mine
creates an imminent danger to the health or
safety of the public, or is causing, or can
reasonably
be
expected
to
cause
significant, imminent environmental harm to
land, air, or water resources • • • .
Within five days of that order, the mine owner may seek review
of

the

decision

with

the

Secretary

of

the

Interior.

That

decision, in turn, is subject to judicial review.
The United States argues that any challenge to this
system is premature and that, in any event, the system comports
with due process.

It is premature because the complaint does

not allege that any plaintiff has received a summary cessation
order.
turns

The constitutionality of a pre hearing cessation order
heavily on

balancing

the

owner's

public interest in abating hazards.
that balance in the abstract.

interest

against

It is impossible to strike

A court must know precisely the

kind of imminent danger identified by the inspector.
at

trial

did

show

that

one

the

plaintiff,

Corp., did receive one summary order.

the

Evidence

Paramont

Mining

But the record is devoid

of evidence that this order caused any significant financial
loss to Paramont.
Even if the challenge is ripe, the statutory practice
is

constitutional.

hearing

A mine

owner

is

entitled

and both administrative appeals

and

to

a

prompt

judicial

review.

Thus, even though he is forced to shut down in the meantime,

13.

the

infringement

is

relatively

That

brief.

infringement

is

small when weighed against the possibility of imminent risk to
the public welfare.
Similarly, it is constitutional to require that fines
and assessments be prepaid.

Congress identified nonpayment as

a problem that needed resolution.

The system Congress adopted

is constitutional because all money paid is promptly refunded
with interest if no violation is found.
2.
occur

Challengers:

before a shutdown,

fines must be paid.

Due process requires that a hearing
and a

finding of a violation before

With respect to the former,

it is plain

that even a shutdown of a couple of days could irreparably harm
With

a mine owner.
interest
burden

in

of

respect

collecting

prepayment

on

to the

fines

is

the

mine

latter,

weak

in

the

government's

comparison

operator.

to

Deprivation

the
of

capital impairs investment and could cause mine owners to shut
down.
My

3.

government.
challenge

I

reaction:

lean

to

agreement

with

There are serious jurisdictional problems
to

the

prehearing

challengers

failed

to

deprivation.

On the merits,

cessation

allege
I

and

orders

in the

because
any

prove

the

the

specific

think the system of prehearing

cessation orders is constitutional.

Constitutionality depends

heavily on the risk to be avoided weighed against the burden on
those subjected to the
319

(1976).

permit

prompt

In

this

orders. ~Matthews
case,

Congress

administrative

action

v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.

created
in

a

provision

matters

of

to

great

14.
exigency.

The

challengers

suggest

that

inspectors

abusing their privileges under that provision.

may

be

But the burden

must be on the challengers to compile a record demonstrating
abuse.

There is no such record here.
Similarly,

Congress

think

I

constitutionally require prepayment provided

probably
that

there

can
is

a

mechanism for prompt return, with interest, when liability is
adjudged.

There is such a provision in this case.

Nothing in

the record documents that inspectors very often err in noting
probable violations.

Absent such a showing, I lean to hold for

the government on this issue.
Summary
The
curious.

posture

The

attack.

case

Yet,

the

of

was
case

this

case,

brought

as

law

is

taken
a

as

facial

clear

that

definition,

with

a

whole,

is

constitutional

such

attacks

are

~

unsuccessful,
"taking"

almost

and

by

procedural

due

respect

process

to

the

arguments.

Constitutionality under those theories invariably turns on the
specific facts of each case.

To prevail under those theories,

the challengers should have made more narrowly focused attacks
as applied to the circumstances of a particular parcel of land.
The
amendment)

are

other

legal

theories Ufcommerce

--------------------~

amenable

to

facial

clause

constitutional

,~ enth

challenges.

--;-"'\

And,

if

we

were

writing

on a

clean

arguments would deserve sympathy.
power under

slate,

the

challengers'

But the scope of Congress'

the commerce clause has long been resolved.

The

commerce clause undoubtedly permits Congress to legislate with

15.

respect to strip mining.

The tenth amendment question may be

closer, but this does not seem to me to be a case like National
League

of

Cities

in which

arguably is threatened.
mining Act may appear

the

integrity of

local government

As you noted the other day, the strip
to

be

unwise

as

applied

to particular

parcels in a particular region such as Virginia.

But this does

not make the law unconstitutional.

The Court should be slow to

declare

the legislative forge.

the

irrational

sphere

legislate
problems

of

at

the
in

should , appeal

Choper,

economic

regulation,

nationally.

represented

slighted

the product of

by

local

Its

level.

Congress,
when

the

Judicial

effort

and

their

brush

Review

and

may

But
it

special

broad

Congress

of
the

the

is

not

is

entitled

perfectly

states

that

are

about

national

legislation.
Political

are

states

problems

National

to

resolve

interests

to Congress

In

to

be
J.

Process

(1980).
For

these

reasons,

I

would

constitutionality of the law in all respects.

P.W.C.

02/22/81

uphold

the
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MEMORANDUM TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Paul Cane

DATE:

February 25, 1981

RE:

No. 79-1538 et al., Strip Mining Cases
The purpose of this memo is to identify some

of the sections of the Strip Mining Act that would be
·'

permitted, and some that would be unconstitutional, under
the Tenth Amendment theory we discussed today.

In the short
•i

time available to me this afternoon, I have compiled a
summary of many such sections, but this list is not
exhaustive.

[As you noted, the Act is very long.]

We had
<.

thought that we could divide the provisions of the Act into
two groups:

one prescribing mining techniques that would be

constitutionally permissible;

the other mandating post-

mining uses that would be constitutionally impermissible.

I

find, however, that there is an intermediate category of
regulation, that pertaining to reclamation techniques, that
has some characteristics of each of the prior ones.
1.
a.

Permissible Regulation of Mining Techniques
[30 U.S.C.]

§

1265{b) (1) requires operators to

"conduct surface coal mining operations so as to maximize
the utilization and conservation of the solid fuel resource
being recovered."

;

2.

b.

(b) (4) requires the operator to "stabilize and

protect all surface areas including spoil piles . • . to
effectively control erosion and attendant air and water
pollution."
c.

(b) (9) requires the operator to "conduct any

augering operation associated with surface mining in a
manner to maximize recovery of mineral reserves remaining."
d.

(b) (12) requires the operator to "refrain from

surface mining within 500 feet from active and abandoned
underground mines."
2.
a.

Questionable Regulation of Reclamation Techniques
[30

u.s.c.]

§

1265(b) (2) requires restoration of

"the land affected to a condition capable of supporting the

-

uses which it was capable of supporting prior to any mining,
or higher or better uses of which there is reasonable
likelihood."
b.

(b) (3) requires that the operator "backfill, grade,

and compact . . • to provide adequate drainage and to
achieve an ecologically sound land use compatible with the
surrounding region."

Under certain circumstances, such land

"shall be shaped and graded in such a way as to prevent
slides, erosion, and water pollution and is revegitated."

3.

c.

(b) (6) requires restoration of "the topsoil or the

best available subsoil which is best able to support
vegetation."
d.

(b) (7) requires the operator, for all prime

farmlands, to "replace and regrade the root zone material •
. . with proper compaction and uniform depth over the
regraded spoil material."
3.

Impermissible Regulation of Post-Mining Uses
a.

[30

u.s.c.]

§

1265(c) requires that land be

returned to its premining use except when a permit is
granted "where an industrial, commercial, agricultural,
residential or public facility use is proposed, [and that
use] will be (i) compatible with adjacent land uses;

(ii)

obtainable according to data regarding expected need and
market;

. . . (iv) supported by commitments from public

agencies .

(vi) planned . . . so as to integrate the

mining operation and reclamation with the postmining land
use."
b.

With respect to prime farmlands, such land must be

returned to farming use,

§

1260 (d) (1) , and to a yield equal

to the prevailing yield before mining.
c.

After reclamation, a bond must be posted with the

government.

Such bond is not fully refunded until post-

mining operations are conducted in accordance with the

4.

premining use for a period of five years (ten years for
prime farmlands).

[This statement was taken from a brief

and is not disputed, but I can't immediately locate the
series of sections of the Act that so requires.]

P.w.c.
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MEMORANDUM TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Paul Cane

DATE:

March 4, 1981

RE:

have

thought

is no merit to

(1)

due

these

cases

the commerce clause argument,

process

parties],

about

and

in

I continue to think that there

somewhat greater detail.

[Indiana

1-oe

Nos. 79-1538, The Strip Mining Cases
I

substantive

~

and
(3)

equal
the

protection

procedural

(2)

the

arguments

due

process

arguments.
The tenth amendment and "taking" questions
are

closer.

could take
involve

an

I

propose

herein

two

approaches

dissenting

in

you

Th~ould

in your voting and writing.
opinion

that

part

on

the

tenth

--------------------------~-----

amendment issue by analogy to National League of Cities.
The

~ould

make

clear

to

--=--------'

simply involve

future

perfect

their

because,

on balance,

tenth

amendment

a concurring opinion to

litigants

the

claims.

I

"taking"

I'm not

argument.

But

correct
favor

manner
the

to

latter

fully persuaded by my own
I

sketch out herein

the

best argument I can make so you can decide.

.....

:;.

·.,"

..
'··

2.

I.

A Tenth Amendment Dissent

Land-use

regulation

quintessentially local activity.

is

the

Each distict court found

that the Act is unwise as applied to the steep slopes of
Virginia
sure,

and

some

of

the

farmlands

of

Indiana.

To

be

it is beyond cavil that land use can be regulated.

But local governments are most aware of the benefits and
burdens associated with various uses of land.
problem of interstate externalities,
local government that
which

land uses

property

owners

governmental

is

it

Absent some

therefore

entity

the

in the best position to decide

to permit and which to ban.
ought

is

to

be

that

able

is

to

most

Similarly,

deal

with

accessible

the
and

knowledgeable about local problems.
Your

Conference

notes,

however,

indicate

that the Justices were not sympathetic to this argument.
They

did

not

think

that
tenth

National
amendment

League

of

Cities

v.

Usery--the

leading

statement--governed

this case.

The SG in its brief sought to distinguish that

case by pointing out that it dealt with interferences in
the employer-employee relationship in such areas as fire
prevention and police protection which are public-service

3.

activities

typically

by

performed

and

state

local

governments.
It

is

at

least

plausible

to

argue

that

land-use control

is entitled to even more constitutional

protection

the

than

relationship

between

employees and the local government.

local

service

I believe it is true

that local governments generally did not undertake to act
in a proprietary (i.e., service) capacity until long after
they acted in a governmental (i.e., legislative) capacity.
State

tort

law

originally

distinguished

for

sovereign

'

immunity purposes between the actions of local governments
qua

proprietor

actions

were

because

the

and

those

accorded
latter

qua

greater

were

government.
immunity

believed

to

The

latter

the

former

than

be

closer

to

the

traditional core of governmental functions.
My prior memo to you divided many of the
provisions

of

this

Act

into

three

categories:

(1)

execution of strip mining;

(2) restoration of mined land;

and

of

(3)

post-mining

uses

that

land.

In

light

of

precedent, I believe that the first two categories are of
the

sort

that

Congress

is

entitled

to

indicents of the interstate commerce in coal.

regulate

as

I believe,

however, that the third category of provisions arguably is

...

,,
~.~i.:'?,·~
~'

..

'

·'

4.

of

the

sort

reserved

to

the

tenth

amendment

under

the

analysis described above.
I
it

does

second
are

nothing

recommend against this approach because
to

help

the

local

In many

category of provisions.

the

localities.

least

rational

governments

as

in

respects,

applied

the

these

particular

to

But, in light of precedent, I do not think it

is possible to write a persuasive opinion contending that
these are out of Congress'

reach.

And if only "category

three" restrictions can be invalidated,

there

is another

reason for rejecting the tenth amendment approach.

Post-

mining use restrictions can be addressed on a case-by-case
basis upon a showing of proper hardship under the "taking"
analysis described below.
II.

A "Taking" Concurrence

Under

this

option,

concurring opinion making clear that

you

could

write

a

the Court does not

intend to foreclose appropriate "taking" suits.
Both

District

Courts

entertained

facial

fifth amendment attacks and declared sections of the Act
unconstitutional.
Court

made

question.

I ,

general

In

the

Virginia

findings

of

case,

fact

on

the

District

the

"taking"

It found that 95% of Virginia's coal lands were

5.

sloped at angles greater than 20 degrees.

Further, these

coal

less

fields

were

hundred acres."

"small

tracts,

usually

than

one

On steep slopes,

the cost of production of coal is increased
up
to
70
percent.
On
occasion,
the
economic impracticality of strip mining
coal is outweighed by physical realities.
Equipment may not be available to cover the
highwall on a steep slope to restore the
original contour.
Even when the land can be restored,

the District Court found

that such restoration would be foolish because steeply sloped
land

is

of

little

value.

reduce the value of the
Act

is

restored

irrelevant
to cover

Thus,

land.

because
the

restoration

actually

would

The variance provision in the

in

all

highwall.

cases

In

sum,

the
said

land
the

must

be

District

Court, it is "economically and physically impossible to comply"
with the Act.

Therefore, the "steep slope" sections of the Act

effect a "taking" and are unconstitutional.
The
farmlands"

Indiana

Court

provisions of the Act.

dealt

with

the

"prime

Under these provisions, an

owner must get a permit to strip mine.

To obtain a permit, he

must show that he has the "technological capability to restore
such mined area,
higher

levels

within a

reasonable

of

yield

as

non-mined

surrounding areas

under

equivalent

time,
prime

to

equivalent or

farmland

in

levels of management."

the
A

·.

'·,

6.

permit
until

holder
the

must

"soil

post

a

bond,

productivity

equivalent levels of yield.
study

which will

establishes

that

has

not

be

released

returned"

to

the

The District Court found that "no

restoration

can

be

achieved"

to

the

required level if neighboring land was farmed under the "high
yield" method.

At best, postmining land could be farmed at a

yield equivalent to that obtained before under "regular" levels
of management.
that

it

was

farmland
law

'

For these reasons, the District Court concluded
"technologically

impossible"

to

reclaim

to the required level of productivity,

therefore

amounted

to

an

prime

and that the
"taking."

unconstitutional

Provisions of the law that prohibit mining near public roads,
cemeteries, dwellings, churches or schools also were found to
be takings.
The approaches of
flawed in similar ways.
that

the

correct

way

the two District Courts are

Recent cases of this Court make clear
to

identification both of a

analyze

"taking"

specific piece of

claims

property and

precise manner in which that property was taken.
of

u.s.

Tiburon,

follows

this analysis.

general

findings

whole.

For

(1980).

Instead,

applicable

example,

the

to

requires

Neither

the

Agins v. City
District

Court

each makes quasi-legislative
the

Virginia

geographical
Court

says

area
the

as

cost

a
of

,I

..

,~·

7.

production is increased "up to 70 percent," and that equipment
"may

not

be

available"

to

effect

the

necessary

restoration.

The Indiana Court in effect shifted the burden of proof when it
concluded that "no study establishes

that restoration can be

achieved"

inquiry

as

required.

The

plaintiffs had established,

correct

was

whether

the

for each parcel of land allegedly

taken, that it was impossible for the necessary restoration to
be

achieved.

The

acknowledge

Indiana

that

definition of

there

Court
was

the various

also

some

erred

by

uncertainty

refusing
about

to
the

levels of land management and that

the government seemed to be willing to apply the Act in a way
that ameliorates some of
31-34;

its harsh effects.

Brief for SG at

cf. Agins, supra.
I recommend that we write a concurring opinion

spelling

out

analysis.

these

We

errors

could

then

in

the

District

emphasize

that

Court's
the

foreclosing subsequent suits properly brought.
suggestions

that

could

be

made

to

help

"taking"

Court

is

not

There are six

future

plaintiffs.

First, it is necessary to identify a specific piece of property
that

was

Second,

taken.

This

was

the

case

in

Pennsylvania

Coal.

it is necessary to show that any applicable variance

procedure has been exhausted.

Cf. Agins, supra.

necessary to present detailed evidence on

the

Third, it is
nature

of

the

..

'

,.
'·,

8.

taking

of

that

particular

piece

of

land.

Id.

Fourth,

~

extinguishing mineral

rights can

uses

remain.

of

the

property

be a

taking

event

if other

[Pennsylvania Coal made

clear

that mineral rights could be an estate in land severable from
the fee.

A taking was found even though the state law had no

effect on surface uses of the land.]

Fifth, unreasonable post-

mining restrictions on use of the land, such as those discussed
above, could be highly relevant to the question of a taking.
Sixth, the remedy would not be a declaration that the relevant
sections of

the Act were

facially unconstitutional,

but only

unconstitutional as applied to the particular piece of property
at

issue.

Thus,

Congress'

regulatory

scheme

would

not

be

disturbed except in specific cases on a specific showing.
I

prefer

a

concurring

opinion on

some

help

from

Justice

Brennan's

dissent

which I hear will be quite a manifesto.

P.W.C.

taking

If you agree, we may

issue to the tenth amendment argument.
get

the

03/04/81

in San Diego,

March 5, 1981
79-1538 Andrus v. Virginia Surface Mining
Dear Chief:
As I •passed• at the Conference on the above
cases, I now write to advise as follows:
I agree with the majority that there is no merit
to the respondents' arguments with respect to (i) the
Commerce Clause, (ii) substantive due process and equal
protection, and (iii) procedural due process.
I am still not at rest on what I view as the Tenth
Amendment/taking question.
Although I could agree that Congress has the power
to regulate the conducting of strip mining and perhaps the
restoration of the mined land, this legislation goes very
far indeed in imposing post-mining obligations on miners.
The intrusion on traditional state and local land use
control is substantial and pervasive, in addition to raising
with respect to individual situations questions of •taking•
without just compensation. Thus, I may try to work out a
dissent with respect to post-mining regulation - although I
recognize that this might not be easy.
In sum, my tentative vote is to reverse in part
and affirm in part.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

-
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CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR .

March 5, 1981
79-1538 Andrus v. Virginia Surface Mining
Dear Chief:
As I "passed" at the Conference on the above
cases, I now write to advise as follows:
I agree with the majority that there is no merit
to the respondents' arguments with respect to (i) the
Commerce Clause, (ii) substantive due process and equal
protection, and (iii) procedural due process.
I am still not at rest on what I view as the Tenth
Amendment/taking question.
Although I could agree that Congress has the power
to regulate the conducting of strip mining and perhaps the
restoration of the mined land, this legislation goes very
far indeed in imposing post-mining obligations on miners.
The intrusion on traditional state and local land use
control is substantial and pervasive, in addition to raising
with respect to individual situations questions of "taking"
without just compensation. Thus, I may try to work out a
dissent with respect to post-mining regulation - although I
recognize that this might not be easy.
In sum, my tentative vote is to reverse in part
and affirm in part.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference
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'J)l~t$Jri:nghm.18. <q. 2!1~,.,~
CHAMBER S OF

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL , JR .

March 5, 1981
79-1538 Andrus v. Virginia Surface Mining
Dear Chief:
As I "passed" at the Conference on the above
cases, I now write to advise as follows:
I agree with the majority that there is no merit
to the respondents' arguments with respect to (i) the
Commerce Clause, (ii) substantive due process and equal
protection, and (iii) procedural due process.
I am still not at rest on what I view as the Tenth
Amendment/taking question.
Although I could agree that Congress has the power
to regulate the conducting of strip mining and perhaps the
restoration of the mined land, this legislation goes very
far indeed in imposing post-mining obligations on miners.
The intrusion on traditional state and local land use
control is substantial and pervasive, in addition to raising
with respect to individual situations questions of "taking"
without just compensation. Thus, I may try to work out a
dissent with respect to post-mining regulation - although I
recognize that this might not be easy.
In sum, my tentative vote is to reverse in part
and affirm in part.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

May 8, 1981

Re:

79-1538 and 79-1596 - Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining

Dear Thurgood:
Although I voted the other way on the civil
penalty issue, I am now satisfied that your proposed
disposition is sound. Please join me in your opinion.
Respectfully,

.-.1

Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

May 8, 1981
Re:

No. 79-1538 Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining &
Reclamation Association

Dear Thurgood:
I plan to write separately in this case.
Sincerely,~

Mr. Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference

.·'
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CHAM BE R S OF"

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

May 8, 1981
Re:

No. 79-1538 Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining &
Reclamation Association

Dear Thurgood:
I plan to write separately in this case.
Sincerely,~

Mr. Justice Ma rshall
Copies to the Conference
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lfp/ss 5/9/81
79-1538 and 79-1596 Surfrace Mining Cases
Dear Thurgood:
You have written a fine opinion, and I believe I

will be able t v
reservations.

My

Just

::::.::..1--

t~ol ~

p~n~ern, ~ ~

~

outset, has been the

Compensatio~th~ you~art

this facial

att~ ~~' ~u

disposed of the
some language

is~ l ~ee~

have

There are, however,

chan~ortant,

appreciate your considering:
1.

and would

~

The quotation on page 20 from Agins is not

entirely accurate.

Your draft states:

"A statute regulating the uses that can be
made of property effects a taking if the law

·j'

.

'

.

'

IV.

you~~!: p~t«Fn

agree with

I

u

2.

'does not substantially advance legitimate
state interests, see Nectow v. Cambridge, 277
u.s. 183, 188 (1928), or denies the property
owner all economically viable use of his
land • . . . ' Agins v. Tiburon, supra, at 260.
See Penn Central Transp. Corp. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) ."

The words "the property" and "all" are not in the U.S.
Reports.

The clause in question reads:

"denies an owner

econmically viable use of his land . . • " Agins v. Tiburon,
447

u.s.

255, 260.
The addition of the word "all" could be viewed as

a substantial change of substance.

Although the language in

.·

our Just Compensation Clauses has not been uniform, I do not
think the Court has ever held that no compensation need be
paid so long as the owner retained some viable use of his
land, however small.

If, for example, an owner were left

with 10% of his marketable coal and deprovided of 90%,
surely there would be a compensable taking.

In Agins, we

emphasized that the owner in any event would retain a
substantial interest.

Similarly, in Penn Central (cited in
-.

..

',

.

.•

'

<

..

..

3.

your opinion with Agins}, we made clear that our holding was
"based on Penn Central's present ability to use the terminal
for its intended purposes and in a gainful fashion".

438
·,.1

u.s.,

at 138, n. 36.
The word "all" is repeated in the fifth line from

the bottom of page 29, and in footnote 37 on that page, and
near the top of p. 38.
2.

I am concerned also by the emphasis on "non-

mining uses", in a context that indicates "no taking" where
some such uses remain, p. 29, n. 37.

y' ~·

See also the sentence

beginning at the bottom of p. 29 and carrying over to the
top of p. 30, noting that the "act does not purport to
regulate alternative uses".

And the statement in n. 38 that
,.

owners "preseumably retain the option of simply leveling the

'

land without first mining the coal", thereby creating
exceptional value per acre.

'·

'

'

..
'

4

0

Having been in the mining country of southwest
Virginia, I am somewhat familiar with the terrain there.
There are few possible "alterntive uses" to most of it.

It
\

tends to be rugged and rocky.

The cost of leveling it in

most places would be wholly prohibitive.
Relative minor changes in language in n. 38 could
limit what you say to suchmining land as is susceptible of
being leveled economically to a higher use than cold mining.
I would guess, however, that if

there is in fact any such

land that can be leveled and sold for $300,000, this would
have been done years ago.

..,_

~.

Moreover, except where near a

town or a plant site (both rather sparce in southwest
Virginia) the leveled would be worthless for residential or
commercial purposes, and the soil will grow little except
scrup trees of no value.
In a more fundamental sense, I do not think we
r

canjustify the inference (see e.g. n. 37, n. 38) that so

... .
..·.
·'

~

.,.• . .

.

•.

.}

::

·;

..

;,

5.

long as some "nonmining" use may be

a~ailable,

however less

valuable than surface mining, there would be no compensable
taking.
As our cases have said, the underlying reason for
the Just Compensation Clause is to make sure that the public

.•

at large - rather than a single owner - bears the burden of

..
an exercise of state power that is in the general public
''

interest.

Agins, supra, at 260.

* * *

Although it has taken me much too long to identify
(for illustrative purposes)language that concerns me, I
think relatively few changes in language would be required.
If you wish, I would be happy to suggest the changes.
.,

,•

ARe we not also talking about dicta?
in Part IV is clear cut:

Your holding

the taking issue is prematurely

•l

presented, and remedies remain available to individual

...
.

-.;

'•I'

'

'

•,
y

•'

6.

owners or operators.

I would think it unnecessary to

undertake an anticipatory summary of what may be the
applicable law or relevant circumstances in future cases.
Sincerely,
Mr. Justice Marshall
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lfp/ss 5/9/81
79-1538 and 79-1596 Surfrace Mining Cases

Dear Thurgood:
You have written a fine opinion, and I believe I
will be able to join you subject to the following
,,

reservations.
My primary concern, from the outset, has been the
Just Compensation Clause issue that you address in Part IV.

th-is -facial- .at..ta..a-k·.

For the most part, I think you have

\.N~ t

-r·

e\,(!'1""' f , ~- ~'"

disposed of the issue very well indeed.\ There-afe, hewe¥er,
some language changes that I consider important, and would
appreciate your
;)

considering~;
.'

1~,\ -~~;

( 1. ...The quotation on page 20 from Agins is not
entirely accurate.

Your draft states:

..

'

"A statute regulating the uses that can be
made of property effects a taking if the law

.,.

·'

'

....

f·

2.

'does not substantially advance legitimate
state interests, see Nectow v. Cambridge, 277
u.s. 183, 188 (1928), or denies the property
owner all economically viable use of his
land • • • • ' Agins v. Tiburon, supra, at 260.
See Penn Central Transp. Corp. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104 (l97S) .••

The words "the property" and "all" are not in the
Reports.

The clause i n question reads:

econmically viable use of his land • •
447

u.s.

u.s.

"denies an owner
11

Agins v. Tiburon,

255, 260.

The addition of the word
a substantial change of substance.

11

al~'

could be viewed as

Although the language in

our Just Compensation Clauses has not been uniform, I do not
think the Court has ever held that no compensation need be
...,

~.

paid so long as the owner retained some viable use of his
land, however small.

If, for example, an owner were left

with 10% of his marketable coal and

J.tf "~

e~~e~de&

surely there would be a compensable taking.

of 90%,

In Agins, we
f .. ·

emphasized that the owner in any event would retain ~~·
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substantial i~5teet.- Similarly, in Penn Central (cited in
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your opinion with Agins), we made clear that our holding was

. , c.._

"based on Penn Central's present ability to use the terminal
for its intended purposes and in a gainful fashion".

u.s.,

438

at 138, n. 36.
The word "all" is repeated in the fifth line from
'
'•

the bottom of page 29, and in footnote 37 on that page, and

........

near the top of p. 38.
t&! ~;. r
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.....~ I t m( <foncerned ~ by the emphasis on "nontvv"< t
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mining uses", J.n a coRt-e Itt that illlili-.awwe
some such

us~

~

remain, p. 29, n. 37.

.

~~taking" where

See also the sentence

beginning at the bottom of 9· 29 and carrying over to the
top of p. 30, noting that the "act does not purport to
regulate alternative uses".

And the statement in n. 38 that

.--

\-.~

owners "pre~~mably retain the option of simply leveling the
land without first mining the coal", thereby creating
exceptional value per acre.
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Having been in the mining country of southwest
Virginia, I am somewhat familiar with the terrain there.
There are few possible "alterntive uses" to most of it.
tends to be rugged and rocky.

It

The cost of leveling it in

most places would be wholly prohibitive.
Relative minor changes in language in n. 38 could
limit what you say to suc1mining land as is susceptible of

~tJ
being leveled economically to a higher use than g

a

mining.

/\

I would guess, however, that if

there is in fact any such

1 "'t(:...t"~~.ctt~el

l

land that can be leveled and sold
have been done years ago.
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this would

)

Moreover, except where near a
"}

town or a plant site (both rather spar~e in southwest
'

t

' "· 'l,l

Virginia)Athe leveled would be worthless for residential or
)

commercial purposes, and the soil will grow little except
trees of no value.

can·
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In a more- \damental sense ,_.., r aCi" Rpt think we
the ' inferende (see e ,,(: . 37, n.
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long as some "nonmining" u\e may be available, howev'e,r less
\aluable than surface minin\, there would be no
'
'--_....
/
ta i.ng. ,.

compe~able
',

As our cases have said, the underlying reason for
the Just Compensation Clause is to make sure that the public
•'.

at large - rather than a single owner - bears the burden of
an exercise of state power that is in the general public

.

~·~.

Although it has taken me much too long to identify
1'
(for illustrative purposes)f anguage that concerns me, I
think relatively few changes in language would be ;e~ui~ed ~
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If you wish, I would be happy to suggest the changes. c..qvv{ ' ...+· Tel
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i~~V"" is clear..._~· the taking issue is prematurely /
presented, and remedies remain available to individual
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79-1538 and 79-1596 Surface Mining Cases
,,·

Dear Thurgood:
You have written a fine opinion, and I believe I
will be able to join you subject to the following
reservations.
From the outset, my primary concern has been the
Compensation Clause issue that you address in Part IV.

For

the most part, I think you have disposed of the issue very
well indeed.

Your holding is clear:

'•.

the taking issue is

prematurely presented, and remedies remain available to
individual owners or operators.

s

undertake an anticipatory summary of what may be the
1\

applicable law in future cases.
concerns me.
entirely.

It is this dicta that

I would be content if you were to omit it

Or, if you wish to include it, there are some

language changes that I consider important, and would
appreciate your considering.
,,.
~:

.

~

2.

First, the quotation on page 20 from Agins is not
entirely accurate.

Your draft states:

"A statute regulating the uses that can be
made of property effects a taking if the law
'does not substantially advance legitimate
state interests, see Nectow v. Cambridge, 277
u.s. 183, 188 (1928), or denies the property
owner all economically viable use of his land
.•.• ' Agins v. Tiburon, supra, at 260. See
Penn Central Transp. Corp. v. New York City,
438 u.s. 104 (1978) ."

The word "all" is not in the
question reads:
his land."

u.s.

Reports.

The clause in

"denies an owner economically viable use of

Agins v. Tiburon, 447

u.s.

255, 260.

The word

"all" is repeated in your opinion in the fifth line from the
bottom of p. 29,

~

in footnote 37 on that page, and near

the top of p. 30.
The addition of the word "all" is a substantial
change.

Although the language in our Compensation Clause

...'•
cases has not been uniform, I do not think the Court has
ever held that compensation need not be paid so long as the
owner retained some viable use of his land, however small.
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If, for example, an owner were left with 10% of his

'•

marketable coal and deprived of 90%, surely there would be a
compensable taking.

In Agins, we found no taking but

emphasized that the property owner there retained
substantial value in his property.

Similarly, in Penn

Central (cited in your opinion with Agins}, the Court made
clear that its holding was "based on Penn Central's present
ability to use the terminal for its intended purposes and in
a gainful fashion."

438

u.s.,

at 138, n. 36.

I therefore am particularly concerned with the
u-H&<-~

emphasis~

you ~Be

on "nonmining uses," and

~

~

suggestion

that no "taking" exists where some such use remains, see p.
29, n. 37.

See also the sentence beginning at the bottom of

p. 29 and carrying over to the top of p. 30.
I am troubled, also, by

rt.L
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comment that owners

"

"presumably retain the option of simply leveling the land
without first mining the coal," thereby creating exceptional
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4.
'.

value per acre (n. 38}.

Having been in the mining country

of southwest Virginia, I am familiar with the terrain there.
There are few possible "alternative uses" to most of it.
tends to be rugged and rocky.

The cost of leveling it in

;9r-ca. ""<"&. ;z;.-:•. 4

most places is wholly p~ohibitive ,{unless the owner or
operator is permitted

~t-~e~.
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~Q

It

aQll the coal

J!IOee,;S1J~r ~hanges

~nearthee

in

'

<

i4c~ c...

~he

.-

in language in n. 38

could limit what you say to such mining land as is
susceptible of being leveled economically to a practical,
profitable

guess, however, that if there is

in fact any such land that can be leveled
sold, this already would have been don

)i(il'

eo·.r-e-r , <:;"xcept

-

or a plant site (both rather sparse in

~

southwest Virginia} , the leveled lana would be worthless for

"

residential or commercial purposes, and the soil will grow
little except scrub trees of no

valu ~

'

.

5.

As our cases have said, the underlying reason for
the Compensation Clause is to ensure that the public at
large -- rather than a single owner -- bears the burden of
.... '

an exercise of state power that is in the general public
interest.

Agins, supra, at 260.

I do not think our cases

support the position that there is no taking as long
_..., .....

C
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"some" nonmining use remains.

Although it has taken me much too long to identify

..

(for illustrative purposes) language that concerns me, I
think relatively few changes would be required.
wish, I would be happy to suggest the changes.

If you
Or, as I

noted at the outset, I would be content to omit the dicta

'.

entirely.
Sincerely,
··\-

Mr. Justice Marshall
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CHAMBE RS OF

JUSTICE POTTER S T EWART

May 11, 1981

Re:

Nos. 79-1538 & 79-1596, Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Min. & Reel. Assn., etc.

Dear Thurgood,
I am glad to join your opinion for the
Court.
Sinc erely yours,

Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference
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~lyingfon, ~. C!J. 20gl)[.~

CHAMBERS OF"

..JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

May 12, 1981

Re: 79-1538 and 79-1596 Hodel v. Virginian Surface Mining
and Reclamation Assn., Inc, etc.

Dear Thurgood,
Please join me.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference
cpm

.,

May 14, 1981
79-1538 and 79-1596 Virginia
~·

..

Dear Thurgood:
You have written a fine opinion, and I expect to
be able to join you.
My only concern relates to some of the language
Part IV. Your holding there is quite clear: The taking
issue is prematurely presented on a facial attack, and
remedies remain available to individual owners or operators.
It seems to me, however, that some of the language in Part
IV, particularly in footnotes 38 and 40, may create some
doubt as to remedies.
Footnote 38 refers to the District Court's
of fancy as to land "left leveled or stabilized with
benches" being worth up to $300,000 per acre. The paragraph
of the opinion that contains this language is not easy to
understand. It commences with the statement that "95% of
the strippable coal lands in Virginia are located on slopes
in excess of 20%". This suggests the rugged character of
the mountainous area in question. Having been in the mining
country of southwest Virginia (and attended college in sight
of the Allegheny range), I am familiar with the terrain. It
tends to be rugged, and sparsely settled. Mining and
bootlegging support this poverty stricken area. The cost of
leveling these hils in most places is wholly prohibitive certainly unless the owner or operator is permitted to mine
the coal at the same time. Moreover, except where coal land
is located near a town or a plant site (both of which are
rare in southwest yirginia), the leveled land would be
largely worthless for residential or commercial purposes.
The soil will grow little except scrub trees of no value.
Thus, when note 38 suggests that "owners
presumably retain the option of simply leveling the land
without first mining the coal" it is an option that may
exist for relatively few owners. I would prefer to

...

-.

! ..

..

!!.,: .

,,.

2.
eliminate the note entirely, as the purpose of Part IV is
merely to leave open all questions of taking. In any event,
I think it is necessary - in the interest of accuracy - to
add the word "some" in the second line of n. 38 immediately
prior to the words "land owners".
The last two sentences of note 40 purport to
identify specific remedies. Resort to the Tucker Act is
characterized "as a first step", and then if that "remedy
unavailable", you say that "declaratory and injunctive
relief" may be sought. I would think it more appropriate
for us not to speculate as to the types of remedies
available. You have correctly said that a "taking is not
constitutional unless just compensation is available". If
there is any doubt as to recovery under the Tucker Act, an
owner or operator should be able to obtain an injunction,
and he should not be deprived of his property without
assurance - such as that available under the condemnation
laws of the states - that a fair compensation proceeding is
available.
·
-In sum, on this second point, after making clear
that just compensation must be provided for a taking, we
should not undertake in this case to indicate what remedies
are available or the order in which they must be pursued.
Identifying two possible remedies also could be read as
excluding all others. I hope you will be willing to omit
the last· two sentences in this footnote.
Sincerely,
~/'
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CHAMBERS OF

May 15 1 19 81

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re: No. 79-1538 - Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining
and Reclamation Association, Inc.
No. 79-1596 - Virginia Surface Mining and
Reclamation Association, Inc. v. Hodel
Dear Thurgood :
Please join me.
• • 'U<,;"'

Sincerely,

jJC. 6-

Mr. Justice Marshal l
cc : The Conference

.,>,
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C!J. 2il,?J!.~

C H AMBERS OF

JUS TI CE B Y R ON R . WHITE

May 15, 1981

Re:

79-1538 and 79-1596 - Virginia
Surface Mining cases

De ar Thurgood,
I

have no objection to your making

the changes Lewis

suggests.

Sincerely yours,

Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference
cprn
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE
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May 19, 1981

J . BRENNAN, JR.

j
I

RE:

Nos. 79-1538 & 1596 Andrus v. Va. Surface Mining

i

·I

Dear Thurgood:
I agree .

...f<•,
Sincerely,
I
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Justice MarsM-11
cc: The Conference
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Nos. 79-1538

AND

79-1596

~ UJ 1:-f J< Donald Paul Hodel, Acting Sec~

~ -r' J J
re~a:~Aof the Interior,
/ -{ ~~ / ppellant,
>.-"-; {_/ KrfJVirgf~ing
7~153JV '" ~ v. -- u,)
and
A

...

j(\

U,ecl,amation Association,
Inc., et al.
Virginia .SJ.rrface Mining and
Iteclamation Association,
Inc., et al., Appellants,
79-1596
v,
Ponald Paul Hodel, Acting Secretary of the Interior, et al.

On Appeals from the United
States District Court for
the Western District of
Virginia.

[May - , 1981]
MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
'£hese cases arise out of a pre-enforcement challenge to the
constitutionality of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (Surface Mining Act or Act), 30 U.S. C.
§ 1201 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. III). The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia declared
several central provisions of the Act unconstitutional.. and
permanently enjoined their enforcement. 483 F. Supp~ 425
(WD Va. 1980) . In these appeals, we consider whether Congress, in adopting the Act, exceeded its powers under the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution/ or transgressed affirJusTICE

1 The Commerce Clause empowers Congress "[t]o regulate Commerce·
with foreign nations and among the several States, and with the, Indian:
'frihe•." U. S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3;..

.!... ·.
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~
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mative limitations on the exercise of that power contained
in the Fifth and Tenth Amendments. We conclude that in
the context of a facial challenge, the Surface Mining Act does
not suffer from any of these alleged constitutional defects and
we uphold the Act as constitutional.

I
A
The Surface Mining Act is a comprehensive statute de . .
signed to "establish a nationwide program to protect society
and the environment from the adverse effects of surface coal
mining operations." § 102 (a), 30 U.S. C. § 1202 (a). Title
II of the Act, 30 U. S. C. § 1211, creates the Office of Surface
Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSM), within the
Department of the Interior, and the Secretary of the Interior
(Secretary) acting through OSM, is charged with primary
responsibility for administering and imple~enting the Act
by promulgating regulations and enforcing its provisions.
§ 201 (c), 30 U. S. C. § 1211 (c). The principal regulatory
and enforcement provisions are contained in Title V of the
Act. 30 U. S. C. §§ 1251- 1270. Section 501, 30 U. S. C.
§ 1251, establishes a two-stage program for the regulation
of surface coal mining, an initial, or interim regulatory phase,
and a subsequent, permanent phase. The interim program
mandates immediate promulgation and federal enforcement
of some of the Act's environmental protection performance
standards, complimented by continuing state regulation.
Under the permanent phase, a regulatory program is to be
adopted for each State mandating compliance with the full
panoply of federal performance standards, with enforcement responsibility lying with either the State or Federal
Government.
Section 501 (a) directs the Secretary to promulgate regulations establishing an interim regulatory program during
which mine operators will be required to comply with some

79-1538 & 7!J-159~0PINION
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of the Act's performance standards, as specified by § 502 (c),
30 U. S. C. § 1252 (c). Included among those selected standards are requirements governing: (a) restoration of land after
mining to its prior condition; (b) restoration of land to its
approximate original contour; (c) segregation and preserva..
tion of topsoil; (d) minimization of disturbance to the hydrologic balance; (e) construction of coal mine waste piles
used as dams and embankments; (f) revegetation of mined
areas; and (g) spoil disposal. § 515 (b), 30 U. S. C. § 1265
(b) .2 The interim regulations were published on December
13. 1977, see 42 Fed. Reg. 62639, 8 and they are currently in
effect in most States, including Virginia. 4
2 Otlwr provi~ions of the Act are, by their own terms, made effective
during the interim period. One example is § 522 (e), 30 U. S. C.
§ 1272 (e), which prohibits, with some exceptions, surface coal mining on
certain lands or within specified distances of particular structures or
faciliti!:'8.
8 Under §§ 502 (b), (c) of the Act, 30 U. S. C. §§ 1252 (b), (c), the
interim standards are applicable only to surface mining operations in
States that wen· themselves regulating surface mining when the Act became law. All States in which surface mining was conducted on private
lands had regulatory programs of their own when the Act was pa:;8ed in
1977. Accordingly, the interim program became applicable in all relevant
areas throughout the country, including Virginia.
4 New surface mining operations, excluding tho~e on "Federal lands" or
"Indian l a nd~ ," commencing on or after February 3, 1978 must comply
with the performance standards established by the interim regulatory program at the start of operations. And, with certain limited exceptions, surfare mining operations begun prior to February 3, 1978, were required to
be in compliance with the interim regulations by May 3, 1978. §§ 502 (b),
(c) and 701 (11) , 30 U. S. C. §§ 1252 (b), (c) and 1291 (11).
Some of the interim regulations were challenged in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia pursuant to § 526 (a) (1) ot
the Act , 30 U. S. C.§ 1276 (a)(l) . In reSurface Mining ReguLation
Litigation, 452 F . Supp. 327 (D. C. 1978); In re Surface Mining ReguLation Litigation, 456 F . Supp 1301 (D. C. 1978), aff'd in part and rev'd in
]>art,- U. S. App. D. C.-, 627 F . 2d 1346 (1980) . The plaintiffs in
the District of Columbia litigation also challenged the validity of a numlJet of the ::1t11.tu1ory provisions that are at issue in the instant cases. The

'·

79-1568 & 79- 1596-0PINION

4

HODEJJ

v. VIRGINIA SURFACE MIN. & RECL. ASSN.

The Secretary is responsible for enforcing the interim regulatory program. § 502 (e), 30 U. S. C. § 125,2 (e). A federal enforcement and inspection program is to be established
for each State, and is to remain in effect until a permanent
regulatory program is implemented in the State. States may
issue permits for surface mining operations during the interim phase, but operations authorized by such permits must
comply with the federal interim performance standards.
§ 502 (b), 30 U. S. C. § 1252 (b). States may also pursue
their· own regulatory and inspection programs during the interim phase, and they may assist the Secretary in enforcing
the interim standards. 5 The States are not, however, required to enforce the interim regulatory standards and, until
the permanent phase of the program, the Secretary may not
cede the :Federal Government's independent enforcement role
to States that wish to conduct thei~regulatory programs.
~
Section 501 (b), 30 U. S. C. § 1251 (b), directs the Secretary to promulga,te regulations establishing a permanent regulatory program incorporating all the Act's performance
staudards. The Secretary published the permanent regulat1ous on March 13, 1979, see 44 Fed. Reg. 14902, but these
regulations do not become effective in a particular State until
either a permanent state program, submitted and approved
in accordance with § 503 of the Act, or a permanent federal
program for the State, adopted in accordance with § 504, is
imp1emented.
Under § 503, any State wishing to assume permanent regulatory authority over the surface coal mining operations on
"non-Federal lands" 8 within its borders must submit a pro-

J.

..
'·

Di~trict

Court 8ustained the validity of thos~ provisions, 452 F . Supp., at
1319- 1321, and the attack was not renewed on appeal.
5 Congress encouraged such assistance by providing for financial reimbursPrnents to States that aetively assist the federal enforcement effort
dming the interim phase. See 30 U.S. C. § 1252 (e)(4) .
6 A separate r~gulatory program governing "Federal lands" is established
by § 523 of the Act, 30 U, S. C. § 1273, The term "Federal lands" is
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posed permanent program to the Secretary for his approval.
The proposed program must demonstrate that the state legislature has enacted laws implementing the environmental
protection standards established by the Act and accompanyiug regulations, and that the State has the administrative and
technical ability to enforce these standards. 30 U. S. C.
§ 1253. The Secretary must approve or disapprove each such
proposed program in accordance with time schedules and
procedures established by §§ 503 (b), (c), 30 U.S. C. §§ 125q
(b) , (c). 7 In addition, the Secretary must develop and implement a federal permanent program for each State that
fails to submit or enforce a satisfactory state program.
§ 504, 30 U. S. C. § 1254. In such situations, the Secretary

,.

d('.fined in § 701 ( 4) , 30 U. S. C. § 1291 ( 4). Section 710 of the Act, 30
U. S. C. § 1300, r('gulate:; surface mining on "Indian lands."
7 The proposed state programs were to have been submitted by l<'ebruary a, 1979- 18 months after the Act was passed. Exercising his
authority under § 504 (a), the Secretary extended the deadline until
Augu"t 3, 1979. See 44 Fed . Reg. 15324 (1979). Because the Secretary's
March 1979 publication of the permanent regulations occurred 7 months
a t'ter the date set by the Act, see 30 U. S. C. § 1251 (b), the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia further extended the
deadline for submission of state programs to and including March 3, 1980.
In n Pennanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, Civ. No. 79-1144
(D. C July 25, and Aug. 21, 1979) . See also 44 Fed. Reg. 60969 (1979)
(announcing conforming changes in the Secretary's regulations governing
submission of state programs) .
With the exception of Alaska, Georgia, and Washington, all States in
which surface mining is either conducted or is expected to be conducted
submitted proposed state programs to the Secretary by March 3, 1980.
The Secretary has made his initial decisions on these programs. Three
p rograms were approved, eight were approved on condition that the States
agr"'e to some modifications, 10 were approved in part and disapproved
i11 part, and three were disapproved because the state legislatures had
failed to enact the necessary implementing statutes. Virginia 's program
wa s among those approved in part and disapproved in part. See 45 Fed.
Rrg. 69977 (1980) . Under § 503 of the Act, a State may revise a plan
that has been disapproved in whole or in part and resubmit it to the
Secretary within 60 days of hie initial decision.

'

·~:. ~
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constitutes the regulatory authority administering the Act
within that State and continues as such unless and until a
"state program" is approved. No later than 8 months after
adoption of either a state-run or federally administered permanent regulatory program for a State, all surface coal mining and reclamation operations on "non-Federal lands"
within that State must obtain a new permit issued in accordance with the applicable regulatory program. § 506 (a), 30
U. S. C. § 1256 (a).

B
On October 23, 1978, the Virginia Surface Mining and
Reclamation Association, Inc., an association of coal pro-.
ducers engaged in surface coal mining operations in Virginia,
63 of its member coal companies, and four individual landowners filed suit in federal district court seeking declaratory
and inj unctive relief against various provisions of the Act.
The Commonwealth of Virginia and the Town of Wise, Va.,
intervened as plaintiffs. 8 Plaintiffs' cha.llen ~ was primarily
ecause the
directed at Title V's,_ erformance standar s
permanent regu atory program was not scheduled to become
effective until June 3, 1980, plaintiffs' challenge was directed
at the sections of the Act establishing the interim regulatory
vrogram. Plaintiffs alleged that these provisions violate the
Commerce Clause, the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment/ 0
"The Virginia Citizens for Better Reclamation, Inc., and the Town of
St Charles, Va ., intervened as defendants in support of the Secretary.
t> Plaintiff::; abo challenged Title IV of the Act, 30 U . S. C. §§ 401-413,
whieh establisheb a reclamation program for abandoned mines. The
Di8trict Court, held, however, that it would exercise its discretion by "not
grant jlllg] declaratory judgments as to the provisions of that title." 483
F. Supp., at 429. There is no appeal from this. portion of the District
Court ':; JUdgment.
10
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment states that no
person :;hall ''bP deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due procest>
(lf• lm ' U. S. Cou:'!t., Arndt. V.
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the Tenth Amendment, 11 and the Just Compensation Clause
of the Fifth Amendment. 12
The District Court held a 13-day trial on plaintiffs' requPst for a permanent injunction. The court subsequently
issued an order and opinion declaring several central provisions of the Act unconstituti~l. 483 F. Supp.~5 (1980),
The court r · cted plain tiff~ommerce Claus~ual protection, an
u ~taE.!iv~~y_r9.._cess c a enges to the Act.
T"he"' court held, however~ that tne Act "'operates to displace
the States' freedom to structure integral operations in numerous areas of traditional functions,' and, therefore, is in contravention of the Tenth Amendment." Id., at 435, quoting
lvational League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976).
Tht' court also ruled that various provisions of the Act effect
an uncompensated taking of private property in violation of
the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
FiHaliy, the court agreed with plaintiffs' due process challenges to some of the Act's enforcement provisions. The
(~ourt permanently enjoined the Secretary from enforcing
various provisions of the Act. 18
In No. 79-1538, the Secretary appeals from that portion
of the District Court's judgment declaring various sections of
the Act unconstitutional and permanently enjoining their enforeernent. In. No. 79-1567, plai11tiffs cross-appeal from the
11 Under the Tenth Amendment, "[]the powers nut delegated to the
U11ite<.l State::, by the Con~titution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
rr~t·rv<'d to the State:> respectively, or to the people." U. S. Canst.,
Amdt. X .
1
~ Tht> Compensation Clause pr~its -~he taking of private property "for
public use, without just compensatiOn." U. S. Canst., Arndt. V.
n The District Court demed the Secretary's motion for a stay pending
dlf(·r·t appeal to this Court. At the same time, the court issued an order
nnd orinion elarifying and modifying its earlier order. Jurisdictional
Statement Appt>ndix (J. S. App.) la-16a. Upon the Secretary'~ application , we issued an order staying the District Court's judgment "pending
U. S.
the I imely filing and disposition of the appeals in this Court." (19 0).

rtblJ
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District Court's rejection of their Commerce Clause challenge
to the Act. 14 Because of the importance of the .issues raised,
we noted probable jurisdiction of both appeals, 15 U. S.
16
- · (1980), and consolidated the two cases.
For convenienec, we shall usually refer to plaintiffs as "appellees."

•

II
On cross-appeal, appellees argue that the District Court
crrf'cl in rejecting their challenge to the Act as beyond the
scope of congressional power under the Commerce Clause.
They insist that the Act's principal goal is regulating the use
o£ private lands within the borders of the States and not, as
the District Court found, regulating the interstate commerce
effects of surface coal mining. Consequently, appellees contelld that the ultimate issue presented is "whether land as
.'luch i8 subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause,
i. e. whether land can be regarded as being 'in commerce.' ., Brief for Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Assn., Inc., et al. Appellees, at 12 (emphasis in original).
In urging us to answer "no" to this question, appellees emphasize that the Court has recognized that land-use regulation is within the inherent police powers of the States and
11

Plaintiffs do not appeal from that portion of the District Court's
judgment rejecting their equal protection and ~ubstantive due proce~s
rhallenges to the Act.
JG The jurisdiction of thb Court was invoked under 28 U. S. C . § 1252
wliH'h provides for duect appeal to this Court from any deci;;ion by a
('0111'1 of the United States invalidating an Act of Congress in any suit to
winch the United States, its agencies, officer;;, or employees are parties.
1
u We also agrt>ed to hear the appeal in No. 80-231, Hodel v. Indiana,
whil'h involves ;;imilar constitutional challenges to different provisions of
tlw Surfac!' Mining Act, and which we also decide today. Post, at-. At
least three other District Courts have considered constitutional challenges
lo provi;;ionb of the Surface Mining Act. In Concerned Citizens of
Appulachia. Inc. v Andrus, 4!:14 F. Supp. 679 (ED Tenn. 1980), appeal
pending, No. 80-1448 (CA6), the District Court upheld the Act in the

I
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their political subdivisions, 11 and argue that Congress may
regulate land-use only insofar as the Property Clause 18 grants
it control over federal lands.
We do not accept either a pellees' framing of the question
or the answer
e would have us supp y.
he task of a
court t at IS asked to etermine w et er a particular exercLe of congressional power is valid under the Commerce
Clause is relatively narrow. The court must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity affects interstate
commerce, if there is any rational basis for such a finding.
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 2H
258 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U. S. 294, 303-304
( 1964). This established, the only remaining question for
judicial inquiry is whether "the means chosen by [Congress]
is reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution ." Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, supra,
at 262. See United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 121
(1941); Katzenbach v. McClung, supra, at 304. The judicial task is at an end once the court determines that Congress
acted rationally in adopting a particular regulatory scheme.

Ibid.
Judicial review in this area is influenced above all by the
the fact that the Commerce Clause is a ant of plenary aufaee of challenges 8imilar to those raised by plaintiffs in the instant case.
In Star Coal Co . v. Andrus, No. 79-171-2 (SD Iowa Feb. 13, 1980),
8]1peal pending, No . 80-49 (CAS), the District Court rejected challenges
bm.;Pd on the Fifth and Tenth Amendments, but enjoined some of the Act's
('Jlforcement provisions. And in Andrus v. P-Burg Coal Co., 495 F. Supp.
2 (SD Ind 1980), appeal pending, No. 80-1916 (CA7), the District Court
tl'.ircted a Commerce Clause challenge to the Act.
11 Appellees cite cases such as Village of Bette Terre v. Bor-aas, 416
U. S. 1 (1974); Berman v. Parker, 348 U. S. 26 (1954); City of Euclid
v. Amber Realty Co ., 272 U. S. 365 (1926).
1
~ The Property Clause provides: "Congress shall have the power to
di;;po~e of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the·
Territory or other property belonging to the United States." U.S Canst .~
Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.

I .
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thority to Congress. See National League of Cities v. Usery,
426~0; Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14,
19 (1946); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S.
1, 37 (1937). This power is "complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations,
other than are prescribed in the constitution." Gibbons v.
Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196 (1824). Moreover, this Court has
made clear that the commerce power extends not only to
"the use of channels of interstate or foreign commerce" and
to "protection of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce . . . or persons or things in commerce," but also to
"activities affecting commerce." Perez v. United States. 402
U. S. 146, 150 (1971). As we explained in Fry v. United
States, 421 U. S. 542, 547 (1975), "[e]ven activity that is
purely intrastate in character may be regulated by Congress,
where the activity, combined with like conduct by others
similarly situated, affects commerce among the States or with
foreign nations." See National League of Cities v. Usery,
.o;upra, at 840 ; Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States.
s·upra, at 255; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 127-128
( 1942); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U. S.
110, 119 (1942); United States v. Darby, supra, at 120- 121.
Thus, when Congress has determined that an activity affects interstate commerce, the courts need inquire only
·whether the finding is rational. Here, the District Co11rt
properly deferred to Congress' express £ndings, set out in the
Act Itself, about the effects of surface coal mininp; on interstakl commerce. Section 101 (c), 30 U. S. C. § 1201 (c) recite~' the congressional finding that
"many surface mining operations result in disturbances
of surface areas that burden and adversely affect commerce and the public welfare by aestroying or diminishing the utility of land for commercial. industrial, residPntial, recreational, agricultural, alld forestry purposes,.
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by causing erosion and landslides, by contributing to
floods, by polluting the water, by destroying fish and
wildlife habitats, by impairing natural beauty, by damaging the property of citizens, by creating hazards dan~erous to life and property by degrading the quality of
life in local communities, and by counteracting governmental programs and efforts to conserve soil, water, and
other natural resources."
lThe legislative record provides ample support for these
statutory findings. The Surface Mining Act became law
only after 6 years of the most thorough leg-islative cons:deration.'9 Committees of both Houses of Congress held ex111 Hearings on proposed legislation regulating surface coal mining began
in 1963. Surface Mining Reclamation: Hearings before the Senate Comtuittl'e on Interior and Insular Affairs, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. ( 1968). Three
year:> later, additional hearings were held by Committees of both the House
and the Senate. Regulation of Strip Mining: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Mines and Mining of the House Committee on Interior and Insular
Affair;,, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); Surface Mining: Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Minerals, Materials and Fuels of the Senate Committee
on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sel:il:i. (1971) . The Committees reported biJI::; for consideration by their respective houses. The
Hon~e IJH~bed H . R. 6482, but Congress adjourned before the Senate could
Ad on the meatjur·e.
Rimilar bllls were reintroduced in the 93d Congress and further hearings were held. Regulation of Surface Mining Operations: Hearings before
I he Sf'nate Committee on Interior and Insular Affair::;, 93d Con g. , 1st Set's.
( l87:3); Regulation of Surface Mining : Hearings before the Subnomml1ter' ou Lhe Environment and the Subcommittee on Mines and Mining
of thl' House Committee on Interior and ln::;ular Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st
Se~~ . (1973)
At the rrque;:;l of the Chairman of the Senate Committee,
tlu• Council on Environmental Quality prepared a report entitled Coal
Surface Mining and Reclamation : An Environmental and Economic
At<t-f'~cment of Alternative!:! (Comm. Print 1973), and the Senate Cornmittel~ ht'ld additional hearings to consider the report.
Coal Surface
Miui11g and Heelamation: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Minerals,
Materials and Fuels of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular
Affair;,, 93d Cong., ll:it Sess. (1973). The House and Senate Cornnl.ittces

. ' i
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tended hearings during which vast amounts of testimony and
documentary evidence about the effects of surface mining on
our Nation's environment and economy were brought to Congress' attention. Both Committees made detailed findings
about these effects and the urgent need for federal legislation
to address the problem. The Senate Report explained that
"[s]urface coal mining activities have imposed large so..
cial costs on the public ... in many areas of the country
in the form of unreclaimed lands, water pollution, erosion, floods, slope failures, loss of fish and wildlife ret·r]Jorted bills for consideration by both houses, and Congress passed a bill
that was vetoed by President Ford in 1974.
The ~urface mining legislation was reintroduced in the 94th Congress in
1975, and the Senate Committee held a hearing on Administration objectiOJJ~ to the bill. Surface Mining Briefing: Briefirg before the Senate
Committee on Interior and IPsular Affairs, 94th CoPg., 1st Sess. (1975).
Both Committees reported bills to the House and Senate, which again
paol:led a bill reported by the Conference Committee. President Ford
again vetoed the bill.
The protacted congressional endeavor finally Lore fruit in 1977. The
re!Pvant House and Senate Cf'mmittees held extersive hearings Phortlv
after the opening of the 95th Congress to consider bills introduced at the
very b ~·ginning of the new legislative ses::;ion. Surface Mining Control and
He~Jamahon Acl of 1977: Hearings on S. 7 before the Subrommittee on
Public Lands and Resources of the Senate Committee on Energv and
~atural Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (Hl77 Senate Hearings);
8mfa<'e Miring Control and Reclamation Act of 1977: HeariflgH on H. H.
'2 LPforr the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong.,
ht Sr~t< . (1\J77) (1977 House Hearings) . The legislation was reported to
hoth Hou~es and pa~~age in both chambers followed , after lengthy floor
debate. 123 Cong Rec . 12681-12886, 15691-Hi754 (1977). The Conferrnce Committee n>port was issued in July 1977, H. R. (Conf. Ren.) No.
9.'5- 493 (1977), and after further floor debate, both Houses 11grecd to the
bill rPrommended by the conferees. 123 Cong. Rec . 23967-23988, 2441924429 (1977) . Pre~ident Carter signed the Act into law on August 3,
1977. The legislative history of the Act is summarized in S. Rep . No.
f!,'i 1?~ 59- 61 (1977) , and in H . R. Ren . No. 95-218 140-141 (1977). See
·:tl~ o , Note,. 81 W. Ya. L. Rev. 775 (1979).
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sources, and a. decline in na.tural beftuty,"
!>5-128, 50 ( 1977).

S.

Rep.

1~

N9.

See id., at 50-54.
' Similarly, the House Committee documented the advetse
~ffects of surface coal mining as including:

''

11

'Acid drainage which has r uined an estimated 11,000
miles of streams; the loss of prime hardwood forest
and the destruction of wildlife habitat by strip min~
ing; the degradation of productive farmland; recurrent
landslides; siltation and Eedimentation of river systexm: .... '" H. R. Rep. No. 95-218, 58 (1977) , quoting
H. R. Rep. No. 94--1445, 19 (1976).
.

Aud 1u

discussin~

the impact of surface coal mining on water
resourees, the House Committee explained that:
"The most widespread damages . . . are environmental
in nature. Water users incur significant economic and financial losEes as well.
~Reduced recreational values, fishkills, reductions in
normal waste assimilation capacity, impaired water supplies, metals and masonry corrosion and deterioration,
increased flood frequencies and flood damages, reductions
in designed water storage capacities at impoundments,
and higher opera.t ing costs for commercial waterway
users are some of the most obvious economic effects that
stern from mining-rela.t ed pollution and sedimentation.'~
!d., at 59.
See id., at 96- 122.
The Committees also explained that inadequacies in existing state laws and the need for uniform minimum nationwide
standards made federal regulations imperative. See S. Rep.
No. 95-128, supm, at 49; H . R. Rep. No. 95-218, s'upra, at
58. l11 light of the evidence available to Congress and the
detailed consideration that the legislation received, we cannot
s~y that Congress did not. have a rational basis for conclu.tlirig
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~h:at surface coal mining has substantial effects on interstatE:!
commerce.
Appellees do not, in general, dispute the validity of the
congressional findings. 20 Rather, appellees' contention is that
the "rational basis" test should not apply in this case because the Act regulates land use, a local activity not affecting interstate commerce. But even assuming arguendo that
appellees correctly characterize the land use regulated by the
Act as a "local" activity, their argument is nonetheless
u11 persuasive.
The denomination of an activity as "local" or "intrastate"
activity does not resolve the question whether Congress may
regulate it under the Commerce Clause. As previously
noted. the commerce E.Q.Wer "extends to those activities intrastate which so affectinterstate commerce, or the exertion of
tli'e"power o ongress over it, as to mal{e -;;gulation 2f them
appropnate means to the attaimrumt oralegitimate end, the
e.ti'ective execution of the granted power to regulate interstate
commerce." United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., s·upra,
at 119 See fi,ry v. United States, ~rupra, at 547; NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., s·upra, at 37. This Court has
loug held that Congress may regulate the conditions under
which goods shipped in interstate commerce are produced
where the "local" activity of producing these goods itself
affects interstate commerce. See, e. g., United States v.
Darby, supra; Wickard v. Filburn, supra; NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., supra; Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316
U. S. 517 (1942) . Cf. Katzenbach v. McClung, supra. Appellees do not dispute that coal is a commodity that moves
in intt>rstate commerce. Here, Congress rationally deter-

l

..·'·

20 Appellee~:> do contend that surface mining enhances rather than
diminishes the utility of lanu in the steep-slope areas of Virginia. CongrE'~ti , however, made contrary finding~, and it is ~ufficient for purposes of
judicial review that Congre~s had a rational ba8is for concluding as it did:

See Kleppe v. New Me:cico, 426 U. S. 529, 541, n. 10 (1976); United
SfateE v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152-154 (1938) ~
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mined that regulation of surface coal mining is necessary to
protect interstate commerce from adverse effects that may
result from that activity. This congressional finding is suffi·
cient to sustain the Act as a valid exercise of Congress' power
under the Commerce Clause.
Moreover, the Act responds to a congressional finding that
nationwide "surface mining and reclamation standards are
essential in order to insure that competition in interstate
commerce among sellers of coal produced in different States
will not be used to undermine the ability of the several States
to improve and maintain adequa.te standards on coal mining
operations within their borders." 30 U. S. C. § 1201 (g).
The prevention of this sort of destructive interstate competi·
tion is a traditional role for congressional action under the
Commerce Clause. In United States v. Darby, supra, the
Court used a similar rationale to sustain the imposition of
federal minimum wage and maximum hour regulations on a
manufacturer of goods shipped in interstate commerce. The
Comt explained that the statute implemented Congress' view
that "interstate commerce should not be made the instrument
of competition in the distribution of goods produced under
substandard labor conditions, which competition is injurous
to the commerce and to the states from which and to which
the commerce flows." !d., at 115. The same rationale ap·
pliPs here to support the conclusion that the Surface Mining
Act is within the authority granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause.
Finally, we agree with the lower federal courts that have
uniformly found the power conferred by the Commerce
Clause broad enough to permit congressional regulation of
activities causing air or water pollution, or other environ·
mental hazards.21 Appellees do not dispute that the envi2t See, e. g., United States v. Byrd, 610 F . 2d 1204, 1209-1210 (CA7
1979); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Train, 544 F . 2d 657, 663 (CA3 1976);
Sierra Club v. Train, U. S. App. D . C. - , 540 F. 2d 1114, 1139
(1976) , crrt. denied, 430 U, S. 959 (1977) ; District of Columbia v. Train.

!I
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romnental and other problems that the Act attempts to con~
trol can properly be addressed through Commerce Clause
legislation. In these circumstances, it is difficult to find any
remaining foundation for appellees' argument that, because
it regulates a particular land use, the Surface Mining Act is
beyond congressional Commerce Clause authority. Accordingly, we turn to the question whether the means selected by
Congress were reasonable and appropriate.
1
ns ' lected by the
Appellees' essential challenge to thl
Act is that they a.re redundant or unnecessary. Appellees
contend that a variety of federal statutes such as the Clea~
Air Act, 42 U. S. C. § 7401 et seq. (19'J ed., Supp. III), the
Flood Control Act, 33 U. S. C. § 701 et seq., and the Clean
Water Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq., adequately address the
federal interest in controlling the environmental effects of
surface coal mining without need to resort to the land use
regulation scheme of the Surface Mining Act. The short
answer to this argument is that the effectiveness of existing
laws .in dealing with a problem identified by Congress is ordinarily a matter committed to legislative j1·dgment. Con-.
gress considered the effectiveness of existing legislation and
concluded that additional measures were necessary to deal
with the interstate commerce effects of surface coal mining.
SN' H. H. Rep . No. 95- 218, supra, at 58-60; S. Rep. No. 95128, supra, at 59-53. And we agree with the court below
that the Act's regulatory scheme is reasonably related to the
goals Congress sought to accomplish. The Act's restrictions
on the practices of mine operators aU serve to control the
environmental and other adverse effects of surface coal
mi11i11g.
TT. S. Ap.[J . D . C. - , 521 F . 2d 971, 988 (1975), vacated and remauded on other grounds sub nom. EPA v. Brown, 43i U. S. 99 (1977);
United Stat es v. Ashland Oil & Tra:nsportation Co., 504 F. 2d 1317, 1325
(CA6 1974) ; Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F. 2d 246, 259 (CA3 1974);
South T erminal Corp . v. EPA , 504 F . 2d 6i6, 677, (CAl 1974); United
S tate8 v. Bishop Processing Co ., 287 F . Supp. 624 (Md. 1968), aff'd, 42S;
F 2d 469 (CA4) , cert , d<>nied, 398 U. S. 904 (1970).
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In sum, we conclude that the District Court properly re~
jected appellees' Commerce Clause challenge to the Act. W ~
therefore turn to the court's ruling that the Act contravenes
affirmative constitutional limitations on congressional exer~
eise of the commerce power.

III
The District Court invalidated §§ 515 (d) and (e) of the
Act, which prescribe performance standards for surface coal
lflining on "steep-slopes," 22 on the ground that they violate
a constitutio;al limitation on the commerce power imposed
by the Tenth Amendment. These provisions require "steepelope" op'eratOrs to: (i) to reclaim the mined area by com ..
pletely covering the highwall and returning the site to its
"approximate original contour"; 28 (.ii) to refrain from dumping spoil material on the downslope below the bench or mining cut; and (iii) to refrain from disturbing la.nd above the
highwall unless permitted to do so by the regulatory authority. § 515 (d), 30 U. S. C. § 1265 (d). Under § 515 (e) , a
~'steep-slope" operator may obtain a variance from the approximate original contour requirement by showing that it
will allow a post-reclamation use that is "deemed to contitute an equal or better economic or public use" than would
therwise be possible. 30 U.S. C. § 1265 (e)(3)(A). 24
St>f'tion 515 (d)( 4), 30 U. S. C. § 1265 (d) (4) defines a "steep ~lope''
~:>lope above 20 degrees or such le;;ser slope as may be defined by
.he regulatory authority after consideration of soil, climate, and othel
fharacleristics of a region or State."
28 The term "approximate original contour" is defined as "that surface
'onfiguration achieved by backfilling and grading of the mined area so
.hat the reclaimed area, including any terracing or access roads, closely
Jetiembles the general surface configuration of the land prior to mining
and bll'nds into and complementb the drainagE' pattern of the surrounding
terrain, with all high walls and ::;poi! piles eliminated.'" § 701 (2), 30
u. s. c. § 1291 (2).
14 Section 515 (c), 30 U. S. C. § 1265 (c) , establitihes a separate vari-·
Jnce p rocedure for mountaintop mining operations.
22
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The District Court's ruling relied heavily on our decision
in National League of Cities v. Usery, supra. The District
Court viewed the central issue as whether the Act governs
the activi~ies of private individuals, or whether it instead
regulates the governmentai decisions of the States. · And
although the court acknowledged that the Act "ultimately
affects the coal mine operator," it concluded that the Act
contravenes the Tenth Amendment because it interferes with
the States' "traditional governmental function" of regulating
land use. 483 F. Supp., at 432. The court held, that, as
applied to Virginia, the Act's steep-slope provisions impermissibly constrict the State's ability to make "essential deci~
sions." 25 The court found the Act accomplishes this result
"through forced relinquishment of state control of land use
planning; through loss of state control of its economy; and
through economic harm, from expenditure of state funds to
implement the act and from destruction of the taxing power
of certain counties, cities. and towns." 483 F. Supp., at
25 The eourt reasoned that although the Act allows a State to elect to
have its own regulatory program, the "choice that is purportedly given
i;; rJo ehoice at all" because the state program must comply with federally
. prescribed standards. 483 F. Supp., at 432.
26 On the basis of the evidence presented at trial, the co~rt found that
post-mining restoration of steep slopes to their "approximate original
contour" is " economically infeasible and physically impossible." 483 F.
Supp., at 434. The court noted that the steep-;;lope provisions pa.rticularly affect Virginia because 95% of its coal reserves are located on such
lands. And the court indicated that several coal mine operators had
bPen forced to shut down becau;;e they were unable to comply with the
Act's requirements, with adverse consequences for the economies of various towns and counties that are dependent on coal mining. The court
also found that there is a need for level land in the counties of the
Virginia coal field:;, and it concluded that the Act's reclamation provisions wuu pr ent " forward-looking land use planning" by the State.
483 F . Supp., a l 434 . Finally, the court found that restoration of mined
laud to its original contour would diminish the value of the land from
the $5 ,000-$300,000 an acre value of level land to the $5-$75 per acr~
vnlue of steep slope land,

·,
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485. 20 The eourt therefore permanently enjoined enforce-.
ment of §§ 515 (d) and (e). 27
The District Court's reliance on National Leag'Ue of Cities
requires a careful review of the actual basis and import of
our decision in that case. There, we considered a constitutional challenge to the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor
Standards Act which had extended federal minimum wage
and maximum hour regulations to most state and local government employees. Because it was conceded that the challeng·,d regulations were "undoubtedly within the scope of
the Commerce Clause," id., at 841, the only question presented was whether that particular exercise of the commerce
power "enco unter[ed] a . . . constitutional barrier because
fthe regulations] ... applied directly to the States and subdivisions of States as employers." Ibid. We began by drawin!-!: a sharp distinction betw~en congressional regulation of
private persons and businesses "necessarily subject to the
dual sovereignty of the government of the Nation and of the
State in which they reside," id., at 845, and federal regulation "directed not to private citizens, but to the States as
States,'' ibid. As to the former , we found no Tenth Amendment impediment to congressional action. Instead, we reaffirmed our consistent rule:
"Congressional power over areas of private endeavour,
even when its exercise may pre-empt express state-law
determiJJ.ations coutrary to the result that has commended itself to the collective wisdom of Congress, has
been held to be limited only by the requirement that

,.

.

.

~

In its order and opinion accompanying its denial of the Secretary's
rt•quest foi a stay of its judgment pending appeal, see n. 13, supra, the
District Court explainl'd that the injunction against enforcement of the
stPrp-slope standards was not intended to "allo [ w] spoil to be placed
on the downslope in an uncontrolled manner." The court stated that
''falny such down~lope spoil placement shall be in a controlled manner
meeting the environmental protection standards ~pecifi ed by the regulatNy authority." ,T. S. App. 2a.
2 '1
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' the means chosen by [Congress] must be reasonably.
adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution.!
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241, 262 (1964)." ld., at 840.
We noted, however, that "the States as States stand on
quite a different footing from an ~orporation
when challenging the exercise of Congress' power to regulate
commerce." I d. at 854. We indicated that when Congress
attempts to 4'[!e~~ii)regulate ~he States as States the Tenth
Amendment reqmres recognitiOn "that there are attributes
of sovereignty attaching to every state government which
may not be impaired by Congress, not because Congress may
lack an affirmative grant of legislative authority to reach the
matter, but because the Constitution prohibits it from exercising the authority in that manner." Id., at 845. We held
that the power to set the wages and work hours of state employees was 11an undoubted attribute of state sovereignty."
Ibid. And because we further found that the challenged
regulations would 11 displace the States' freedom to structure
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions," we concluded that Congress could not, consistently
with the Tenth Amendment, "abrogate the States' otherwise plenary authority to make [these decisions]." I d., at
845-846.28
28 National Leagtte of Cities expressly left open the question "whether
different results might obtain if Congress seeks to affect integral operation ~ of state governments by exerci~ing authority granted it under other
sections of the Constitution such as the spending power, Art. I, § 8, cl.
1, or § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." National League of Cities v.
U&ery , 426 U. S. 833, 852, n. 17 (1977). In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzet, 427
U. S. 445 (1976) , the Court upheld Congress' power under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment . to authorize private damages actions against
~t ate government ~ for discrimination in employment. The Court explained that, beeause the Amendment was adopted with the specific
purpose of limiting State autonomy, constitutional principles of federalism
do not restrict ·congressional power to invade State autonomy when

I
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should be apparent from this discussion that in orden
io succeed, a claim that congressional commerce power legislation is invalid under the reasoning of National League of
Cities must satisf e c of three requirements. First, there
must be a showing t at the cha lenged statute regulates the
States as States. Second, the federal regulation must address matters that are indisputably "attributes of state sovereignty.'' ld., at 845. And third, it must be apparent that
the States' compliance with the federal law would directly
impair their ability "to structure integral operations in areas
of traditional functions." Id., at 852. 1 s 'When the Surface
Mining Act is examined in light of these principles, it is
clear that appellees' Tenth Amendment challenge must fail
because the first of the three requirements is not satisfied.
The District Court's holding to the contrary rests on an unwarranted extension of our holding in National Leag·ue of
Cit·ies.
As the District Court itself acknowledged, the steep-slope
provisions of the Surface Mining Act govern only the activities of coal mine operators who are private individuals and
businesses. Moreover, the States are not compelled to enforce the steep-slope standards, to expend any state funds,
or to participate in the federal regulatory program in any
manner whatsoever. If a Sta.te does not wish to submit a
proposed permanent program that complies with the Act and
implementing regulations, the full regulatory burden will be
borne by the Federal Government. Thus, there can be no
Congress legislates under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id, at
452-456.
~ 9 Demonstrating that these three requirements are met does not , however, guarantee that a Tenth Amendment challenge to congressional
commerce power action will succeed. There are situations in which the
nature of the federal intere~:~t advanced may be such that it .iustifies
State submission . See f!'ry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542 (1975), reaffirmed in National Leag·ue of Cities v. Usery , supra, at 852-853 (1977).
See al~o , id., at 856 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring).
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suggf'stion that the Act commandeers the legislative processes
of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program. Cf. Maryland v. EPA,
530 F. 2d 215, 224-228 (CA4 1977), vacated and remanded
sub nom. EPA v. Brown, 431 U. S. 99 (1977); District of
Colum-b-ia v. Train, U. S. App. D. C. - . 521 F. 2d 971,
990-994 (1975), vacated and remanded sub nom. EPA v.
Brown , 431 U. S. 99 ( 1977); Brown v. EPA, 521 F. 2d 827,
837-R42 (CA9 1975), vacated and remanded, 431 U. S. 99
(1977) . The most that can be said is that the Surface Mining
Act establishes a program of cooperative federalism that
allows the States, within limits established by federal minim urn standards, to enact and administer their own regulatory
programs, structured to meet their own particular needs. See
ln re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, U. S. App. D. C. - , 617 F. 2d 807, 808 (1980). In this
respect, the Act resembles a number of other federal statutes
that have survived Tenth Amendment challenges in the lower
feder-al courts.30
Appellees argue, l1owever, that the threat of federal usurpation of their regulatory roles coerces the States into enforcing the Surface Mining Act. Appellees also contend that
the Act directly regulates the States as States because it establishes mandatory minimum federal standards. In essence,
appellees urge us to join the District Court in looking beyond
the activities actually regulated by the Act to its conceivable
effects on the States' freedom to make decisions in areas of
"integral governmental functions." And appellees emphasize, as did the court below, that the Act interferes with the·
so See, e. g., United States v. Helsley, 615 F . 2d 784 (CA9 1979) (upholding the Airborne Hunting Act, 16 U. S. C. § 742j-1); li'riends of the
Ea1·th , Inc . v. Carey, 552 F . 2d 25, 36-39 (CA2), cert. denied, 434 U. S.
90'2 (1977) (upholding the Clean Air Act, 42 U. S. C. § 7401 et seq.
(1976 ed., Supp. III) ; Sierra Club v. EPA U. S. App. D. C. - ,
540 F. 2d 1114, 1140 (1976) , cert.. denied, 430 U.S. 959 (1977) (upholding the Clean Water Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq.) .
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States' ability to exercise their police powers by regulating
land use.
Appellees' claims accurately characterize the Act insofar as
it prescribes federal minimum standards governing surface
coal mining, which a State may either implement itself or
else yield to a federally administered regulatory program.
'To object to this scheme, however, appellees must assume
that the Tenth Amendment limits congressional power to
pre-empt or displace state regulation of private activities affecting interstate commerce. This assumption is incorrect.
A wealth of precedent attests to congressional authority to
displace or pre-empt state laws regulating private activity
affecting interstate commerce when these laws conflict with
federal law. See, e. g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S.
519, 525-526 (1977); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U. S. 637, 649650 (1971) ; Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,
3~7 U. S. 132. 141-143 (1963); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New
York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U. S. 767, 772-776;
Hines v. Davidotvitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67-68 (1941) . Moreover,
it is clear that the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to
prohibit all--and not just inconsistent-state regulation of
such activities. See, e. g., Burbank: v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973); Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S.
297 (1961); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218
(1947); Transit Comm'n v. United States, 289 U. S. 121
(1933) . Although such congressional enactments obviously
curtail or prohibit the States' prerogatives to make policy
choices respecting subjects the States may consider important, the Supremacy Clause permits no other result. See
Chicaqo North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile,
U. S. - , - - · - (1981); Sanitaru Distr·ict v. United
States, 266 U. S. 405. 425-426 (1925); 1'he Minnesota Rate
Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 399 (1913); Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. ,
at 211. As the Court long ago stated: "It is elementary and
wen settled that there can be no divided authority over inter~
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state commerce, and that the acts of Congress on that subject are supreme and exclusive." Missour'i Pacific R. Co. v.
Stroud, 267 U. S. 404, 408 (1925).
Thus, Congress could constitutionafly have enacted a stattJ t<> prohibiting any state regulation of surface coal mining.
We fail to see why the Surface Mining Act should become
constitutionally suspect simply because Congress chose to
allow the States a regulatory role. Contrary to the assumption by both the District Court and appellees, nothing in
National League of Cities suggests that the Tenth Amendment shields the States from pre-emptive federal regulation
of private activities affecting iuterstate commerce. To the
contrary, National League of Cities explicitly reaffirmed the
teaching of earlier cases that Congress may, in regula.ting private activities pureuant to the commerce power, "pre-empt
E-xpress state-law determinations contrary to the result which
ha!l commended itself to the collective wisdom of Congress . . . . " !d., at 840. The only limitation on congressional authority in this regard is the requirement that the
means selected be reasonably relat<>d to the goal of regulating interstate commerce. Ibid. We have already indicated
that the Act satisfies this test. 31
Thir. conrlusion applies regardless of whether the federal
legislation rlisplaces laws enacted under the States' "police
r.owers." The Court long ago rejected the suggestion that
Congrrss invades areas reserved to the States by the Tenth
Amendment sinwly because it exercises its authority under
the Commerce Clause in a manner that displaces the States'
exercise of their police powers. See Hoke v. United States,
227 U. S. 308, 320- 323 (1913); Athanasaw v. United States,
SI Sre S'upra, at ll~17 .
It is ,;ignificant that the Commonwealth of Virginia prel:iSes its Tenth Amenument challenge to the Act simply as another regulator of ~urface coal mining whose regulatory program has been
displaced or pre-empted by federal law. As indicated in text, no Tenth
Amendment concerns are implicated in :;urh ~ituation~:;,
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'227 U. S. 326 (1913); Cleveland v. United States, supra, at
19; United States v. Darby, supra, at 113-114; United States
·v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., supra, at 119. Cf. United States
v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 147 (1938) ("it is
uo objection to the exertion of the power to regulate interstate commerce that its exercise is attended by the same incidents which attend the exercise of the police power of the
states"); 32 accord, FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315
U. S. 575, 582 (1942); Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries &
Warehouse Co., 251 U. S. 146, 156 (1919); Seven Cases v.
United States, 239 U. S. 510, 514 (1916). This Court has
upheld as constitutional any number of federal statutes enacteJ under the commerce power that pre-empt particular
exrrciscs of state police power. See, e. g., United States v.
Walsh, 331 U. S. 432 (1947) (upholding Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act, 21 U. S. C. §§ 301--392); N LRB v. Jones
(e: Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1 (1937) (upholding National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 151-168); United
States v. Darbu, supra (upholding Fair Labor Standards Act,
29 U. S. C. §§ 2)1-219). It would therefore be a radical departure from long-established precedent for this Court to
hold that the Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress from
displacing state police power laws regulating private activity.
Nothing in National League of Cities compels or even hints
at such a departure.83
3~

This huldirg disposes of the contention by appellees and

rw!ici that the Surface Mining Act is unconstitutional

becau~e

variou~:.

it presumes the exi~tence of a federal police power. A~ the Court has 10tated:
' 'The authority of the Federal Government over interstate comm r e does
not differ in extent or character from that rett 1ed by the states over
intrnstate commerce." United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 116
(1941). quoting United States v. Rock Royal r'o-operative, 307 U.S. 533
Mi9- !\70 (1939) .
q 3 The remamirg justification H8serted by the District Court for its
frnth Am"?ndment ruling, one that appellee urge here, is that the steepHlop0 mining requirements will harm Virginia'~ economy and destroy the
jnxirg power of ~orne town~ and counties in the Commonwealth. In this
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In sum, appellees' Tenth Amendment challenge to the Sur..
face Mining Act must fail because here, in contrast to the
situation in National League of Cities, the statute at issue
regulates only "individuals and businesses necessarily subject
to the dual sovereignty of the government of the Nation and
the State in which they reside." National League of Cities
v. Usery, supra, at 845. 84 Accordingly, we turn to the District Court's ruling that the Act contravenes other constitutional limits on congressional action.

IV
The District Court held that two of the Act's provisions
violate the J~t C~~~~ ~e of the Fifth Amendment. First, tfie court found that the steep-slope provisions
discussed above effect an uncompensated taking of private
property by requiring operators to perform the "economically
and physically impossible" task of restoring steep-slope sur..
regard, thf' courf may have been influencf'd by the discussion in National
League of Oities about the likely impact of the challenged regulations on
the finnnces of St11te and local governments. National League of Cities
v. Use1':t/. supra, at 846-847. But as the Court made clear, the determinative factor in that rase was the nature of the federal action, not the
nltimnte reonomic impact on the States. !d., at 847. Moreover, even
if it i:;:; true that the Act's rf'quirements will have a measurable impact
on Virginia's economy, thi, kind of effect., standing alone, is insufficirnt to
e;tnblii-ih a violation of the Tenth Amendment. In Oklahoma v. Atkinson
Co .. 213 U. S. 508, 524-535 (1941), thE' Court rejected the assertion that
an arlvl'l'RE' impact on State and local economies is a barrier to Congress•
exl'rrise of itR power 11ndf'r the Commerce ClausE' to regulate private activitlrR affecting intrrstate commf'rce. We are not pE'rsuaded that there
a.re compelling reasons presf'nted in the instant case for rever~ing the·
Court's poHition.
94 We have a~<sumed, m·guendo, that the District Court correctly held
that lanrl use regulation is an "integral governmental function" as that
tf'rm wn~ used in National League of Cities. Our resolution of the Tenth
Amendment challenge to the Act makes it unnecessary for us to decide·
whethct thi::; is actually the case.
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face mines to their approximate original contour. 483 F.
Supp., at 437. 35 The court further held that, even if steep.,
slope surface mines could be restored to their approximate
original contour, the value of the mined land after such restoration would have "been diminished to practically nothing." 1bid. Second, the court found that § 522 of the Act
effects an unconstitutional taking because it expressly prohibits mining in certain locations and "clearly prevent [s] a
person from mining his own land or having it mined." ld.,
at 441. 8 'l Relying on this Court's decision in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 265 U. S. 393 (1922), the District Court
held that both of these provisions are unconstitutional because they "deprive[] [coal mine operators] of any use of
85 The District Court acknoweldged the existence of a statutory pror·edure for requesting variances from the steep-slope provisions. But the
court ~uggested that the statutory requirement that highwalls of reclaimed mining cuts be completely covered makes this variance procedure
"meaningle~;s" to steep-slope mine operators. 483 F. Supp., at 437. This
conclusion was premature. See n. 39, ·infra.
8 0 With certain specified e~tions, and subject to "valid existing
rights ." § 522 (e) prohibits surface miniPg operations in national parks
and forests, or where they will adversely affect publicly owned parks
or places that are included in the National Register of His•oric ~ites .
30 U. S. C. 1272 (e)(l), (2) , and (3) . It also prohibits surface mining
within 100 feet of a cemetery or the right-of-way of a public road . and
within 300 feet of an occu11ied dwelling, public building, school, church,
community or institutional building, or public park. §§ (e)(4) and (5).
Sections 552 (a), (c) and (d), which become applicable durir>g thP
permanent phase of the regulatory program, require the establishment of'
procedure8 for designating particular lands as unsuitable for some or all
surface mining. §§ 1272 (a), (c), and (d) . The District Court's ruling
that these latter provisions effect an unconstitutional taking of private
propE-rty is puzzling and cannot stand. SincE' these provisions do not come·
into effect until the permanent phase of the Act's regulatory program,
1hey have not been applied to appellePs or any other private landowner
in Virginia . In these circumstances, there was no justiciable case or rontroversy with regard to these sections of the Act . See United Public;
Works v. M·itchell, 330 U.S. 75 . 89-91 (1947).
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[their 1 land, not only the most profitable. 483 F . Supp., at
441.
We conclude that the District Court's ruling on the "taking issue suffers from a fataldenCiency: neither - appellees
nor t e cour i en 1 e any property m which appellees have
an interest that has allegedly been taken by operation of the
Act. By proceeding in this fashion, the court below ignored
this Court's oft-repeated admonition that the constitution..
ality of statutes ought not be decided except in an actual
factual setting that makes such a decision necessary. See
Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U. S. 583, 588 (1972);
Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U. S. 549, 568- 575
584 (1947); Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory,
325 U.S. 450, 461 (1945). Adherence to this rule is particu ..
larly important in cases raising allegations of an unconstitutional taking of private property. Just last Term, we reaffirmed that
" this Court has generally 'been unable to develop any
"set formula" for determining when "justice and fairness" require that economic injuries caused by public
action be compensated by the government, rather than
remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.' Rather, it has examined the 'taking' question by
engagi11g in essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries that have
identified several factors-such as the economic impact
of the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment backed expectations, and the character of the
government action-that have particular significance.''
Ka·iser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979)
( ~ions omitted).
'

•

These "ad hoc, factual inquiries" must be conducted with
respect to specific property, and the particular estimates of
economic impact and ultimate valuation relevant in the
uniquo eircumstances.
Because appellees' taking claim arose in· the context of a.
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facial challenge, it presented no concrete controversy concerning either application of the Act to particular surface
mining operations or its effect on specific parcels of land.
Thus, the only issue properly before the District Court and,
in turn, this Court, is whether the "mere enactm;mt" of the
Surface Mining Act constitutes a taking. See Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255, 260 (1980). The test to be applied in
considering this facial challenge is fairly straightforwarcy A
statute regulating the uses that can be made of property
effects a taking if the law "does not substantially advance
.,..-~
legitimate state interests, see N ectow v. Cambridge2 277 U. S.
183, 188 (1928), or denies Mie p! ~fk!~~owner ~conom- '
~
ically viable use of his land .... " Agi:ns v. Tibu~
at 260. See Penn Central Transp. Corp. v. New York City,
43/i U. S. 104 (1978). The Sur~ce Mining Act easily survives scrutiny under these tests.
}i'irst, there can be no question t at the Act furthers governmental interests in controlling the adverse economic and
environmental effects of surface coal mining. Such governmental interests have long been recognized as legitimate.
See Penn Central Transp. Corp. v. New York City, supra. at
127--129; Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U. S. 590 (1962);
Miller v. Schoene, 276 U. S. 272 (1928). Moreover, the Act
does not, on its face, prevent all beneficial use of coal beariug lands. Except for the pr~ription of mining near cert l ~cations by § 522 (e), the Act does not categorically
\.../
prom~ surface coal mining; it merely regulates the conditions under which such operations may be conducted. 37 And

,.;
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87 Although § 552 (e) prohibits any surface coal mining in certain
areas, appellees' "takings" challenge to this provision is premature. First,
appellees made no showing in the District Court that they own tracts of
land that are affected by this provision. Second, 522 (e) does not, on
it~ face , deprive owners of land within its reach of al economJCa y VIa le
use of their land since it does not proscribe nonn imn
s s of ·uch land.
Third, § 522 (e)'s restn · ns are express y made subject to "valid exis •
{ ing rights." Appellees contend that thi1:> exception "applies only to
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the Act does not purport to re~es to which
coal bearing lands may be put. 88 Thus, in the posture .in
which the case comes before us, there is no reason to suppose
that, "rnere enactment" of the Surface Mining Act has de.,
}Jrived appellees of ~ economically viable use of the~
property.
- - - - - - - -o
Mor(•over, appellees cannot at this juncture legitimately
raise complaints in this Court about the manner in which
the chall~ed provisions of the Act have been or will be
applied iu specific circumstances, or about their effect on
particular coal mining operations. There is no indication in
thP record that appellees have availed thermelves of the op..
portunities provided by the Act to obtain administrative relief by requesting either a variance from the approximate
origilla1 contour requirement of § 515 (d) or a waiver from
thf' surface mining restrictions in § 522 (e). If appellees
were to seek administrative relief uuder these procedures, a
mutually acceptable solution might well be reached with regard to individual properties. thereby obviating auy need to

•

. '·
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spcclfie f>ttrface mining opera t ionb for which all required permit:, were
issnerl prior to Angu;.;t 3, 1977, thl' rffective date of the Act." Brief for
Virginia Surface Mining Reclamation A~::;ociation, Inc., et a!., at 48. Thib
interpretation of thr exception i~ not C'Ompelled either by the statutory
languagf' 01 it~ legislative histor) . See H. R. Rep. No. 95-218, supra,
n . 19, at 95. It i" apparrntly bat'ed on ao CFR § 761.5 (a) (2) (i), a regIllation pronmlgatPd by Secretary. That rrgulation, however, was n•mandPd to the S1•eretary for reconsidrration by the United State~ Di~triet
Court lor the Di~triet of Columbia . In re ?ermanent :Surface Miuiny
Regulatiun Litigation,- F. Supp. - . - (DC 1980), appeaiH pl'llding,
No:, 80-lt-10 et seq . (CADC). Tlw Secretary did not a::;k the Court
o f Appml~ to reviPw this portion of the Dis'riet Court'~ jud
~b If, a::. the D1~trict Court found, level land in th
ep-~lOJJC arcus
owne · presumably
o f V1rginia j, worth 85,000-$300,000 per acre •
n·tuin tlw option of Himpl · lt>vl'ling the land wit! out fir::;t mining the coal.
l\1oreovl·r, 1f at euc an Ji> trul; as valuable a;,; the court below found,
thPre ::;lwuld hP no financial impediment to the ree~:;tablishment of flut
area:, on the silt>::; of old mining opPra1ions, once those area::; have been
re~torrd aJJd ' 1abilized in the mnnncr required by the Act.

7 7
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address the constitutional questions. 3 ~ The potential fol'
such administrative solutions confirms the conclusion that
the takings issue decided by the District Court simply is not
ripo for judicial resolution. 40

v
A
The District Court next ruled that the Act contravenes the
Fifth Amendment because a number of its enforcement provisions offend the Amendment's Due Process Clause. One
such provision is § 521 (a) (2), 30 U. S. C. § 1271 (a)(2),
which instructs the Secretary immediately to order total or
partial cessation of a surface mining operation whenever he
determines, on the basis of a federal inspection, that the operation is in violation of the Act or a permit condition required by the Act and that the operation
"creates an immediate danger to the health or safety of
su The District Court's conclusion that the steep-slope variance proeedure in § 515 (e) doe::> not offer a meaningful opportunity for administra1ive relief was premature. Appellees did not identify any im;tance in
which the statutory obligation to cover the highwall had prevented a
mine operator from taking advantage of the variance procedure.
tu Although we conclude that "mere enactment" of the Act did not
effec1 a taking of private property, this holding does not preclude appellees or other coal mine operators from attempting to show that as
applied to particular parcels of land, the Act and the Secretary's regulationt> effect a taking. Even then, such an alleged taking is not
uncon,;titutional unless just compensation is unavailable. See Duke
Powet Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59,
94, n. 39 (1978); Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102,
125-136 (1974); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp, 337
U. S. 682, 697, n. 18 (1949). Thus, uggrieved coal mine operators may,
ab a first step, attempt to obtain just compensation for property they
believe ha::> been taken by the Surf~tce Mining Act by pursuing a claim
under the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1491. If it is determined that a
Tucker Act remedy is unavailable, and we intimute no views on thib
question, the coal mine operator may bring an action in district court
for appropriate deelaratory and injunctive relief.

·....
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the public, or is causing, or can reasonably be expected to
cause sigilificant, imminent enviroumental harm to land,
air, or water resources . . . ." 11

A mine operator aggrieved by an immediate cessation order
issuPd under § 521 (a) (2) or by a cessation order issued after
a notice of violation and expiration of an abatement period
under § 521 (a) (3) may immediately request temporary relief from the Secretary, and the Secretary must respond to
the request within 5 days of its receipt. § 525 (c), 30
U. S. C. § 1257 (c) . Section .526 (c) of the Act, 30 U. S. C.
§ 1276 (c). authorizes judicial review of a decision by the
Secretary denying temporary relief. In addition. cessation
orders are subject to informal admillistrative review under
§ 521 (a)( 5), and formal administrative review, including an
adjudicatory hearing, under § 525 (b), 30 U. S. C. ~ 1275
(b) ,12 The Secretary's decision in the formal review proceeding is subject to judicial review pursua.nt to § 526 (a) (2), 30
U. S. C. § 1276 (a).
The District Court held that § 521 (a)(2)'s authorization
of immediate cessation orders violates the Fifth Amendment
because the statute does not provide sufficiently objective
criteria for summary administrative action. In this regard,
the court relied on its finding that OSM inspectors had issued against a particular company three immediate cessation orders which were later overturued on appeal, and that
the company involved had suffered significant losses. The
41 Where the Secretary detPrmine<' tlwt a violation of the Act or of a
pC'rrnit. condition does not ('ntail ~nch a serious threat, he mu~t issue a
notice of violation fixing a rea~onablc timC' for abatE'liJent. § 521 (a) (3) ,
30 U . S. C. § 1271 (a) (3). If the violation i~ not. abated within ]1rescribed veriod, the Secretary mu~t immediately order total or partial
cessa tion of the offending mining 011eration.
4 2 Under § 521 (a) (5), 30 U. S. C.§ 1271 (a) (5), ces:;ation order::: automaticaUy expire after 30 days, " unless a public hearing is held aL the·
site or within :;uch reasonable proximity to the site that any viewii~gs
of the site ean be conducted during the course of the public heariug."

'•
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court enjoined the Secretary from issuing any immediate cessation orders "until such time as Congress makes provisions
to correct the use of subjective criteria by OSM inspectors."
483 F . Supp., at 448. 4 8 In addition. the court ruled even if
the Act is amended to correct this problem, the 5-day response period prescribed by the Act does not meet the requirements of due process. Instead. the court held that the
Secretary must respond within 24 hours to a mine operator's
request for temporary relief from an immediate cessation
order. We find both aspects of the District Court's reasouing unpersuasive.
Our cases have indicated that due process ordinarily requires an opportunity for "some ku1d of heariJ1g" prior to the
deprivation of a significant property interest. See Parratt
v. 'Paylor,- U. S. - , - (1981); Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U. S. 371, 379 (1971). The Court has often acknowledged, however, that summary administrative action may be
justified in emergency situations. See, e. g., Calero-1'oledo
v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 677- 680 (1974) ;
Boddie v. Connecticut, supra, at 378- 379; Ewing v. Mytinyer
& Casselberry, Inc., 339 U. S. 594, 599-600 (1950); Fahey v.
Mallonee, 332 U. S. 245, 253-254 (1947); Yakus v. United
States, 321 U. S. 414, 442-443 (1944); Bowles v. Willingham,
321 U. S. 503, 519-520 (1944); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283
U. S. 589, 595-599 (1931); North American Cold Storage Co.
v. Chicayo, 211 U. S. 306, 315-321 (1908). The question
then. is whether the issuance of immediate cessation orders
under § 521 (a) falls under this emergency situation exception to the 1~le that due rocess requires a hearing
prior to deprivation of a roperty right.
a it
does,

.

.r.,
•1
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'The Di~triet Court'~ .Tan. 21, 1980, supplemental order und opinion,
see n. 13, wupm, explained that its injunction did not apply to imm!:'diate
cessation ord!:'r" i~S:;ue d pur~uant to § 521 (n) (3) against mine opPrators
who had failed to abate violations within the lime period specified in the ·
no1icc of violation. J. S. App., at 2a-3tt.
13
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The immediate cessati011 order provisions reflect Congress'
concern about the devastating damage that may result from
mining disasters. 41 They represent an attempt to reach an
accommodation between the legitimate desire of mining companies to be heard before submitting to administrative regulation and the goverumental interest in protecting the public health and safety and the environment from imminent
dauger. Protection of the health and safety of the public
is a paramount govemmeutal interest which justifies summary administrative action. Indeed, deprivation of property
to protect the public health and safety is "one of the oldest
examplps" or permissible summary action. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., supra, at 599. See Mackey v.
Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17-18; id., at 21, u. 1, 25 (S'l'EWAH'r,
J., dissenting); North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago,
supra, at 315- 316. Moreover, the administrative action provided through immediate cessation orders responds to situations in which swift action is necessary to protect the public
health and safety. This is precisely the type of emergency
situation in which this Court has found summary administrative action justified. See Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry,
Inc. , supra ; North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago,
supra.
Rather than taking issue with any of these principles, the
District Court held that the Act does not establish sufficiently
objective criteria. goveming the issuance of summary cessation orders. We disagree. In our judgment, the criteria
4 4 The legi;;lativc hi~tory of§ 521 (a) (2) indicatE'~ that Congress viPwed
the Secretary 's power to i~sue immrdiate ce~sation arden:; as criticnl, and
that the measure was primarily intendrd to avert the po~~ible occurrence
of sueh di::ms ters as the Buffalo Creek flood. Sre H. R. Rep. No . 95-218,
supra, n. 19, al 129- 130 ; S. Rep . No. 95-128, supra, n . 19, at 90-91.
The Buffalo Creek flood was cau~ed by the suddf'n collapse of a coal mine
wns te impoundm ent dam iu 1972 1war Buffalo Creek, W. Va. The fiood
left 124 per~on s dead and rendered 4,000 persons homeless. See H . R.
Rep. N o. 94- 1445, 19 (1976).
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,t·stablisheu by the Act auu the Secretary's implemeuting reg.,
ulations are specific enough to control governmental action
anu reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation. Section 701
(8) of the Act, 30 U. S. C. § 1291 (8) , defines the threat of
"imminent danger to the health and safety of the public" as
the existence of a condition or practice which could:
"reasonably be expected to cause substantial physical
harm to pE>rsons outside the permit area before such
condition, practice. or violation can be abated. A reasonable expectation of death or serious injury before
abatement exists if a rational person , subjected to the
same conditions or practices giving rise to the peril,
would not expose himself or herself to the danger during
the time necessary for abatement." 45
If anythi ng. these standards are more specific than the criteria in other statutes authorizing summary administrative
action that have been upheld against due process challenges ..
See, e. (J., Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., supra, at
595 ("dangerous to health ... or would be in a material
respect misleading to the injury or damage of the purchaser
or consumer''); Fahey v. Mallonee, supra, at 250-251. n. 1
(''is unsafe or unfit to manage a Federal savings and loau
association" or "[i]s in immineut danger of becoming impaired"); Air East, Inc. v. National Transportation Safety
Board, 512 },. 2d 1227, 1232 (CA3), cert. denied, 423 U. S.
~"The Seeretary'::; regulalionb define "a signific!mt, imminent environmeut al lwrm" in lhe following terms:
"(i) An t-uvironmental harm JS any adver,;e impact on laud , air, or water
re~:>oure(·~, wcludmg but not lmutrd to plaut and animal life.
"(ii) An rnvironmental harm i~ imminrnt if a C'ondition, practice or
violation ex1~t8 which (a) i~:> ca u ~ing ;,;nrh harm or (b) may reaoonalJly
Lr t·xpPC'ted to cau~e ~uc b harm at any time before the end of the rcabonahle aLa1Pmeut time that would be set under Seetiou 521 (a) (3) of the

Act.
"(iii) An enviromnentuJ lwrm is ignificauL if that harm is appreciableuud' uot numediately reparable." 30 CFI-t §§ 700.5 aud 701.5.

.

'
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Sud (1975) ("emergency requiring immedit:tte action . . inI
respect to air safety in commerce").
The fact that OSM inspectors have issued immediate cessation orders that were later overturned on administrative
appeal does 11ot undermine the adequacy of the Act1s criteria
but instead demonstrates the efficacy of the r.eview procedun's 'Phe relevant 'inquiry is not whether a cessation order
should l1ave been issued in a particular cas.e. but whether the.
statutory procedure itself is incapable of affording due proc~ss. Yakus v. United States, supra, at 434-435. The po~-:
sibility of administrative error inheres in any regulatory
program; statutory programs authorizing emergency admin ..
istrative action prior to a hearing are no exception. 46 As we
explained in Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., supra,
at .599 :
"Discretion of any official action may be abused.

Yet

it is not a requirement of due process that there be
judicial illquiry before discretioll can be exercised. It
is sufficient, where only property rights are concerned,
Lhat there is at some stage an opportunity for a hearing
and s judicial determination."
Here, mine operators are afforded ~ompt and adequate
post-deprivation administrative hearings and an opportunity
for judiclalreview. We are satisfied that the Act's immediate cessation order provisions comport with the requirements
of due proces~.
We also conclude that the District Court erred in reducing
the statutorily prescribed time period for the Secretary's re46 A differeut case might be pre:sE>nied if a pattern of aburse and arbitrary action were di:;cernable from review of au ageney'~:; adminiotration
of a ;;urnmary procedure. Although the Di~triet Court sought to characterh:e the OSJ\1':; record in is~uing ce~::;ation ordrn:~ in therse terms, a
showing tlutt three ccs~:;at ion order:; were overturned on administrative
appeal i:; far from sufficient to c::;tabli8h a pattern of abuse and arbitrary
action.
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sponse to requests for temporary relief. In the first place,
the 5-day period is a statutory maximum and there is no indication in the record that the Secretary has not responded
or will not respond iu less than 5 days. Second, appellees
have not demonstrated that they have been adversely affected
by the 5-day response period in a particular case or that it is
genrrally unreasonable. In addition, no evidence was introduced to show that a shorter reply period is administratively
feasible. In these circumstances, there simply is no basis
for the District Court's decision to substitute a judicial policy
preference for the scheme adopted by Congress. Cf. V ermollt Yankee Nuclear Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Cu'Unc-£7, l11c. , 435 U. S. 519 (1978). Accordingly, we turn
to the District Court's holdiHg that other sectious of the Act
violat.e the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.

B
The District Court ruled that the Act's civil penalty provisions do not comport with the requirements of due process.
Under these provisions, the Secretary is to notify the recipient of a notice of violation or a cessation order of the proposed amount of any civil penalty that is to be assessed
against it. § 518 (c), 30 U. S. C. § 1268 (a). Section 518
(c) further states that, if the operator "wishes to contest
either thr amount of the 1Je11alty or the fact of the violation,"
it must "forward the proposed amount to the Secretary for
placemE'nt in an escrow account." 47 Once the escrow requiremell t is met, the operator receives a full adjudicatory
hearing. before au administrative law judge, with a right of
appeal to an administrative board and .i udicial review of the
4'

Howeve1 , no pe11altieR are finally irupooed uutil the allegpd offender
hai- lwen provided an opportunity for a public hearing. SPction 518 (b)
prov1de~: " A civil penalty tlhall be aHRPoHed by the Secretary only after
t he per~01 1 eharged with a violation ... hm; been given an opvortnnity
for a IJUbli(' hearing " 30 U. S. C. § 126b (b).

'.
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final decision. See 30 U. S. C. § 1276 (a) (2). If, after administrative or judicial review, it is determined that no violation occurred or that the amount of the proposed penalty
should be reduced, the appropriate amount must promptly
be refunded to the operator with interest. 30 U. S. C.
§ 1268 (c).
In challe11ging the Act's civil penalty provisions appellees
did not allege that they, or any one of them have had civil
penalties assessed against them. Moreover, the District
Court did not find, as it did in ruling on the immediate cessation order provisions. that any of appellee coal mine operators have been affected or harmed by any of the statntory
procedures for the assessment and collection of fines. Thus.
the record in the case belies any snggestion that there is a
concrete caE"e 0r controversy concerning the operation of t"hese
provisions. In these circPmstances, we mw~t conclude that
appellees' challenge is :premature, and that it was improper
for the court below to render a decision on this claim.

VI
011r ('xamina tion of appellees' consritutional challene-es to
t,he Sl'rface Mining Act persuades us that the Act is not
vulw'rable to their pre-enforcement challenge. Accord;n!rly.
we affirm the judgment of the District Court upholdi11g the
Art against. appellees' Commerce ClauFe attack (No. 791596) , a11d we reverse the judgment below im:ofar as it held
variou~:~ provisions of the Act unconstitutional (No. 7~-1538).
The cases are remanded to the District Court with instrl'ctionR to dissolve the in.iunction issued against the Serretary
and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.
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These cases arise out of a pre-enforcement challenge to the
constitutionality of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (Surfa.ce Mining Act or Act ) , 30 U.S. C.
§ 1201 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. III). The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia declared
several central provisions of the Act unconstitutional and
permnnently enjoined t.heir enforcement. 483 F. Supp. 425
(WD Va. 1980). In these appeals, we consider whether Congress, in adopting the Art., exceeded its powers under the
Commerce Cln.use of the Con::;titution/ or tra.nRgressed affirJusTICE

Th<· Conunprrr Cl:ltt>'t' Plllpower~ Congrrss "[tlo rr~uhte C'ommrrce
with forri~n nation~ :11111 :unon~ the several 8tatP~, and with the Indian
Tribes." U. S. Const Art. I, § 8, cl. 3 .
1
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mative limitations on the exercise of that power contained
in the Fifth and Tenth Ame~dlvents. We conclude that in
the context of a facial challenge, the Surface Mining Act does
not suffer from any of these alleged constitutional defects and
we uphold the Act as constitutionaL
][

A
, The Surface Mining Act is a comprehensive statute deBigned to "establish a nationwide program to protect society
and the environment from the adverse effects of surface coal
mining operations." § 102 (a) , 30 U.S. C. § 1202 (a). Title
II of the Act, 30 U. S.
§ 1211 , creates the Office of Surface
Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSM) , within the
Department of the Interior, and -the -·secretary of the Interior
(Secretary) acting through OSM, is charged with primary
responsibility for administering and implementing the Act
by promulgating regulations and enforcing its provisions.
1201 (c), 30 U. S. C. §' 1211 (c) . -The principal regulatory
and enforcement provisions are contained in- Title V of the
Act, 30 U . S. C. §§ 1251-1270. Section 501, 30 U. S. C.
§ 1251 , establishes a two-sta.ge program for the regulation
of surface coal mining, ari initial, or interim regulatory phase,
and a subsequent, permanent phase. ·· The interim program
mandates immediate promulgation and federal enforcement
of some of the Act's environmental protection performance
standards, complimented by continuing state regulation.
Under the permanent phase, a regulatory program is to be
adopted for each State mandating compliance with the full
panoply of federal performance standards, with enforcement responsibility lying with either the State or Federal
Government.
Section 501 (a) directs the Secretary to promulgate regulations establishing an interim regulatory program during
- which mine operators will be required to comply with some·

c:
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of the Act's performance standards, as specified by § 502 (c),
30 U. S.C. § 1252 (c). Included among those selected standards are requirements governing: (a) restoration of land after
mining to its prior condition; (b) restoration of land to its
approximate original contour; (c) segregation and preservation of topsoil; (d) minimization of disturbance to the hydrologic balance; (e) construction of coal mine waste piles
used as dams and embankments; (f) revegetation of mined
areas; and (g) spoil disposal. § 515 (b), 30 U. S. C. § 1265
· {b). 2 The interim regulations were published on December
· 13, 1977, see 42 Fed. Reg. 62639, 8 and they are currently in
effect in most States, including Virginia.'
1 Other provisions of the Act are, by their own terms, made effective
during the interim period. One example is § 522 (e), 30 U. S. C.
§ 1272 (e), which prohibits, with some exceptions, surface coal mining on
certain lands or within specified distances of particular r:,1:ructures or
facilities .
1 Under §§ 502 (b), (c) of the Act, 30 U. S. C. §§ 1252 (b), (c), the
interim standards are applicable only to surface mining operations in
States that were themselves regulating surface mining when the Act became law. All States in which surface mining was conducted on private
lands had regulatory programs of their own when the Act was pa:,'Sed in
1977. Accordingly, the interim program became applicable in all relevant
areas throughout the country, including Virginia.
• New surface mining operations, excluding those on "Federal lands" or
"Indian lands," commencing on or after February 3, 1978 must comply
with the performance standards established by the interim regulatory program at the start of operations. And, with certain limited exceptions, surface mining operations begun prior to February 3, 1978, were required to
be in compliance with thP intrrim regulation::: of May 3, 1978. §§ 502 (b),
(c) and 701 (11), 30 U. S. C. §§ 1252 (b), (c) and 1291 (11) .
Some of the interim regulation~; were challenged in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia pursuant to § 526 (a) (1) of
the Act , 30 U. S. C. § 1276 (a) (1) . In re Surface Mining Regulation
Litigation, 452 F. Supp. 327 (D. C. 1978) ; In re Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 456 F . Supp 1301 (D. C. 1978), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part,- U. S. App. D . C. - , 627 F . 2d 1346 (1980) . The plaintiffs in
the District of Columbia litigation also challenged the validity of a number of the statutQry provisions that are at issue in the instant cases. The

19-1538 & 1'9-1596-0PiNI0N

4

HODEL v. VIRGINIA SURFACE MIN. & RECL. ASSN.

The Secretary is responsible for enforcing the interim reg..
ulatory program. § 502 (e), 30 U. S. C. § 1252 (e). A federal enforcement and inspection program is to be established
for each State, and is to remain in effect until a permanent
regulatory program is implemented in the State. States may
issue permits for surface mining operations during the interim phase, but operations authorized by such permits must
comply with the federal interim performance standards.
§ 502 (b), 30 U. S. C. § 1252 (b). States may also pursue
their own regulatory and inspection programs during the interim phase, and they may assist the Secretary in enforcing
the interim standards. 8 The States are not, however, reCJUired to enforce the interim regulatory standards and, until
the permanent phase of the program, the Secretary may not
cede the Federal Government's independent enforcement role
to States that wish to conduct their regulatory own programs.
Section 501 (b), 30 U. S. C. § 1251 (b), directs the Secretary to promulgate regulations establishing a permanent regulatory program incorporating all the Act's performance
standards. The Secretary published the permanent regulations on March 13, 1979, see 44 Fed. Reg. 14902, but these
regulations do not become effective in a particular State until
either a permanent state program, submitted and approved
in accordance with § 503 of the Act, or a permanent federal
program for the State, adopted in accordance with § 504, is
implemented.
Under § 503, any State wishing to assume permanent regulatory authority over the surface coal mining operations on
"non-Federal lands" • within its borders must submit a proDistrict Court sustained the validity of those provisions, 452 F . Supp., at
1319-1321, and the attack was not renewed on appeal.
b Congress encouraged such aS!:iistance by providing for financial reimbursements to State~ that actively assist the federal enforcement effort
during the interim phase. See 30 U. S. C. § 1252 (e)(4) .
1 A separate regulatory program governing "Federal lands" is ·el:itablished
by § 523 of the Act, 30 U. S. C. § 1273. The term "Federal lands" is

·.

79-1538 & 79-1596-0PINION

HODEt v. VIRGINIA SURFACE MIN. & RECL. ASSN.

5

posed permanent program to the Secretary for his approval.
The proposed program must demonstrate that the state legislature has enacted laws implementing the environmental
protection standards established by the Act and accompanying regulations, and that the State has the administrative and
technical ability to enforce these standards. 30 U. S. C.
§ 1253. The Secretary must approve or disapprove each such
proposed program in accordance with time schedules and
procedures established by §§ 503 (b), (c), 30 U.S. C. §§ 1253
(b), (c) .1 In addition, the Secretary must develop and im-:plement a federal permanent program for each State that
fails to submit or enforce a satisfactory state program.
§ 504, 30 U. S. C. § 1254. In such situations, the Secretary
defined in § 701 (4), 30 U. S. C. § 1291 (4) . Section 710 of the Act, 30
U. S. C. § 1300, regulates surface mining on "Indian lands."
7 The proposed state programs were to have been submitted by February 3, 1979-18 months after the Act was passed. Exercising his
authority under § 504 (a), the Secretary extended the deadline until
August 3, 1979. See 44 Fed. Heg. 15324 (1979) . Because the Secretary's
March 1979 publication of the permanent regulations occurred 7 months
after the date set by the Act, see 30 U. S. C. § 1251 (b), the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia further extended the
deadline for submission of state programs to and including March 3, 1980.
In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, Civ. No. 79-1144
(D . C. July 25 , and Aug. 21, 1979) . See also 44 Fed. Reg . 60969 (1979)
(announcing conforming changes in the Secretary's regulations governing
submission of state programs) .
With the exception of Alaska, Georgia, and Washington, all States in
which surface mining is either conducted or is expected to be conducted
submitted proposed state programs to the Secretary by March 3, 1980.
The Secretary has made his initial decisions on these programs. Thres
programs were approved, eight were approved on condition that the States
agree t o some modification ~ , 10 were approved in part and disapproved
in part, and three were disapproved because the state legislatures had
failed to enact the necessary implementing statutes. Virginia's program
was among those approved in part and disapproved in part. See 45 Fed.
Reg. 69977 (1980) . Under § 503 of the Act, a State may revise a plan
t hat has been disapproved in whole or in part and resubmit it to the
St>cretary whhjn 60 days of his initial decision.

..
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constitutes the regulatory authority administering the Act
within that State and continues as such unless and until a
"state program" is approved. No later than 8 months after
adoption of either a state-run or federally administered permanent regulatory program for a State, all surface coal mining and reclamation operations on "non-Federal · lands"
within that State must obtain a new permit issued in accordance with the applicable regulatory program. § 506 (a), 30
U. S. C. § 1256 (a).

n

On October 23, 1978, the Virginia Surface Mining and
Reclamation Association, Inc., an association of coal producers engaged in surface coal mining operations in Virginia,
63 of its member coal companies, and four individual landowners filed suit in federal district court seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief against various provisions of the Act.
The Commonwealth of Virginia and the Town of Wise, Va.,
intervened as plaintiffs. 8 Plaintiffs' cha.Ilenge was primarily
directed at Title V's performance standards. 9 Because the
permanent regulatory program was not scheduled to become
effective until June 3, 1980, plaintiffs' challenge was directed
at the sections of the Act establishing the interim regulatory
program. Plaintiffs alleged that these provisions violate the
Commerce Clause, the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 1 ~~-'
! The Virginia Citizens for Better Reclamation, Inc., and the Town of'
St. Charles, Va ., intervened as defendants in support of the Secretary.
9 Plaintiffs also challenged Title IV of the Act, 30 U. S. C. §§ 401-413,
which establishes a reclamation program for abandoned mines. The·
District Court, held, however, that it would exerCise its discretion by ''not
grant[ing] declaratory judgments as to the provisions of that title." 483'
F . Supp., at 429. There is no appeal from this portion of the District
Court 's judgment.
10 The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment states that no·
person shall ''be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process·
of law." U. S. ConsL, Arndt. Y.
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the Tenth Amendment, 11 and the Just Compensation Clause
of the Fifth Amendment. 12
The District Court held a 13-day trial on plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction. The court subsequently
issued an order and opinion declaring several central provisions of the Act unconstitutional. 483 F. Supp. 425 (1980).
The court rejected plaintiffs' Commerce Clause, equal protection, and substantive due process challenges to the Act.
The court held, however, that the Act " 'operates to displace
the States' freedom to structure integral operations in numerous areas of traditional functions,' and, therefore, is in contravention of the Tenth Amendmeht." fd., at 435, quoting
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976) .
The court also ruled that various provisions of the Act effect
an uncompensated taking of private property in violation of
the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Finally, the court agreed with plaintiffs' due process challenges to some of the Act's enforcement provisions. The
court permanently enjoined the Secretary from enforcing
various provisions of the Act. 1 3
In No. 79-1538, the Secretary appeals from that portion
of the District Court's judgment declaring various sections of
the Act unconstitutional and permanently enjoining their enforcement. In No. 79-1567, plaintiffs cross-appeal from the
11

Under the Tenth Amendment, "[]the powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the State~ respectively, or to the people." U. S. Const.,
Arndt. X .
12 The Compensation Clause prohibit~ the taking of private vroperty
" for pubhc u:::e, without JU~t compensation.· U. S Const., Amdt. V.
13 The District Court denied the Secretary's motion for a stay pending
direct appeal to this Court. At the same time, the court issued an order
and opinion clarifying and modifying its earlier order. Jurisdictional
Statement Appendix (J. S. App.) la-16a. Upon the Secretary's application , we issued an order staying the District Court's judgment "pending·
the timely filing and disposition of the appeals in this Court." U. S ..
- '(1980) .

. ... ·
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District Court's rejection of their Commerce Clause challenge
to the Act. 14 Because of the importance of the issues raised,
we noted probable jurisdiction of both appeals, 15 U. S,
16
(1980), and consolidated the two cases.
For conven~
ience, we shall usually refer to plaintiffs as ''appellees."

II
On cross-appeal, appellees argue that the District Court
erred in rejecting their challenge to the Act as beyond the
~Scope of congressional power under the Commerce Clause.
They insist that the Act's principal goal is regulating the use
of private lands within the borders of the States and not, as
the District Court found, regulating the interstate commerce
effects of surface coal mining. Consequently, appellees contend that the ultimate issue presented is "whether land as
~uch is subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause,
i. e. whether land can be regarded as being 'in com~
merce.'" Brief for Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Assn., Inc., et al. Appellees, at 12 (emphasis in original) .
In urging us to answer "no" to this question, appellees emphasize that the Court has recognized that land-use regulation is within the inherent police powers of the States and
Plaintiffs do not appeal from that portion of the District Court's
judgment rejecting their equal protection and sub~tantive due process
challenges to the Act.
15 The jurisdiction of this Court was invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1252
which provides for direct appeal to this Court from any decision by a
court of the United States invalidating an Act of Congress in any suit to
which the United States, its agencies, officers, or employees are parties.
16 We also agreed to hear the appeal in No. 80-231, Hodel v. Indiana,
which involves similar constitutional challenges to different provisions of
the Surface Mining Act, and which we also decide today. Post, a t -. At
least three other District Courts have considered constitutional challenges
to provision::; of the Surface Mining Act. In Concerned Citizens of
Appalachia, Inc . v. Andrus, 494 F . Supp. 679 (ED Tenn. 1980), appeal
pending,· No. 80-1448 (CA6) , the District Court upheld the Act in the14
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their political subdivisions, 17 and argue that Congress may
regulate land-use only insofar as the Property Clause ' 8 grants
it control over federal lands.
We do not accept either appellees' framing of the question
or the answer they would have us supply. The task of a
court that is asked to determine whether a particular exercise of congressional power is valid under the Commerce
Clause is relatively narrow. The court must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity affects interstate
commerce, if there is any rational basis for such a finding.
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 2i1
258 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U. S. 294, 303-304
(1964). This established, the only remaining question for
judicial inquiry is whether "the means chosen by [Congress]
is reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution." Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, supra,
at 262. See United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 121
(1941); Katzenbach v. McClung, supra, at 304. The judicial task is at an end once the court determines that Congress
acted rationally in adopting a particular regulatory scheme.
Ibid.
Judicial review in this area is influenced above all by the
the fact that the Commerce Clause is a grant of plenary auface of challenges similar to those raised by plaintiffs in the instant case.
In Star Coal Co . v. Andrus, No. 79-171-2 (SD Iowa Feb. 13, 1980),
appeal pending, No. 80-49 (CA8), the District Court rejected challenge::;
based on the Fifth and Tenth Amendments, but enjoined some of the Act's
enforcement provisions. And in Andrus v. P-Burg Cocil Co. , 495 F . Supp.
82 (SD Ind. 1980), appeal pending, No. 80-1916 (CA7), the District Court
rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the Act.
17 Appellees cite ca~es such as Village of Belle 'ferre v Boraas, 416
U S. 1 (1974) ; Berman v Parker, 348 U. S. 26 (1954) : City of Euclid.
v. Amber R ealty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926) .
18 The Property Clause provides: "Congress shall have the power to·
dispose of and make all needful Rules and R egulations respecting the·
Territory or other property belonging to the United States.'' U. S Const.,.
Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.

79-1538 & 79-1596-0PINION
10

HODEL v. VIRGINIA SURFACE MIN. & RECL. ASSN.

thority to Congress. See National League of Cities v. Usery 1
U. S., at 840; Cleveland v. United States, 329 U. S. 14,
19 (1946); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S:
l, 37 (1937). This power is "complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations,
other than are prescribed in the constitution." Gibbons v.
Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196 (1824). Moreover, this Court has
made clear that the commerce power extends not only to
"the use of channels of interstate or foreign commerce" and
to "protection of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce . . . or persons or things in commerce," but also to
"activities affecting commerce." Perez v. United States, 402
U. S. 146, 150 (1971). As we explained in Fry v. United
States, 421 U. S. 542, 547 (1975), "[e]ven activity that is
purely intrastate in character may be regulated by Congress,
where the activity, combined with like conduct by others
similarly situated, affects commerce among the States or with
foreign nations.'' See National League of Cities v. Usery,
supra, at 840 ; Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
supra, at 255 ; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 127-128
(1942); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U. S.
110, 119 (1942); United States v. Darby, supra, at 120-121.
Thus, when Congress has determined that an activity affects interstate commerce, the courts need inquire only
whether the finding is rational. Here, the District Co11rt
properly deferred to Congress' express findings, set out in the
Act itself, about the effects of surface coal mining on interstate commerce Section 101 (c) , 30 U. S. C. § 1201 (c) recites the congressional finding that
"many surface mining operations result in disturbances·
of surface areas that burden and adversely affect commerce and the public welfare by destroying or diminishing the utility of land for commercial, industrial, residential, recreational, agricultural, and forestry purposes,.

~26
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by causing erosion and landslides, by contributing to
floods. by polluting the water, by destroying fish and
wildlife habitats, by impairing natural beauty, by damaging the property of citizens, by creating hazards danp;erous to life and property by degrading the quality of
life in local communities, and by counteracting governmental programs and efforts to conserve soil, water, and
other natural resources."
The legislative record provides ample support for these
statutory findings. The Surface Mining Act became law
only after 6 years of the most thorough lep;islative consideration.19 Committees of both Houses of Congress held exHearings on proposed legislation regulating surface coal mining b~gan
in 1968. Surface Mining Reclamation: Hearings before the Senate Committee on Interior and In~ular Affairs, 90th Con g., 2d Sess. ( 1968) . Three
years later, additional hearings were held by Committees of both the House
and the Senate. Rrgulation of Strip Mining: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Mines and Mining of the House Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); Surface Mining: Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Minerals, Materials and Fuels of the Senate Committee
on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Con g., 1st Sess. ( 1971). The Committees reported bills for consideration by their respective houses. The
House pa~sed H . R. 6482, but Congre~ adjourned before the Senate could
Act on the measure.
Similar bills were reintroduced in the 93d Congress and further hf.'arings were held . Regulation of Surface Mining Operations: Hearin~rR before
the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973) ; Regulation of Surface Mining: Hearings b2fore the Subnommittee on the Environment and the Subcommittee on Mines and Mining
of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973) . At the request of the Chairman of the Senate Committee,
the Council on Environmental Quality prepared a report entitled Coal
Surface Mining and Reclamation : An Environmental and Economic
Asses~ment of Alternatives (Comm. Print 1973), and the Sem1te Committee held additional hearings to consider the report . Coal Surface
Mining and Reclamation : Hearings before the Subcommittee on Minerals,
Materials and Fuels of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insula"!'
Affairs, 93d Cong, lst Sess. ( 1973) . The House and Senate · Committees10
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tended hearings during which vast amounts of testimony and
documentary evidence about the effects of surface mining on
our Nation's environment and economy were brought to Con~ress' attention. Both Committees made detailed findings
about these effects and the urgent need for federal legislation
to address the problem. The Senate Report explained that
" [slurface coal mining activities have imposed large social costs on the public . . . in many areas of the country
in the form of unreclaimed lands, water pollution, erosion, floods, slope failures, loss of fish and wildlife rereported bills for con~ideration by both houses, and Congress passed a bill
that was vetoed by President Ford in 1974.
The surface mining legislation was reintroduced in the 94th Congress in
1975, and the Senate Committee held a hearin~~: on Administration objections to the bill. Surface Mining Briefing: BriefiPg before the Senate
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Con g., 1st Srss. ( 1975).
Both Committees reported bills to the House and Senate, which again
passed a bill rrported by the Conference Committee. President Ford
again vetoed the bill.
The protacted eongressional endeavor finally bore fruit in 1977. The
relevant House and Senate C0mmittees held extePsive hearini!'S Fhortly
after the opening of the 95th Congress to consider bills introduced at the
very beginning of the new legislative session. Surface Mining Control and
Re,lamation Act of 1977: Hearings on S. 7 before the Subrommittee on
Public Lands and Resources of the Senate Committee on Energv and
Natural Resources, 95th Conj!'., 1st Sess. (1977) (1977 Senate HeariPI!'S);
Surface MiPing Control and Reclamation Act of 1977: Hearini!'S on H. R.
2 before the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1977) (1977 House Hearings). The legislation was reported to
both Houses and pa~sage in both chambers followed, after lengthy floor
debate. 123 Cong. Rec. 12681-12886, 15691-1.5754 (1977). The Conference Committee report was issued in July 1977, H. R. (Conf. Rep.) No.
95--493 (1977), and after further floor debate, both Houses ae:reed to the
bill recommended by the conferees. 123 Cong. Rec. 23967-23988, 2441924429 (1977). President Carter signed the Act into Jaw on August 3,
1977. The lf'gislative history of the Act is summarized in S. Rep. No.
fl5-128 59-61 (1977), and in H R. Ren . No. 95-218 140-141 (1977) Seealso, Note, '81 W. Va . L. Rev. 775 (1979) .

..S''
~if '~"

79-1538 & 79-1596-0PINION
HODEL v. VIRGINIA SURFACE MIN. & RECL. ASSN.

sources, and a decline in natural beauty."
95- 128 50 (1977).

1~

S. Rep. No,

See id. , at 50-54.
• Similarly, the House Committee documented the adverse
effects of surface coal mining as including :
'
'
"'Acid drainage which has ruined an estimated 11,000
miles of streams; the loss of prime hardwood forest
and the destruction of wildlife habitat by strip min~
ing; the degradation of productive farmland; recurrent
landslides ; siltation and sedimentation of river systems .... ' ., H . R. Rep. No. 95- 218 58 (1977), quotil)g
H. R. Rep. No. 94-1445 19 (1976) .
.
A.nd in discussing the impact of surface coal mining on water.
resources, the House Committee explained that :
"The most widespread damages . . . are environmental
in nature. Water users incur significant economic and financial losses as well.
"Reduced recreational values, fishkills, reductions in
normal waste assimilation capacity, impaired water supplies, metals and masonry corrosion and deterioration,
increased flood frequencies and flood damages, reductioh&.
in designed water storage capacities at impoundments,
and higher operating costs for commercial waterway
users are some of the most obvious economic effects that
stem from mining-related pollution and sedimentation."·
ld., at 59.
See id., at 96-122.
The Committees also explained that inadequacies in existing state laws and the need for uniform minimum nationwide
standards made federal regulations imperative. See S. Rep,
No. 95- 128, supra, a.t 49 ; H. R. Rep. No. 95-218, supra. at
58. In light of the evidence available to Congress and the
detailed consideration that the legislation received, we cannot
s~y that. Co.ngtess did not have a rational basis for concluding·
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that surface coal mining has substantial effects on interstate
commerce.
Appellees do not, in general, dispute the validity of the
congressional findings. 20 Rather, appellees' contention is that
.the "rational basis" test should not apply in this case because the Act regulates land use, a local activity not affecting interstate commerce. But even assuming arguendo that
appellees correctly characterize the land use regulated by the
Act as a "local" activity, their argument is nonetheless
un persuasive.
The denomination of an activity as a "local" or "intrastate"
activity does not resolve the question whether Congress may
regulate it under the Commerce Clause. As previously
noted, the commerce power "extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce, or the exertion of
the power of Congress over it, as to make regulation of them
appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the
effective execution of the granted power to regulate interstate
commerce." United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., supra,
at 119. See Fry v. United States, supra, at 547; NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., supra, at 37. This Court has
long held that Congress may regulate the conditions under
which goods shipped in interstate commerce are produced
where the "local" activity of producing these goods itseli
affects interstate commerce. See, e. g., United States v.
Darby, supra,· Wickard v. Filburn, supra; NLRB v. Jones~
Laughlin Steel Corp., s'upra; Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316
U. S. 517 (1942). Cf. Katzenbach v. McClung, supra. Appellees do not dispute that coal is a commodity that moves
in intE>rstate commerce. Here, Congress rationally deter20 Appellees do contend that surface mining enhances rather than
diminishes the utility of land in the steep-slope areas of Virginia. Congress, however, made contrary findings, and it is sufficient for purposes of
judicial review that Congress had a rational basis for coneluding as it did.
See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U. S. 529, -541, n. 10 (1976) ; UniteZt
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U . S. 144, 152-154 (1938) .

• • <
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mined that regulation of surface coal mining is necessary to
protect interstate commerce from adverse effects that may
Tesult from that activity. This congressional finding is sufficient to sustain the Act as a valid exercise of Congress' power
under the Commerce Clause.
Moreover, the Act responds to a congressional finding that
nationwide "surface mining and reclamation standards are
essential in order to insure that competition in interstate
commerce among sellers of coal produced in different States
will not be used to undermine the ability of the several States
to improve and maintain adequate standards on coal mining
operations within their borders." 30 U. S. C. § 1201 (g) .
The prevention of this sort of destructive interstate competition is a traditional role for congressional action under the
Commerce Clause. In United States v. Darby, supra, the
Court used a similar rationale to sustain the imposition of
federal minimum wage and maximum hour regulations on a
manufacturer of goods shipped in interstate commerce. The
Court explained that the statute implemented Congress' view
that "interstate commerce should not be made the instrument
of competition in the distribution of goods produced under
substandard labor conditions, which competition is injurous
to the commerce and to the states from which and to which
the commerce flows." /d., at 115. The same rationale applies here to support the conclusion that the Surface Mining
Act is within the authority granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause.
Finally, we agree with the lower federal courts that have
uniformly found the power conferred by the Commerce
Clause broad enough to permit congressional regulation of
activities causing air or water pollution, or other environmental hazards that may have effects iu more than one State/1
21 See, e. g., United States v. Byrd, 610 F. 2d 1204, 1209-1210 (CA7
1979) ; Bethlehem Steel Cor]> . v. 'l'rain, 544 F . 2d 657, 663 (CA3 1976);
Sierra Club v. 'l'rain, U. S. App. D. C. - , 540 F. 2d 1114, 1139
(1976) , cert. denil'd, 430 U. S. 959 (1977) ; District of Columbia v. 'l'rain,.
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Appellees do not dispute that the environmental and other
problems that the Act attempts to control can properly be
addressed through Commerce Clause legislation. In these
circumstances, it is difficult to find any remaining foundation
for appellees' argument that, because it regulates a particular
land use, the Surface Mining Act is beyond congressional
Commerce Clause authority. Accordingly, we turn to the
question whether the means selected by Congress were reasonable and appropriate.
Appellees' essential challenge to the means selected by the
Act is that they are redundant or unnecessary. Appellees
contend that a variety of federal statutes such as the Clean
Air Act, 42 U. S. C. § 7401 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. III) , the
Flood Control Act, 33 U. S. C. § 701 et seq., and the Clean
Water Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq., adequately address the
federal interest in controlling the environmental effects of
surface coal mining without need to resort to the land use
regulation scheme of the Surface Mining Act. The short
answer to this a.r gument is that the effectiveness of existing
laws in dealing with a problem identified by Congress is ordinarily a matter committed to legislative j'·dgment. Congress considered the effectiveness of existing legislation and
concluded that additional measures were necessary to deal
with the interstate commerce effects of surface coal mining.
See H. R. Rep. No. 95- 218, supra, at 58-60; S. Rep. No. 95128, supra, at 59-53. And we agree with the court below
that the Act's regulatory scheme is reasonably related to the
goals Congress sought to accomplish. The Act's restrictions
on the practices of mine operators all serve to control the
U. S. App. D. C. - , 521 F . 2d 971, 988 (1975), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. EPA v. Brown, 431 U. S. 99 (1977) ;
United States v. Ashland Oil & Transportation Co ., 504 F. 2d 1317, 1325
(CA6 1974) ; Pennsylvania v. EPA , 500 F . 2d 246, 259 (CA3 1974);
South Terminal Corp . v. EPA , 504 F . 2d 646, 677, (CAl 1974) ; Unitea
8tates v. Bishop Processing Co , 287 F . Supp. 624 (Md. 1968) , aff'd, 423~
F . 2d 469 (CA4) , cert. denied, 398 U. S. 904 (1970).
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~nvironmental and other adverse effects of surface coal
mining.
In sum, we conclude that the District Court properly rejected appellees' Commerce Clause challenge to the Act. We
therefore turn to the court's ruling that the Act contravenes
affirmative constitutional limitations on congressional exer-.
cise of the commerce power.

III
The District Court invalidated §§ 515 (d) and (e) of the
Act, which prescribe performance standards for surface coal
mining on "steep-slopes," 22 on the ground that they violate
a constitutional limitation on the commerce power imposed
by the Tenth Amendment. These provisions require "steepslope" operators to: (i) to reclaim the mined area by completely covering the highwall and returning the site to its
uapproximate original contour"; 28 (ii) to refrain from dumping spoil material on the downslope below the bench or mining cut; and (iii) to refrain from disturbing land above the
highwall unless permitted to do so by the regulatory authority. § 515 (d), 30 U. S. C. § 1265 (d). Under § 515 (e), a
"steep-slope" operator may obtain a variance from the approximate original contour requirement by showing that it
will allow a post-reclamation use that is "deemed to con12 Section 515 (d)(4), 30 U.S. C. § 1265 (d)(4) defines a "steep slope''
as "any slope above 20 degret>S or ~uch }e:;ser slope as may be defined by
the regulatory authority after consideration of soil, climate, and other
characteristics of a region or State."
2 a The term "approximate original contour" is defined as "that surface
configuration achieved by backfilling and grading of the mined area so
that the reclaimed area, including any terracing or access roads, closely
resembles the general surface configuration of the land prior to mining
~nd blends into and complements the drainage pattern of the surroundin~
terrain , with all high walls and spoil piles eliminated.' " § 701 (2), 30
u. s. c. § 1291 (2) •

.'
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etitute an equal or better economic or public use" than would
otherwise be possible. 30 U. S. C. § 1265 (e)(3)(A). 24
The District Court's ruling relied heavily on our decision
in National League of Cities v. Usery, supra. The District
Court viewed the central .issue ~s whether the Act governs
the activities of private individuals, or whether it instead
regulates the governmental decisions of the States. And
although the court acknowledged that the Act "ultimately
affects the coal mine operator," it concluded that the Act
contravenes the Tenth Amendment because it interferes with
the States' "traditional governmental function" of regulating
land use. 483 F. Supp., at 432. · The court held, that, as
applied to Virginia, the Act's steep-slope provisions impermissibly constrict the State;s abiiity to make "essential decisions." 25 The court found the Act accomplishes this result
"through forced relinquishment of state control of land use
planning; through loss of state control of its economy; and
u Section 515 (c), 30 U. S. C. § 1265 (c) , establishes a separate variance procedure for mountaintop mining operations.
25 The court reasoned that although the Act allows a State to elect to
have its own regulatory program, the "choice that is purportedly given
is no choice at all" because the state program must comply with federally
prescribed standards. 483 F . Supp., at 432.
26 On the basis of the evidence presented at trial, the court found that
po::;t-mining restoration of steep slopes to their "approximate original
~ontour" is "econ?mically infeasible and physically impossible." 483 F .
Supp., at 434. The court noted that the steep-slope provisions particularly affect Virginia because 95% of its coal reserves are located on such
lands. And the court indicated that several coal mine operators had
been forced to shut down because they were unable to comply with the
Act's requirements, with adverse consequences for the economies of various towns a.nd counties that are dependent on coal mining. The court
also found that there is a need for level land in the counties of the
Virginia coal fields, and it concluded that the Act 's reclamation provi~>ions would prevent "forward-looking land use planning" by the State.
483 F . Supp., at 434. Finally, the court found that restoration of mined
land to its original contour would diminish the value of the land from
the $5,000-$300,000 an acre value of level land to the $5-$75 per acre
value of steep slope land.
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through economic harm, from expenditure of state funds to
implement the act and from destruction of the taxing power
of certain counties, cities, and towns." 483 F. Supp., at
435. 26 The court therefore permanently enjoined enforce·
ment of §§ 515 (d) and (e). 27
The District Court's reliance on National L9ague of Cities
requires a careful review of the actual basis and import of
our decision in that case. There, we considered a constitutional cha1lenge to the 1974 amendments to the Fair ·Labor
Standards Act which had extended federal minimum wage
and maximum hour ree;ulations to most state and local government employees. Because it was conceded that the challeng~d regulations were "undoubtedly within the scope of
the Commerce Clause," id., at 841, the only question presented was whether that particular exercise of the commerce
power "encounter [ ed] a . . . constitutional b9rrier because
fthe regulations] ... applied directly to the States and sub·
divisions of States as employers." Ibid. We began by drawin~ a sharp distinction between congressional regulation of
private persons and businesses "necessarily subject to the
dual sovereignty of the government of the Nation and of the
State in which they reside," id., at 845, and federal regulation "directed not to private citizens, but to the States as
States." ibid. As to the former, we found no Tenth Amendment impediment to congressional action. Instead, we reaffirmed our consistent rule:
eccongressional power over areas of private endeavour,
even when its exercise may pre-empt express state-law
27

In its order and opinion accompanying its denial of the Secretary's
request for a stay of its judgment pending appeal, see n. 13, supra, the
District Court explained that the injunction against enforcement of the·
steep-slope standards was not intended to "allo[w] spoil to be placed
on the· downslope in an uncontrolled manner." The court stated that
"[a lny such downslope spoil placement shall be in a controlled manner
meeting the environmental protection standards specified by the regula. tory · autho-rity." · J . S. App . .2a.

,
>·

·.

19-1538 & 19-1596-0PiNI0N
~0

HODEL v. VIRGINIA SURFACE MIN. & RECL. ASSN.
determination~ contrary to the result that has com..,
mended itself to the collective wisdom of Congress, has
been held to be limited only by the requirement that
'the means chosen by [Congress] must be reasonably
adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution.'
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S,
241, 262 (1964)." · Id., at 840.

The Court noted, however, that "the States as States stand
on quite a different footing from an individual or corporation
when challenging the exercise of Congress' power to regulate
commerce." Id., at 854. It indicated that when Congress
attempts to directly regulate the States as States the Tenth
Amendment requires recognition "that there are attributes
of sovereignty attaching to every state government which
may not be impaired by Congress. not because Congress may
lack an affirmative grant of legislative authority to reach the
matter, but because the Constitution prohibits it from exercising the authority in that manner." !d., at 845. The Court
held that the power to set the wages and work hours of state
employees was "an undoubted attribute of state sovereignty."
Ibid. And because it further found that the challenged
regulations would "displace the States' freedom to structure
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions,'' the Court concluded that Congress could not, consistently with the Tenth Amendment, "abrogate the States'
otherwise plenary authority to make [these decisions]." Id.,
at 845-846/ 8
National League of Cities expressly left. open the question "whether
different results might obtain if Congress seeks to affect integral operations of state governments by exercising authority granted it under other
sections of the Constitution such as the spending power, Art. I, § 8, cl.
1, or § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U. S. 833, 852, n. 17 (1977). In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427
U. S. 445 ( 1976) , the Court upheld Congress ' power under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to authorize private damages actions against
state governments for discrimination in employment. The Court ex28

..
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it should be apparent from this discussion that in order
to succeed, a claim that congressional commerce power legislation is invalid under the reasoning of National League of
Cities must satisfy each of three requirements. First, there
must be a showing that the challenged statute regulates the
States as States. Second, the federal regulation must address matters that are indisputably "attributes of state sovereignty." l d., at 845. And third, it must be apparent that
the States' compliance with the federal law would directly
impair their ability "to structure integral operations in areas
of traditional functions." !d., at 852/ 6 When the Surface
Mining Act is examined in light of these principles, it is
clear that appellees' Tenth Amendment challenge must fail
because the first of the three requirements is not satisfied.
The District Court's holding to the contrary rests on an unwarranted extension of the decision in National League of
Cities.

As the District Court itself acknowledged, the steep-slope
provisions of the Surface Mining Act govern only the activities of coal mine operators who are private individuals and
businesses. Moreover, the States are not compelled to enforce the steep-slope standards, to expend any state funds,
or to participate in the federal regulatory program in any
manner whatsoever. If a State does not wish to submit a
proposed permanent program that complies with the Act and
plained that because the Amendment was adopted with the specific
purpose of limiting State autonomy, constitutional principles of federalism
do not restrict congressional power to invade State autonomy when
Congress legislates under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id, at
452-456.
29 Demonstrating that these three requirements are met does not, however, guarantee that a Tenth Amendment challenge to congressional
commerce power action will succeed. There are situations in which the
nature of the federal interest advanced may be such that it justifies
State submission. See Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542 (1975), r~
affirmed in National League of Cities v. Usery , supra, at 852-853 (1977),.
See also, id., at 856 (BLACKMUN, .T., concurring).
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( \ 1uggestion that the Act commandeers the legislative processes
)-~f the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program. Cf. Maryland v. EPA,
630 F. 2d 215, 224-228 (CA4 1977), vacated and remanded
3Ub nom. EPA v. Brown, 431 U. S. 99 (1977); District of
'Columbia v. Train, - U. S. App. D. C. - , 521 F. 2d 971,
990--994 (1975), vacated and remanded sub nom. EPA v.
!Jrown, 431 U. S. 99 (1977); Brown v. EPA, 521 F. 2d 827,
~37-842 (CA9 1975), vacated and remanded, 431 U. S. 99
(1977). The most that can be said is that the Surface Mining
Act establishes a program of cooperative fedetalisrh that
allows the States, within limits established by federal minimum standards. to enact and administer their own regulatory
programs, structured to meet their own particular needs. See
In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, U. S. App. D. C. - , 617 F. 2d 807. 808 (1980). In this
respect, the Act resembles a number of other federal statutes
that have survived Tenth Amendment challenges in the lower
federal courts. 80
Appellees argue, however, that the threat of federal usurpation of their regulatory roles coerces the States into enforcing the Surface Mining Act. Appellees also contend that
the Act directly regulates the States as States because it establishes mandatory minimum federal standards. In essence,
appellees urge us to join the District Court in looking beyond
the activities actually regulated by the Act to its c9nceivable
effects on the States' freedom to make decisions in areas o£

I

implementing regulations, the full regulatory burden will be
borne by the Federal Government. Thus there can be no
so See, e. g., United States v. Helsley, 615 F. 2d 784 (CA9 1979) (upholding the Airborne Hunting Act, 16 U. S. C. § 742j-1); Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Carey, 552 F. 2d 25, 36-39 (CA2), cert. denied, 434 U. S.
902 (1977) (upholding the Clean Air Act, 42 U. S. C. § 7401 et seq.
(1976 ed., Supp. III) ; Sierra Club v. EPA U. S. App. D. C. - ,
540 F. 2d 1114, 1140 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U. S. 959 (1977) (upholding the Clean Water Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq.).
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well settled that there can be no divided authority over interstate commerce, and that the arts of Congress on that subJect are supreme and exclusive." Missouri Pacific R. Co. v,
Stroud, 267 U. S. 404, 408 (1925).
Thus. Congress could constitutionally have enacted a statute prohibiting any state regulation of surface coal mining.
We fail to see why the Surface Mining Act should become
constitutioPally suspect simply because Congress chose to
allow the States a regulatory role. Contrary to the assumption by both the District Court and appellees, nothing in
National Leag11e of Cities suggests that the Tenth Amendment shields the States from pre-emptive federal regnlation
of priva •e artivities affecting interstate commerce. To the
contr::~ry, National League of Cities explicitly reaffirmed the
teaching of earlier cases that Congress may, in regulating private activities purmant to the commerce power, "pre-empt
~>xnre~s ~tat~ law determinations contrary to the result which
harl commended itself to the collective wisdom of Congres!'l .. . ." !d., at 840. The only limitation on congressional authority in this regard is the requirement that the
mcanR selert€d be reasonably relat."d to the goal of regulating interstate commerce. Ibid. We have already indicated
that the Act satisfies this test. 81
Thir. rondns;on annlies re!!ardless of whether the federal
legislation rlisplarcs laws enacted nndf'r the States' "police
r.owcrs." T 1H' Court long ago re.jpnted t,_,e suage~tion that
Conl!r~ss invades areas reserved to the States by the Tenth
Anv'ndment simnly because it E'X"rrises its authoritv nnder
tl-,0. Commerce Clause in a manner tlrflt displares the States'
~X"r~it:f> of t 1,eir nolire powf'rS. Sne Hoke v. United Sta~es,
227 U. S. 308, 320-323 (1913); Athanasaw v. United States,
Sre supra, at 16-17. It is significant that the Comm:mwealth of Vir- ·
ginia pr ~sses its Tenth Amendment challenge to the Act simply as ano·her regulator of surface coal mining whose regulatory program has been
displared or pre-empted by federal Jaw. As indicated in text, no Tenth.Amt'lldment cQncern~ are imi?licat.ed in S)Jch situation1..
81

.. .
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well settled that there can be no divided authority over interstate commerce, and that the acts of Congress on that subJect are supreme and exclusive." Missouri Pacific R. Co. v,
Stroud, 267 U. S. 404, 408 (1925).
Thus. Congress could constitutionally have enacted a statute prohibiting any state regulation of surface coal mining.
We fail to see why the Surfa.ce Mining Act should become
constitutionally suspect simply because Congress chose to
allow the States a regulatory role. Contrary to the assumption by both the District Court and appellees, nothing in
N ationa,l Leag1'e of Cities suggests that the Tenth Amendment shields the States from pre-emptive federal regnlation
of priva•e artivities affecting interstate commerce. To the
contr::1ry, National League of Cities explicitly reaffirmed the
teaching of earlier cases that Congress may, in regulating private activities pun:uant to the commerce power, "pre-empt
"'XDre~s stat~ law determinations contrary to the result which
ha~ commended itself to the collective wisdom of Congresf'l. . . ." I d., at 840. The only limitation on congressional authority in this regard is the requirement that the
means selected be reasonably relat."d to the goal of regulating interstate commerce. Ibid. We have already indicated
that the Act satisfies this test. 31
Thir. rondn:::;on annlies re!l'ardless of whether the federal
legislation n;snlares laws enacted under the States' "police
nowers." T 11r Court long ago re.ie"ted tt-.e suo-gel"tion that
ConJ!r"ss invades areas reserved to the States by the Tenth
A nv'ndment simnly because it ex·'rrises its authoritv nnder
tJ.,c Commerce Clause in a manner tl1::~t displares the States'
~X 0 r"ic::e o+ t 1,eir nolire powE"rs. S?P- Hoke v. United Stafes,
227 U. S. 308, 320-323 ( 1913); Athanasaw v. United States,
31 See supra, at 16--17.
It is significant that the Comm:mwealth of Vir-·
ginia pr ~sses its Tenth Amendment challenge to the Act simply as ano· her regulator of ::;urface coal mining whose regulatory program has been
displaced or pre-empted by federal law. As indicated in text, no Tenth>
Amendment cqncernli! are imJ<licated in $.1Ch situationii..
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227 U. S. 326 (1913); Cleveland v. United States, supra, at
19; United States v. Darby, supra, at 113-114; United States
v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., supra, at 119. Cf. United States
v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 147 (1938) ("it is
no objection to the exertion of the power to regulate interstate commerce that its exercise is attended by the same incidents which attend the exercise of the police power of the
states"); 82 accord, FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315
U. S. 575, 582 (1942); Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries &
Warehouse Co., 251 U. S. 146, 156 (1919); Seven Cases v.
United States, 239 U. S. 510, 514 (1916). This Court has
upheld as constitutional any number of federal statutes enacted under the commerce power that pre-empt particular
ex"rcises of state police power. See, e. g., United States v.
Walsh, 331 U. S. 432 (1947) (upholding Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act, 21 U. S. C. §§ 301·-392); NLRB v. Jones
f· Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1 (1937) (upholding National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 151-168); United
Statrs v. Darbu, supra (upholding Fair Labor Standards Act,
29 U. S. C. §§ 2')1-219). It would therefore be a ra.dical departure from long··established precedent for this Court to
hold that the Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress from
displacing state police power laws regulating private activity.
Nothing in National League of Cities compels or even hints
at, such a departure. 88
" ~This

holdirg disposes of the contention by appellees and various

amici that the Surface Mining Act is unconstitutional because it presumrs the existence of a federal police power. As the Court has stated:
" Thr nnthority of the Federal Government over interstute commerce doe!!
not differ in extent or charucter from that retained by the l:itates overiPtrn>;tate rommrrre." United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 115
( 1941). quotiPg United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, 307 U. S. 533'
5119-570 (1939) .
H:J The rrmainit' g justification asserted by the District Court for itl!
Tellth AmandmPnt ruling, one that appellees urge here, is that the steep~l opP mining requirements will harm Virginia's economy and destroy the
•nxir~ rower QJ ~O!Jl.e tQwn~ al!.d CQU.Uties in the Commonwealth. In thif!·
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In .sum, appellees' Tenth Amendment challenge to the Sur~
face Mining Act must fail because here, in contrast to the
situation in National League of Cities, the statute at issue
regulates only "individuals and businesses necessarily subject
to the dual sovereignty of the government of the Nation and
the State in which they reside." National League of Cities
v. Usery, supra, at 845. 34 Accordingly, we turn to the· Dis~
trict Court's ruling that the Act contravenes other constitu~
tional limits on congressional action.

IV
The District Court held that two of the Act's provisions
violate the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amend~
ment. First, the court found that the steep-slope provisions
discussed above effect an uncompensated taking of private
property by requiring operators to perform the "economically
and physically impossible" task of restoring steep~slope sur~
regard, the court may have been influenced by the discussion in National
League of Cities about t-he likely impact of the challenged regulations on
the finances of State and local governments. National League of Cities
v. Usery, supra, at 846-847. But as the Court made clear, the determinative factor in that case was the nature of the federal action, not the
ultimate economic impact on the States. /d ., at 847. Moreover, even
if it is true that the Act's requirements will have a measurable impact
on Virginia's economy, this kind of effect, standing alone, is insufficient to
establish a violation of the Tenth Amendment. In Oklahoma v. Atkinson
Co., 313 U. S. 508, 534-535 (1941), the Court rejected the assNtion that
1.n adverse impact on State and local economies is a barrier to Congress'
exercise of its power under the Commerce Clause to regulate private activities affecting interstate commerce. We are not persuaded that there
are compelling reasons presented in the instant case for reversing the ·
Cotirt's position.
~4 We have assuincd, arguen(lo, that the District Court correctly held
tl1at lnnd use regulation is nn "integral governmental function" as that
term was used in National League of Cities. Our resolution of the Tenth
Amendment challenge to the Act makes it unnecessary for us to decide·
whether this is actually the case.
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face mines to their approximate original contour. 483 F.
Supp., at 437. 3 u The court further held that, even if steepslope surface mines could be restored to their approximate
original contour, the value of the mined land after such restoration would have "been diminished to practically nothing." Ibid. Second, the court found that § 522 of the Act
effects an unconstitutional taking because it expressly prohibits mining in certain locations and "clearly prevent [s 1 a
person from mining his own land or having it mined." !d.,
at 441. 86 Relying on this Court's decision in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 265 U. S. 393 (1922), the District Court
held that both of these provisions are unconstitutional because they "deprive[] [coal mine operators] of any use of
85

The District Court ncknoweldged the existence of a statutory proredure for requesting variances from the steep-slope provisions. But the
court suggested that the statutory requirement that highwalls of reclaimed mining cuts be completely covered makes this variance nroccdure
"meaningless" to steep-slope mine operators. 483 F. Supp., at 437 . This
conclusion was premature. See n. 39, infra.
80 With certain r:;pecified exceptions, and r:;ubject to "valid existi~·g
'rights," § 522 (e) prohibits surface mining operations in national parks
and forests, or where they will adversely affect publidy owned p11rks
or places that are included in the National Register of His•oric Flites.
30 U. S. C. 1272 (e) (1), (2), and (3). It alr:;o prohibits su,.fare mining
within 100 feet of a cemetery or the right-of-way of a public rond . a!id
within 300 feet of an occupied dwelling, public buildiPg, school, church,
community or institutional building, or public park. ~~ (e) (4) and ( 5) .
Sectionr:; 552 (a) , (c) and (d), which become applicable c!urirg the
permanent phase of the regulatory program, require the establishment of
procedures for designating particular lands as unsuitable fo,. some or all
surface mining. §§ 1272 (a), (c), and (d). The Distrirt Court's ruling
that ther:;e latter provisions effect an unronr:;titutional taking of pri,atc
property is puzzling and cannot stand. Since these provisions do not rome
into effect until the permanent phase of the Act's regulatory program,
they have not been applied to appellees or any other private landowner
in Virginia . In these circumstances, there was no justiciable case or rontroversy with regard to thes" sections of the Act. See United Public
Works v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 89- 91 (1947).

i.~
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[their] land, not only the most profitable. 483 F. Supp., at
441.
We conclude that the District Court's ruling on the "taking issue suffers from a fatal deficiency: neither appellees
nor the court iE.._entified any__property in which appellees have
an interest that has allegedly been taken by operation of the
Act. By proceeding in this fashion, the court below ignored
this Court's oft-repeated admonition that the constitutionality of statutes ought not be decided except in an actual
factual setting that makes such a decision necessary. See
Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U. S. 583, 588 ( 1972) ;
Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U. S. 549, 568-575
584 (1947) ; Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory,
B25 U. S. 450, 461 (1945). Adherence to this rule is particu.,
larly important in cases raising allegations of an unconstitutional taking of private property. Just last Term, we re.,
affirmed that
"this Court has generally 'been unable to develop any
"set formula" for determining when "justice and fairness" require that economic injuries caused by public
action be compensated by the government, rather than
remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.' Rather, it has examined the 'taking' question by
engaging in essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries that have
identified several fadors-such as the economic impact
of the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment backed expectations, and the character of the
government action-that have particular significance.'~
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164,175 (1979)
(citations omitted) .
These "ad hoc, factual inquiries" must be conducted with
respect to specific property, and the particular estimates of
economic impact and ultimate valuation relevant ·in the
unique circumstances.
Because appellees' taking claim arose in the context of a.

~

f
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acial challenge it presented no concrete controversy con.,
cernmg
r application of the Act to particular surface
mining operations or its effect on specific parcels of land,
Thus, the only issue properly before the District Court and,
in turn, this Court, is whether the "mere enactment" of the
Surface Mining Act constitutes a taking. See Agins v. Tib..,
uron, 447 U. S. 255, 260 (1980). · The test to be applied in
considering this facial challenge is fairly stra-ightforward. A
statute regulating the uses that can be made of property
effects a taking if it "denies an owner economically viable
use of his land ... ." Agins v. Tiburon, supra, at 260. See
Penn Central Transp. Corp. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104
(1978). The Surface Mining Act easily survives scrutiny
under this test.
First, the Act does not, on its face, prevent beneficial use /
of coal bearing lands. Ex~ept for the proscription of mining
near certain locations by § 522 (e), the Act does not categorically pr~hibit surface coal mining; it merely regulates the
conditions under which such operations may be conducted.a 7

1

37 Although § 552 (e) prohibits any surface coal mining in certain
areas, appellees' "takings" challenge to this provision is premature. First,
appellees made no showing in the District Court that they own tracts of
land that are affected by this provision. Second, § 522 (e) does not, on
its_f~ deprive owners of land within its reach of economically viable /
use o their land since it does not proscribe nonmining uses of such land.
Third, § 522 (e)'s restrictions are expressly made subject to "valid existing rights." Appellees contend that this exception "applies only to
specific surface mining operations for which all required permits were
issued prior to August 3, 1977, the effective date of the Act." Brief for
Virginia Surface Mining Reclamation Association, Inc., et al., at 48. This
interpretation of the exception is not compelled either by the statutory
language or its legislative history. See H. R. Rep. No. 95-218, supra,
n. 19, at 95. It is apparently based on 30 CFR § 761.5 (a) (2) (i), a regulation promulgated by Secretary. That regulation, however, was remanded to the Secre•ary for recon::;ideration by the United States District
. <:;ourt for . the District of Columbia. In re Permanent Surface Mining·
Regulation ,Litigation, - F . Supp. - , (DC 1980) , appeals pending,.

.r
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Moreover the Act does not purport to regulate alternative
uses to which coal bearing ands may e put.:; 8 · Thus, in the
posture in whic t e case comes e ore us. there is no reason
/
to suppose that "mere enactment" of the Surface Mining Act / ,
has deprived appellees of economically viable use of their. { '0 t'V\.
property.
Moreover, appellees cannot at this juncture legitimately
raise complaints in this Court about the manner in which
the challenged provisions of the Act have been or will be
applied in ,specific circumstances, or about their effect on
particular coal mining operations. 'There is no indication in
the record that appellees have availed themselves of the op ..
portunities provided by the Act to obtain administrative relief by requesting either a variance from the approximate
original contour requirement of § 515 (d) or a waiver from
the surface mining restrictions in § 522 (e). If appellees
were to seek administrative relief under these procedures, a
mutua.Ily acceptable solution might well be reached with re~
gard to individual properties, thereby obviating any need to
address the constitutional questions. 3
The potential for
such administrative solutions confirms the conclusion that

CJ1{
t"' S / t> IV'

. ,.

Q

Nos. 80-1810 et seq. (CADC) . The Secretary did not ask the Court
·of Appeals to review this portion of the District Court's judgm
38 !!, as the District Court found, )~vel Ia.rul in t
ep-slope areas
of Virginia is worth $5,000-$300,000 per acre, and owners presumably
retain the option of simply leveling the land without first mining the coal.
Moreover, if flat bench land is truly as valuable as the court below found,
there shouid be no financi:rl impediment to the reestablishment of fiat
areas on the sites of old mining operations, once those areas have been
restored and stabilized in the manner required by the Act.
89 The District Court's conclusion that the steep-slope variance proce;
dure in § 515 (e) does not offer a meaningful opportunity for administrative relief was premature. Appellees did not identify any instance in
which the statutory obligation to cover the high wall had prevented ·a.
mine operator from taking advantage of the variance procedure.

~ ..
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the takings issue decided by the District Court simply is not
ripe for judicial resolution. 40

v
A
The District Court next ruled that the Act contravenes the
Fifth Amendment because a number of its enforcement provisions offend the Amendment's Due Process Clause. One
such provision is § 521 (a) (2), 30 U. S. C. § 1271 (a) (2),
which instructs the Secretary immediately to order total or
partial cessation of a surface mining operation whenever he
determines, on the basis of a federal inspection, that the operation is in violation of the Act or a permit condition required by the Act and that the operation
"creates an immediate danger to the health or safety of
the public, or is causing, or can reasonably be expected to
cause significant, imminent environmental harm to land,
air, or water resources . . . ." 41
A mine operator aggrieved by an immediate cessation order
issued under § 521 (a)(2) or by a cessation order issued after

•o Although we conclude that "mere enactment" of the Act did not
eff<>ct a taking of private property, this holding does not preclude appellees or other coal mine operators from attemptiug to show that as
applied to particular parcels of land, the Act and the Secretary's regulations effect a taking. Even then, such an alleged taking is not
unconstitutional unless just compensation is unavailable. See Duke
Power Co . v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59,
94, n. 39 (1978); Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102 1
125-136 (1974); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp ., 337
U. S. 6
97, n . 18 (1949) . Thus, aggrieved coal mine operators may,
te
, attempt to obtain just compensation for property they
~:_,:.;-~--})
en taken by the Surface Mining Act by I?!!rsuing_ a claim
un.£er the Tucker _Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1491. If it is determined that a
Tucl<er Act remedy is unavailable, and we intimate no views on thi~ ·
9uestion, the coal mine operator may bring an action in district court .
for appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief.

I

J
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a notice of violation and expiration of an abatement period
under § 521 (a) (3) may immediately request temporary relief from the Secretary, and the Secretary must respond to
the request within 5 days of its receipt. § 525 (c), 30
U. S. C. § 1257 (c). Section 526 (c) of the Act, 30 U. S. C.
§ 1276 (c), authorizes judicial review of a decision by the
Secretary denying temporary relief. In addition, cessation
orders are subject to informal administrative review under
§ 521 (a)(5), and formal administrative review, including an
adjudicatory hearing, under § 525 (b), 30 U. S. C. § 1275
(b)! 2 The Secretary's decision in the formal review proceeding is subject to judicial review pursuant to § 526 (a) (2), 30
U. S. C. § 1276 (a).
The District Court held that § 521 (a)(2)'s authorization
of immediate cessation orders violates the Fifth Amendment
because the statute does not provide sufficiently objective
criteria for summary administrative action. In this regard,
the court relied on its finding that OSM inspectors had issued against a particular company three immediate cessation orders which were later overturned on appeal, and that
the company involved had suffered significant losses. The
court enjoined the Secretary from issuing any immediate cessation orders "until such time as Congress makes provisions
to correct the use of subjective criteria by OSM inspectors."
483 F. Supp., at 448! 3 In addition, the court ruled even ii
Where the Secretary determines that a violation of the Act or of a
permit condition does not entail such a serious threat, he must issue a
notice of violation fixing a reasonable time for abatement. § 521 (a) (3),
30 U. S. C. § 1271 (a) (3). If the violation is not abated within prescribed period, the Secretary must immediately order total or partial'
cessation of the offending mining operation.
42 Under § 521 (a) (5), 30 U. S. C. § 1271 (a) (5), cessation orders automatically expire after 30 days, "unless a public hearing is held at the·
site or within such reasonable proximity to the site that any viewings-·
of the site can be conducted during the course of the public hearing."
43 The District Court's Jan. 21, 1980, supplemental order and opinion,
see n. 13, supra, explained that its injunction did not apply to immediate-:
41
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'the Act is amended to correct this problem, the 5-day response period prescribed by the Act does not meet the requirements of due process. Instead, the court held that the
Secretary must respond within 24 hours to a mine operator's
·request for temporary relief from an immediate cessation
order. We find both aspects of the District Court's reasoning unpersuasive.
Our cases have indicated that due process ordinarily requires an opportunity for "some kind of hea.ring" prior to the
deprivation of a significant property interest. See Parratt
v. Taylor,- U . S . - , - (1981); Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U. S. 371, 379 (1971). The Court has often acknowledged, however, that summary administrative action may be
justified in emergency situations. See, e. g., Calera-Toledo
v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663, 677-680 (1974);
Boddie v. Connecticut, supra, at 378-379; Ewing v. Mytinger
& Casselberry, Inc., 339 U. S. 594, 599-600 (1950); Fahey v.
Mallonee, 332 U. S. 245, 253-254 (1947); Yakus v. United
States, 321 U.S. 414, 442-443 (1944); Bowles v. Willingham,
321 U. S. 503, 519-520 (1944); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283
U.S. 589, 595-599 (1931); North American Cold Storage Co.
v. Chicago, 211 U. S. 306, 315-321 (1908). The question
then, is whether the issuance of immediate cessation orders
under § 521 '(a) falls under this emergency situation excep~
tion to the normal rule that due process requires a hearing
prior to deprivation of a property right. We believe that it
does.
The immediate cessation order provisions reflect Congress'
concern about the devastating damage that may result from
mining disasters.4 ' They represent an attempt to reach an
cessation orders issued pursuant to § 521 (a) (3) against mine operators
who had failed to abate violations within the time period specified in the
notice of violation. J. S. App., at 2a-3a.
44 The legislative history of § 521 (a) (2) indicates that Congress viewed
the Secretary's power to issue immediate cessation orders as critical, and
that the m~as\lre was primarily intended to avert the possible occurrence
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?'9-1538 & 79- 1596-0PINION
fH

HODEL v. VIRGINIA SURFACE MIN. & RECL. ASSN.

accommodation between the legitimate desire of mining com~
panies to be heard before submitting to administrative regulation and the governmental interest in protecting the public health and safety and the environment from imminent
danger. Protection of the health and safety of the public
is a paramount governmental interest which justifies summary administrative action. Indeed, deprivation of property
to protect the public health and safety is "one of the oldest
examples" or permi~sible summary action. Ewing v.- Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., supra, at 599. See Mackey v.
Montrym, 443 U. S . 1, 17- 18; id., at 21, n. 1, 25 (STEWART,
J., dissenting); North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago,
IUpra, at 315-316. Moreover, the administrative action provided through immediate cessation orders responds to situations in which swift action is necessary to protect the public
health and safety. This is precisely the type of emergency
situation in which this Court has found summary administrative action justified. See Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry,
Inc., S'Upra ,· North American Cold Storage Co . v. Chicago,
supra.
Rather than taking issue with any of these principles, the
District Court held that the Act does not establish sufficiently
ob.iective criteria governing the issuance of summary cessation orders. We disagree. In our judgment, the criteria
established by the Act and the Secretary's implementing regulations are specific enough to control governmental action
and reduce the risk of erroneous depriva.tion. Section 701
(8) of the Act, 30 U. S. C. § 1291 (8) , defines the threat -or
'of such disasters as the Buffalo Creek flood. See H. R. Rep . No. 95-218,
supra , n. 19, at 129-130 ; S. Rep. No. 95-128, supra, n. 19, at 90-91.
The Buffalo Creek flood was caused by the sudden collapse of a coal mine
waste impoundment dam in 1972 near Buffalo Creek, W. Va. · The flood
left 124 persons dead and rendered 4,000 persons homeless. See H. R.
Rep. No 94-1445, 19 (1976).
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' 'imminent danger to the health and safety of the public" ali
the existence of a condition or practice which could:
"reasonably be expected to cause substantial physical
harm to persons outside the permit area before such
condition, practice, or violation can be abated. A reasonable expectation of death or serious injury before
abatement exists if a rational person, subjected to the
same conditions or practices giving rise to the peril,
would not expose himself or herself to the danger during
the time necessary for abatement." 45

If anything, these standards are more specific than the criteria in other statutes authorizing summary administrative
action that have been upheld against due process challenges.
See, e. g., Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., supra, at
595 ("dangerous to health ... or would be in a material
respect misleading to the injury or damage of the purchaser
or consumer") ; Fahey v. Mallonee, supra, at 250-251, n. 1
("is unsafe or unfit to manage a Federal savings and loan
association" or "[i]s in imminent danger of becoming impaired") ; Air East, Inc. v. National Transportation Safety
Board, 512 F. 2d 1227, 1232 (CA3), cert. denied, 423 U. S.
863 (1975) ("emergency requiring immediate action ... in
respect to air safety in commerce").
The fact that OSM inspectors have issued immediate cesThe Secretary's regulations define "a significant, imminent environmental harm " in the following terms :
" (i) An environmental harm is any adverse impact on land, air, or water
resources, including but not limited to plant and animal life.
11
(ii) An environmental harm is imminent if a condition, practice or
violation exists which (a) is causing such harm or (b) may reasonably
be expected to cause such harm at any time before the end of the rea, sonable abatement time that would be set under Section 521 (a) (3) of the
Act.
" (iii) An environmental harm ie significant if that harm is appreciable
and not immediately reparable." 30 CFR §§ 700,5 and 701.5.
4 ti
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sation orders that were later overturned on administrative
appeal does not u.ndermine the adequacy of the Act's criteria
but instead demonstrates the efficacy of the review procedures. The relevant inquiry is not whether a cessation orde!\
should have been issued in a particular case, but whether the
statutory procedure itself is incapable of affording due process. Yakus v. United States, supra, at 434-435. The possibility of administrative error inheres in any regulatory
program; statutory programs authorizing emergency admin,.
istrative action prior to a hearing are no exception. 46 As we
explained in Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., supra,
at 599:
"Discretion of any official action may be abused. Yet
it is not a requirement of due process that there be
judicial inquiry before discretion can be exercised. It
is sufficient, where only property rights are concerned,
that there is at some stage an opportunity for a hearing
and a judicial determination."
Here, mine operators are afforded a prompt and adequate
post-deprivation administrative hearings and an opportunity
for judicial review. We are satisfied that the Act's immediate cessation order provisions comport with the requirements
of due process.
We also conclude that the District Court erred in reducing
the statutorily prescribed time period for the Secretary's response to requests for temporary relief. In the first place,
the 5-day period is a statutory maximum and there is no indication in the record that the Secretary has not responded
46 A different case might be presented if a pattern of abuse and arbitrary action were discernable from review of an agency's administration
of a summary procedure. Although the District Court sought to cha.racterize the OSM's record in issuing cessation orders in these terms, a
showjng that three cessation orders were overturned on administrative
appeal is far fnom' snfl'ficient to establish a pattern of abuse and arbitrary
action.

'

'

79-1538 & 79-1596-0PINION
HODEL

v. VIRGINIA SURFACE MIN. & RECL. ASSN.

3.1

or will not respond in less than 5 days. Second, appellees
have not demonstrated that they have been adversely affected
by the 5-day response period in a particular case or that it is
generally unreasonable. In addition, no evidence was introduced to show that a shorter reply period is administratively
feasible. In these circumstances, there simply is no basis
for the District Court's decision to substitute a judicial policy
preference for the scheme adopted by Congress. Cf. V ermont Yankee Nuclear Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U. S. 519 (1978) . Accordingly, we turn
to the District Court's holding that other sections of the Act
violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.

B
The District Court ruled that the Act's civil penalty provisions do not comport with the requirements of due process.
Under these provisions, the Secretary is to notify the recipient of a notice of violation or a cessation order of the proposed amount of any civil penalty that is to be assessed
against it. § 518 (c), 30 U. S. C. § 1268 (a). Section 518
(c) further states that, if the operator "wishes to contest
either the amount of the penalty or the fact of the violation,"
it must "forward the proposed amount to the Secretary for
placement in an escrow account." 47 Once the escrow requirement is met, the operator receives a full adjudicatory
hearing, before an administrative law judge, with a right of
appeal to an administrative board and judicial review of the
final decision. See 30 U. S. C. § 1276 (a)(2). If, after administrative or judicial review, it is determined that no violation occurred or that the amount of the proposed penalty
hould be reduced, the appropriate amount must promptly
4 7 However, no penalties are finally imposed until the alleged offender·
has been provided an opportunity for a public hearing. Section 518 (b)
provides : "A civil penalty shall be assessed by the Secretary only after
the person charged with a violation ... has been given an opportunity
for a public hearing." 30 U. S. C. § 1268 (b).

,, i'-·
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be refunded to the operator with interest. 30 U. S. ·C.
§ 1268 (c) ,
In challenging the Act's civil penalty provisions appellees
did not allege that they, or any one of them have had civil
penalties assessed against them. Moreover, the District
Court did not find, as it did in ruling on the immediate cessation order provisions, that any of appellee coal mine operators have been affected or harmed by any of the statutory
procedures for the assessment and collection of fines. Thus,
the rerord in the case belies any suggestion that there is a
concrete case or controversy concerning the operation of these
provisions. In these ·circumstances, we must conclude that
appellees' challenge is premature, and that it was improper
for the court below to render decision on this claim.

a

VI
Our examination of appellees' constitutional challenges to
the Surface Mining Act persuades us that the Act is not
vulnerable to their pre-enforcement challenge. Accordi.ngly,
we affirm the judgment of the District Court upholding the
Act against appellees' Commerce Clam:e attack (No. 791596), and we reverse the judgment below insofar as it held
various provisions of the Act unconstitutional (No. 79-1538).
The cases are remanded to the District Court with instructiom: to dissolve the injunction issued against the Secretary
: and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion .
. So ordered,

,,
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
In terms of the relationship between the federal
and state governments,

the Surface Mining Act -- as the

Commonwealth of Virginia's brief emphasizes -- mandates an
extraordinarily
and

control

normally

intrusive

of

left

land

program

use

and

of

land

federal

regulation

reclamation,

to state and local governments.

15

areas

Whatever

one may think of the wisdom of this Act, I agree with the
Court

that

the

Commerce

Clause,

as

construed

by

many

decisions, confers upon Congress the power to enact this

20

legislation.
The

Act

also

has

troubling

and

farreaching

implications with respect to its effect on the owners and
lessees of the land and coal, particularly in this case in
the seven western most counties in Virginia.

I agree with

the Court, however, that it was premature to consider in
this case "taking" questions under the Just Compensation
Clause

of

the

Fifth Amendment.

Appellees

have

made

a

facial attack only, identifying no specific property that

25

2.

is alleged to have been taken.

The Court's decision is
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confined to a holding that the Act in this respect is not
facially

unconstitutional.

The

taking

issue

remains

available to, and may be litigated by, any owner or lessee
whose

inte~est

property

enforcement

of

this

is

adversely
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by

government

the
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prohibited by the plain language of the Fifth Amendment to
pay just compensation for any taking of private property
for public use.

But whether there has been such a taking

and the amount of

just compensation are questions to be

decided in specific cases.
444

U.S.

164

(1979)
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Kaiser Aetna v. United States,

Agins
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the area of Virginia

that
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Tiburon,

u.s.

affected

447

40

255 (1980) .1

by

this

Act,

as

its

location, topography and geology are highly relevant to an
understanding of the affect of this Act.
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Bituminous coal,

said to be Virginia's "most valuable natural resource", is
found

in

a

region

level land area.

of

mountainous

terrain

with

limited

The region is marked by steep mountain

slopes, sharp ridges, massive outcrops of rock, and narrow
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valleys which severely limit development of the land for
any

other

rugged

economic

terrain,

the

use.
land

Because of
in

its

thin soi 1 and

natural

state

is

this
not

suited for agricultural use nor does it grow merchantable
timber.

Its value lies, in most instances, solely in the

underlying and surface coal.

Mining this coal is a major

1 See also Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in
San Diego Light & Power Co. v.
, ___ u.s.
(1981). The taking question considered by Justice Brennan
and the three Justices who joined him was not reached by a
majority of the Court.
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industrial activity in an otherwise impoverished area of
Virginia.2

A number

of

the Act's
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appear

to

have been written with no comprehension of its potentional
affect on this rugged area.
in

§

515(d)

approximately

For example, the requirement

steep

that
to

their

slope

areas

be

restored

contours,

original

60

seems

particularly unrealistic - as the District Court's opinion
emphasizes.
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In most
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from such implementation are for the future.
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is
said,
perhaps
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now,
that
bootlegging was the secondmost remunerative activity in
that part of the state.
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has the power to enact this legislation.
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instances,

Mining the coal is a major industrial

activity in an otherwise impoverished area of Virginia. 3
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A number of the Act's provisions appear to have
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affect on this rugged area.
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is a $2 billion per year industry in the Commonwealth.
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95% of the strippable coal lands in Virginia are located
on slopes
cost

of

in

excess of

restoration

substantially

the

twenty degrees.

in

value

some
of

situations

the

coal.

App.

44a.

could
In

any

The

exceed
event,

60

restoring steep mountain slopes generally would diminish
rather than increase the land's worth.
In

sum,

if

the

Act

is

implemented

broadly

in

accordance with its terms, the consequences to individual
lessees and owners, and to the area as a whole, could be
far-reaching.

But ajudication of claims arising from such

implementation is for the future.

I agree with the Court

that we cannot say that the Act is facially invalid, and I
therefore join its opinion.
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JusTICE PowELL, concurring.
The Surface Mining Act mandates an extraordinarily intrusive program of federal regulation and control of land use
and land reclamation, activities normally left to state and
local governments. But the decisions of this Court over
many years make clear that, under the Commerce Clause,
Congress has the power to enact this legislation.
The Act could affect seriously the owners and lessees of the
land and coal in the seven westernmost counties of Virginia.
The Federal Government is required by the Fifth Amendment to pa.y just compensation for any taking of private
property for public use. 1 See San Diego Gas & Electric Co.
v. City of San Diego,- U. S. - , - - - (1981) (BREN1 We as~ume, of course, that Congress weighed thii:l probable cost against
the desirable environmental goals of the Act.
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J ., dissenting). 2 But whether there has been such a
"taking" and, if so, the amount of just compensation are
f!Uestions to be decided in specific cases. Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255, 260 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U. S. 164, 175 (1979). I agree with the Court,
therefore, that it is premature to consider in this case questions under the Compensation Clause. Ante, at - - - .
Appellees have identified no specific property that is alleged
to have been taken. The Court's decision thus is confined to
a holding that the Act in this respect is not facially unconlltitutional. I d., at - . The "taking" issue remains available to, and may be litigated by, any owner or lessee whose
property interest is adversely affected by the enforcement of
the Act. 3
I add a word about the area of Virginia that will be affected by this Act, as its location, topography and geology
are highly relevant to an understanding of the "taking" question. Bituminous coal, Virginia's most valuable natural re~ource,4 is found in a region marked by steep mountain slopes.
11harp ridges, massive outcrops of rock, and narrow valleys-conditions that severely limit alternative uses of the land.
Because of thin soil and rugged terrain, the land in its natural ..8{ate is not suited for agricultural use or the growing
of /nerchantable timber. Its value lies, in most instances,
solely in its coal. Mining the coal is a major industrial activity in an otherwise impoverished area of Virginia. 5
NAN,

The "taking" question considered by JusTICE BRENNAN and the three
who joined him was not reached by a majority of the Court.
8 In Agins, supra, at 260, we observed that the "determination that government action constitutes a taking is, in essence, a determation that the
public nt large, rather than a single owner, must bear the burden of an
t~xercise of :;tate power in the public interest."
"The Di~:~trict Court found that the mining of coal is a $2 billion per
year industry in the Commonwealth.
1 It i::; said, perhaps frivolously now, that bootlegging was the second
111ost remunerative activity in that part of the State.
t
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A numbrr of the Act1s provisions appear to have been
written with little comprehension of its potential affect on
this rugged area. For example, the requirement in § 515 (d)
that steep slope areas be restored approximately to their original contours seems particularly unrealistic. As the District
Court found, 95o/o of the strippable coal lands in Virginia
are located on slopes in excess of 20 degrees. App. 44a. The
cost of restoration in some situations could exceed substantia11y the value of the coal. In any event restoring steep
mountain slopes often would diminish rather than increase
the land's worth.
In sum, if the Act is implemented broadly in accordance
with its terms, the consequences to individual lessees and
owners, and to the area as a whole. could be far-reaching.
But adjudication of claims arising from such implementation is for the future. I agree with the Court that we cannot
say that the Act is facially invalid, and I therefore join itsopinion.

